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The reality is quite plain: the "end of the era of nationalism," so long prophesied, is not
remotely in sight. Indeed, nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political
life of our time."
I. INTRODUCTION
Remapping Europe with explosive force, national movements in the for-
mer Yugoslavia dispelled hopes that the liberal peace would replace commu-
nism in Eastern Europe and reversed decades of progress in affirming universal
principles of humanity. That nationalism assumed brutal dimensions in Europe,
the cradle of liberal universalist values, made its resurgence there astonishing
but scarcely unique. The volcanic fury of ethnic assertion has been global,
ranging from Liberia to Sri Lanka, from Chechnya to Rwanda, from Northern
Ireland to Kashmir.
Flouting international law's bedrock principle of established states' terri-
torial integrity, national movements from Slovenia to Eritrea have forced inter-
national institutions and governments to reckon with, ratify, and in some re-
spects even defend their separatist claims. But while responding in piecemeal
fashion, the international community has failed to develop a principled response
to secessionist movements. When, if ever, should international law and institu-
tions support separatist claims? When, instead, should the international commu-
nity defend a state's right to suppress internal movements bent on its dismem-
berment? More particularly, how should international law and institutions re-
spond to separatist movements that base their claims on national identity?
In the nascent years of the post-Cold War period and in light of develop-
ments in international law throughout the twentieth century, appropriate criteria
for accepting new states into the society of nations are unsettled. What is clear
is that core principles of international law governing acquisition of sovereignty
are outmoded. Shaped centuries ago by principles of Roman law that assimilate
territorial sovereignty to ownership of private property, this law has failed to
adapt to profound transformations in prevailing conceptions of sovereignty.
1. BENEDiCr ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES 3 (rev. ed. 1991).
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What is needed is a contemporary framework for determining when aspirants to
statehood-including ethno-separatist movements-have a legitimate claim.2
International law has long been ambivalent in its treatment of national
identity as a basis for statehood, and the confusion persists to the present day. If
anything, emerging trends in relevant law have enlarged the potential for con-
flicts between core norms of the international legal system. In large perspective,
international law has in recent decades embraced a cosmopolitan, liberal vision
of states, their relationships with their citizens, and their relations with each
other.3 While respect for pluralism within states is part of that vision, liberal
internationalists have largely disdained ethnic particularity as an organizing
principle of political legitimacy, emphasizing instead liberal republican virtues
of civic equality. In similar fashion, global adherence to human rights principles
in the postwar decades has affirmed a cosmopolitan faith in universal norms
that would displace the parochial values of an obsolete nationalism.
The fulcrum of international law's embrace of liberal values has been its
affimnation of democratic governance as a universal entitlement-only recently
the object of truly global endorsement, but now deeply embedded in the rhetoric
and practice of international law and diplomacy. But if the new democratic en-
titlement4 reflects the liberal internationalist vision, it may also inspire a largely
antithetical alternative: a revival of nineteenth-century nationalism. For interna-
tional law's embrace of democracy fairly raises the question, does the interna-
tionally protected right to governance by the consent of the governed include
the right to determine the boundaries of political commitment? The emerging
law relating to participatory government has thus far largely skirted this ques-
tion, but, I will argue, has more consequential implications for separatist claims
than has generally been acknowledged.
Those implications were scarcely lost on political leaders in the Age of
Enlightenment. As I argue in Part II, the idea of popular sovereignty that trans-
formed eighteenth-century political arrangements in Europe meant not only that
a people could govern itself within defined borders, but also that it could deter-
mine the territorial boundaries of its sovereignty. But these implications were to
remain largely a matter of principle, policy, and occasional practice, and only
rarely the province of law, for some two centuries following the Age of En-
lightenment.
2. Outside the legal academy, moral and political philosophers have devoted greater attention to
the relationship between justifications for government and the appropriate boundaries of political
sovereignty. See, e.g., ALLEN BUCHANAN, SECESSION: THE MORALITY OF POLITICAL DIVORCE FROM FORT
SUMTER TO LITHUANIA AND QUEBEC (1991); ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITIcs 193-209
(1989); WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICuLTURAL CIZENSIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF Mi'oRriY RIGHTS 181-
86 (1995); JEFF SPINNER, THE BOUNDARIES OF CTZENSHP 168-71 (1994); Avishai Margalit & Joseph
Raz, National Self-Determination, 87 J. PHLn. 439 (1990); Michael Walzer, The Moral Standing of States:
A Response to Four Critics, 9 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 209, 216-17 (1980); Michael Walzer, The New
Tribalism: Notes on a Dfifcult Problem, DISSENT, Spring 1992, at 164 [hereinafter Walzer, The New
Tribalism]; Frederick G. Whelan, Prologue: Democratic Theory and the Boundary Problem, in NOMOS
XXV: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 13 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1983).
3. See generally CHRIS BROWN, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: NEW NoRMATIVE
APPROACHES 23-47 (1992).
4. See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 Am. J. INT'L
L. 46, 46 (1992).
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Long formally neutral on separatist claims, international law has in this
century affirmed several distinct conceptions of the principle of self-
determination. As I argue in Part III, early validations of self-determination
claims familiar to international lawyers-the Wilsonian project at Versailles and
the postwar decolonization process-are instructive above all for their lessons in
the richly complex relationship between ethnic identity and popular sovereignty.
In particular, the interwar experience showed that, for ethnically mobilized
peoples, exercise of popular sovereignty has scant meaning apart from national
identity. But however richly textured, these applications of the principle of self-
determination were confined to special cases. When statecraft affirmed the
principle of self-determination, states limited its applied sphere, precluding
sweeping claims of entitlement by separatist groups.
But with the dawning of a democratic entitlement in the closing years of
this century, the legal ramparts are bursting. This emerging law, which has
gone a long way toward transforming eighteenth-century ideals into legal enti-
tlements, has more far-reaching implications for ethno-separatist claims than
has heretofore been recognized. In Part IV, I challenge the widely held view
that questions of boundary stand wholly outside democratic theory. Instead, I
argue, the norm of democracy significantly contributes to creating the problem
of political unit in contemporary international law and practice. While the basic
democratic proposition-that a people should govern itself-does not resolve the
prior question of the territorial boundaries of self-government, this conclusion
does not, as is commonly asserted, exhaust the relationship between democratic
theory and the problem of defining political units. On the contrary, justifications
for democratic government may have significant implications for resolving
ethno-separatist claims.
Even so, the right of self-government does not justify a general rule sup-
porting separatist claims, or even a presumption in their favor. Concerns relat-
ing to democratic governance may in fact point in the opposite direction. But if
democratic theory does not compel a uniform response to separatist claims, it is
a mistake to conclude that considerations relating to democratic governance are
irrelevant to their resolution.
The very complexity of these issues presents singular challenges to inter-
national actors called upon to mediate disputed separatist claims. This much has
become plain in the wake of the violent implosion of the former Yugoslavia.
Drawing on the lessons of that experience, I argue in Part V that international
institutions must be prepared to undertake the demanding role of providing an
authoritative resolution of contested separatist claims. The task today is to
fashion a coherent response to the challenge of ethno-separatism that promotes
peaceful resolution of conflicting demands within a framework of liberal demo-
cratic values.
II. THE NATION-STATE IN HISTORY
Two claims dominate arguments in support of separatist claims based on
national identity. One rests upon proponents' belief that states whose citizens
[Vol. 23: 1
International Responses to Ethno-Separatist Claims
comprise a national group are relatively stable. This claim tends to support an
"objective" principle of self-determination, which holds that, to the extent pos-
sible, the borders of states should correspond with the boundaries of national
communities. The second claim asserts the right of groups to control their
common destiny by determining the political community to which they owe
paramount allegiance. This claim is sometimes associated with a "subjective"
principle of self-determination, which emphasizes groups' right to determine
their political community through the exercise of collective will-notably
through plebiscite.5
As a foundation for critiquing international legal and institutional re-
sponses to ethno-separatist movements, it is useful first to consider whether
historical experience has validated these two core claims. What role has na-
tional identity played in the emergence, stability, and survival of states? In par-
ticular, does historical experience support the claim that states with a compara-
tively homogeneous polity are more stable than those comprising a highly di-
verse citizenry? And finally, to what extent have states and international legal
institutions affirmed separatist claims based upon principles of national self-
determination?
As I argue in this Part, the historical record of state-making provides am-
biguous support for the claim that statehood naturally follows nationhood. In
Western Europe, national identity was as much a byproduct as a basis of state-
making in the early modem period. As my analysis in Part II makes clear, in-
ternational legal principles concerning recognition of states derive above all
from this historical experience. But since the nineteenth century, national iden-
tity has notably been an engine as well as incident of state-making.
Ironically, although this trend drew inspiration from the ideals of popular
sovereignty associated with the Age of Revolution, many states that emerged as
the result of self-determination movements developed comparatively weak
democratic cultures and have been prone to ethnic conflict. Particularly vulner-
able in this respect have been states that have experienced rapid transitions to
democratic government. Manifestly regrettable, this byproduct of rapid democ-
ratization is also paradoxical. For as I argue below, the civic culture of liberal
democracy is the most effective inoculation against intolerant nationalism.
A. Nations and Nationalism
The issues I address in this Part beg a basic definitional question: What
are nations? Answers have proved notoriously elusive. Evoking the peculiar dif-
ficulty of defining a nation more than a century ago, Walter Bagehot's words
still ring true: "'[W]e know what it is when you do not ask us,' but we cannot
5. See generally Nathaniel Berman, "But the Alternative Is Despair:" European Nationalism
and the Modernist Renewal ofInternational Law, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1792, 1812-16 (1993) (noting that
phrase "principle of nationalities" is often associated with objective conception of national self-
determination, while term "plebiscite principle" is associated with subjective approach). These distinctions
should not be overdrawn; an objective principle might be endorsed because its proponents believe the
resulting states would most nearly reflect the will of their citizens. In effect, an objective approach might
be invoked as a proxy for implementing the subjective principle of self-determination.
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very quickly explain or define it."6 Though ensuing generations of scholars
have produced a vast literature on nationalism across several disciplines,7 the
definitional quandary remains equally vexing today."
Although problematic, Joseph Stalin's definition provides an instructive
point of departure: "A nation is a historically evolved, stable community of
language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a
community of culture."' The chief problem with this definition is that it as-
sumes what is often an article of faith on the part of national groups: that the es-
sence of a nation can be captured in objective terms, in which the factual data of
history loom large. Yet as chroniclers of nationalism have so often reminded
us, attempts to define nations solely in objective terms inevitably fall short.
Central to any adequate definition of a nation is a shared sense of communal
solidarity-a sentimental identification with the group."0
But if subjective will is essential to any definition of nations, it is scarcely
possible to define nations solely in subjective terms. An exclusive emphasis on
subjectivity would, as E.J. Hobsbawm cautions, "lead the incautious into ex-
tremes of voluntarism which suggests that ... if enough inhabitants of the Isle
of Wight wanted to be a Wightian nation, there would be one."" National con-
sciousness may be a modem artifact,"2 but nationalists cannot invent their histo-
ries out of whole cloth. 3
6. WALTER BAGEHOT, PHYSICS AND POLITICS 23 (Alfred A. Knopf 1948) (1869).
7. The literature is truly vast. The bibliography to ANTHONY D. SMITH, THE ETHNIC ORIGINS
OF NATIONS (1986) is 25 pages long, and it omits much of the relevant legal literature.
8. Thus, Smith asserts, "In many ways it is easier to 'grasp' nationalism, the ideological
movement, than nations, the organizational cultures. Even ethnic communities, so easily recognizable from
a distance, seem to dissolve before our eyes the closer we come and the more we attempt to pin them
down." Id. at 2. In an important work on the subject, Ernest Gellner easily defines nationalism in the first
sentence of the first chapter, but postpones even attempting to define nations until the fifth chapter. See
ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 1, 53-62 (1983). On the difficulty of defining nations, see
also WALKER CONNOR, ETHNONATIONALISM: THE QUEST FOR UNDERSTANDING 89-113 (1994), which
aptly entitles the chapter on the meaning of "nation" and related terms "Terminological Chaos"; E.J.
HOBSBAWM, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780: PROGRAMME, MYTH, REAIrY 1-13 (1990); HUGH
SETON-WATSON, NATIONS AND STATES: AN ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINS OF NATIONS AND THE POLITICS OF
NATIONALISM 5 (1977); and YAEL TAMIR, LIBERAL NATIONALISM 58-69 (1993).
9. JOSEPH STALIN, MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL AND COLONIAL QUESTION 8 (I. Tovstukha
trans., International Publishers, n.d.). For Stalin, it was essential that all of these constituent criteria be
satisfied for a group to be a nation. See id.
10. For Max Weber, the term "nation" evoked the idea that "it is proper to expect from certain
groups a specific sentiment of solidarity in the face of other groups." MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND
SOCITY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRMTVE SOCIOLOGY 922 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978).
11. HOBSBAWM, supra note 8, at 8.
12. A notable expression of this view is Ernest Gelner's claim that "[n]ationalism is not the
awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist . . . ." ERNEST
GELLNER, THOUGHT AND CHANGE 168 (1964).
13. As one writer has argued, "Nationalist intellectuals may well invent a tradition, but they
cannot invent just any tradition-it must fit within some recognizable continuum of distinctive local
features." Tony Judt, The New Old Nationalism, N.Y. REv., May 26, 1994, at 44, 46. In the Greco-
Bulgarian "Communities" case, the Permanent Court of International Justice applied a combination of
objective and subjective factors in defining the term "communities," which was used in the Convention
Respecting Reciprocal Emigration, Nov. 27, 1919, Greece-Bug., 1 L.N.T.S. 67, 69-70, in a sense that
was virtually synonymous with ethnic nations:
By tradition, which plays so important a part in Eastern countries, the "community" is a
group of persons living in a given country or locality, having a race, religion, language and
[Vol. 23: 1
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What features, then, are peculiar to national identity? Are Serbs a nation
because of the importance they attach to their Slavic ethnicity? Or is it princi-
pally their Eastern Orthodox Christianity that constitutes them as a nation and
distinguishes them from ethnically similar Croats and Slavic Muslims?
In this Article, I use the term "nation" to connote groups that share a
sense of group solidarity based on language, lineage, ethnicity, culture, and/or
religion 4 and a sense of political community rooted in their group identity.
While such a common political identity does not necessarily entail a sense of
entitlement to independent statehood, it is of course a necessary basis for the
separatist claims that are the subject of this Article.' 5
As the foregoing discussion suggests, the term "nation" covers a diverse
range of groups, and the defining quality or qualities of a nation may vary sig-
nificantly from one nation to the next and even for the same nation across time
and place. Indeed, their very diversity has contributed to the difficulty of estab-
lishing a widely accepted definition of nations.
An important dimension of that diversity is captured by the distinction
between civic and ethnic models of nations. 6 Central to the civic model is the
concept of a political community defined in significant part by a common legal
code and political institutions and a particular bounded territorial space within
which people obey the same political and legal authorities. The paradigmatic
civic model of nationalism also presupposes some measure of common cul-
ture." Still, in the civic model, citizenship is the core determinant of national-
ity, regardless of citizens' ethnic lineage." In contrast, in the ethnic model, a
nation is above all a community defined by common descent or, more accu-
rately, by a myth of common descent.19 Also characteristic of the ethnic para-
digm is the central importance of common culture, often manifested in a ver-
nacular language and shared customs.20 The two models are ideal types, and
elements of both can be found in most nationalisms.2' Still, the distinction be-
traditions of their own and united by this identity of race, religion, language and traditions
in a sentiment of solidarity.
Advisory Opinion No. 17, Interpretation of the Convention Between Greece and Bulgaria Respecting
Reciprocal Emigration (Question of the "Communities"), 1930 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 17, at 21 (July 31).
14. See PETER ALTER, NATIONALISM 7 (2d ed. 1994); Charles A. Kupchan, Introduction to
NATIONALISM AND NATIONALITmES IN THE NEw EUROPE 1, 2 (Charles A. Kupchan ed., 1995); see also
HANS KOHN, THE IDEA OF NATIONALISM 13-14 (1944) ("A nationality generally has several of [certain
objective] attributes; very few have all of them. The most usual of them are common descent, language,
territory, political entity, customs and traditions, and religion. . . . N]one of them is essential to the
existence or definition of nationality.").
15. Some writers do, however, define nations in terms that include a claim of entitlement to an
independent state. See, e.g., JOHN BREuiLLY, NATIONALISM AND THE STATE 2-3 (2d ed. 1993).
16. The civic model is sometimes identified as a predominantly Western model of nations, while
the ethic model is associated with predominantly non-Western trajectories for nation formation. See, e.g.,
ANrHONY D. SMrrH, NATIONAL IDENTHY 9-13 (1991). For criticism of the view that ethnic nationalism is
predominantly non-Western, see BOGDAN DEN1TCH, ETHNIC NATIONALISM: THE TRAGIC DEATH OF
YuGostAviA 186-88 (1994).
17. See SMITH, supra note 16, at 9-15.
18. See HOBSBAWM, supra note 8, at 18-20; Kupchan, supra note 14, at 4.
19. See SMrrH, supra note 16, at 11-12.
20. See id. at 12.
21. See id. at 13. In Smith's view, the interaction of the two models has produced a common
core of "beliefs about what constitutes a nation." Id. These include
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tween ethnic and civic nations is useful in addressing the question to which I
will turn shortly: What role has national identity played in the emergence and
success of states?
As suggested earlier, the ultimate focus of this inquiry will be on ethno-
national movements-that is, national movements in which the ethnic model
predominates-that assert a claim to statehood on the basis of their national
identity. Put differently, this claim aspires to the ideal of a nation-state-"a pol-
ity whose territorial and juridical frontiers coincide with the etlmic boundaries
of the national entity with which that state is identified."'
This is, of course, a form of nationalism-a term that has spawned per-
haps as many definitions as the term "nation." In this Article, I use the term
"nationalism" to signify the principle that nations are a proper unit-or, in the
doctrine's extreme version, the proper unit-of political organization I and also
to refer to social movements that are committed to this principle4 or that act in
accordance with it, whether or not pursuant to a well-formulated ideology. This
range of meanings is intended to include national movements seeking a political
status, such as local autonomy within an established state or independent state-
hood, regardless of whether the claimants believe that other nations deserve a
similar status.
B. Nations, Nationalism, and the State
The legitimating principle of politics and state-making today is nationalism; no other princi-
ple commands mankind's allegiance. 26
the idea that nations are territorially bounded units of population and that they must have
their own homelands; that their members share a common mass culture and common
historical myths and memories; that members have reciprocal legal rights and duties under a
common legal system; and that nations possess a common division of labour and system of
production with mobility across the territory for members.
Id. at 13-14.
Although the distinction between civic and ethnic nations is particularly important to my analysis,
other distinctions are useful in explaining the historic evolution of national movements. See, e.g., John A.
Hall, Nationalisms: Classified and Explained, DAEDALUS, Summer 1993, at 1, 5-9 (emphasizing, inter
alia, distinction between nationalisms that historically were produced by "revolutions from above" and
those that "come from below").
22. Uri Ra'anan, The Nation-State Fallacy, in CONFLICT AND PEACEMAKING IN MULTIETHNIC
SociErEs 5, 5 (Joseph V. Montville ed., 1991). Like "nation," the phrase "nation-state" has several
common meanings. It frequently is used in a sense that renders it a virtual redundancy, referring essentially
to modern states. See, e.g., Introduction to INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS at xxii (Louis
Henkin et al. eds., 3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW].
23. See EIE KEDOURIE, NATIONALISM at xv (4th ed. 1993) ("[N]ationalism... saw humanity
naturally divided into nations which were, which had to be, the proper unit of political organization."); see
also GELLNER, supra note 8, at 1 ("Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the
political and the national unit should be congruent."); Hall, supra note 21, at 3 (defining nationalism as
idea "that people should share a culture and be ruled only by someone co-cultural with themselves").
24. See BREIuJLY, supra note 15, at 2 (using term "nationalism" "to refer to political
movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such actions with nationalism arguments").
25. This category would include rebel Serbs in the recent conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Croatia and their ultranationalist supporters in Serbia. While fighting to establish a Greater Serbia, these
Serbs did not recognize that Croats and Bosnian Muslims were entitled to symmetrical rights of self-
determination.
26. SMrIH, supra note 7, at 129.
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By one reckoning, in over ninety percent of contemporary countries, the
state is either considerably larger or smaller than the area inhabited by the cor-
responding nation.27 Even so, the nation-state remains a powerful paradigm for
twentieth-century statehood-one quite literally capable of exploding estab-
lished boundaries.
Does history support this paradigm? That is, does the history of state-
making provide cause to believe that nations are a natural-perhaps the ideal-
unit for successful states?29
In Western Europe, the crucible of modem states, enduring nations tended
to emerge as a function of-rather than a prelude to-state-making. Further, the
early history of state-making in Europe underscores the contingency of contem-
porary states and of the nations with which they are identified.
1. The Nation-State in History: Western Europe
A State may in course of time produce a nationality; but that a nationality should constitute
a State is contrary to the nature of modern civilisation.
Against the broad sweep of history, states are a peculiarly modem phe-
nomenon. Although states have antecedents as ancient as civilization, the mod-
em state arose out of the disintegration of the medieval Holy Roman Empire.
By general acknowledgment, the Peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty
Years' War in 1648, inaugurated the modem European state system, including
the legal system governing relations between sovereign territorial states.31
The medieval period itself saw the gradual unification by Saxon and
Frankish kings of territories they controlled, laying the foundation for the later
emergence of England and France.32 Similar processes of administrative cen-
tralization unfolded in Spanish, Swedish, and Polish territories and, later, in
Russia, Hungary, and Holland.33 But if the Middle Ages saw the beginning of
27. See Ra'anan, supra note 22, at 7. This observation-in which the writer is apparently using
"nation" in a predominantly ethnic sense-is true even with respect to some states that generally are
considered nation-states. For example, only 52% of those who inhabited Latvia at the time it regained its
independence in 1991 were ethnic Latvians. See HELSINKI WATCH, NEW CITIZENSHIP LAWS IN THE
REPU]LICS OFTHE FORMER USSR 1 n.1 (1992).
28. See Wolfgang J. Mommsen, The Varieties of the Nation State in Modem History: Liberal,
Imperialism, Fascist and Contemporary Notions of Nation and Nationality, in THE RISE AND DECLNE OF
THE NATION STATE 210. 226 (Michael Mann ed., 1990) (concluding that "the age of the nation state is far
from over; rather we observe a revival of the national state").
29. I will largely omit from consideration in this Section states that were deliberately created or
reconfigured at the conclusion of World War I pursuant to the "principle of nationalities." The discussion
in this Section is in large measure a predicate for consideration of that principle and its legitimation in
international law and state practice, which reached its apogee in the interwar period. For discussion of the
latter, see itfra Section 1LI.D.
30. LORD ACrON, NATIONALIrY (1862), reprinted in DYNAMiCs OF NATIONALISM 5, 6 (Van
Nostrand ed., 1964).
31. See INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 22, at xxii; Richard Falk, The Interplay of Westphalia
and Charter Conceptions of International Legal Order, in 1 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDER 32, 43 (R. Falk & C. Black eds., 1969); Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 AM.
J. INT'L L. 20, 20 (1948).
32. See SMrrH, supra note 7, at 130.
33. See id.
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state-building processes, a more typical pattern of that period-perpetual
changes in Europe's political divisions-underscores the historical contingency
of states.
By equal measure, the processes that accompanied state-building under-
score the historical contingency of Western European nations (however primor-
dial they may seem to their members). Far from being the descendants of an-
cient nations through an unbroken lineage, modem Western European nations
were forged, with no small measure of compulsion, out of disparate peoples.
Alfred Cobban described the process as "sometimes a ruthless one, as is seen in
the conquest of southern France by the feudal barons of the North. Groups of
related or unrelated peoples were welded into political unity during the medie-
val period by the force of feudal overlords, supported by their baronage."34
The early history of modem states thus reflects a paradigm in which state-
and nation-making go hand in hand, rather than one in which preexisting na-
tions constitute the natural units for new states.3" Still, such factors as the de-
gree of cultural affinity among peoples in a region and the existence of natural
geographic boundaries were surely relevant in determining whether an area
would emerge and endure as a state.36
In Renaissance Europe a spectrum of models for political organization-
including city republics, principalities, and empires-still presented alternatives
to the state." What, then, accounts for the state's eventual emergence as the pre-
eminent unit of political organization? And what role has national identity
played in the process of state-making? On these questions there are as many
views as there are experts, and it is scarcely possible to resolve here the debates
among them. Still, there is broad consensus on several points pertinent to this
Article.
First, while scholars have offered varying accounts of factors that proved
decisive in the emergence and consolidation of states-and in the eventual tri-
umph of the state over competing forms of political organization-influential
theorists typically link these developments to broader aspects of modernization.
These scholars explain the consolidation of nascent states during and after the
Middle Ages as a byproduct of social, military, economic, and/or administra-
tive revolutions that surfaced first in Western Europe.38 Second, influential
34. ALFRED COBBAN, THE NATION STATE AND NATIONAL SELF DETERMINATION 26 (rev. ed.
1969). During this period, lesser dynasties were "creating" smaller national groups out of disparate
peoples. See, e.g., J.B. TREND, A PICTURE OF MODERN SPAIN: MEN & MUSIC 90, 95 (1921) (describing
Catalan nation as "above all an historical product .... On to the old Iberian stem have been grafted stocks
that were Greek, Roman, Goth, Arab and Gaul. . . .There is no Catalan race, in the anthropological
sense.. ").
35. Further, to the extent that self-determination based on national identity is justified as a
corrective to historical processes of conquest and subjugation, see, e.g., LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION:
THE LEGmiMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 3 (1978), Western European history reminds us that this claim
is based on assumptions that may benefit from considerable refinement.
36. See COBBAN, supra note 34, at 28.
37. See SMrrH, supra note 7, at 130; Charles Tilly, Reflections on the History of European State-
making, in THE FORMATION OF NATIONAL STATES IN WESTERN EUROPE 3, 26-27 (Charles Tilly ed.,
1975).
38. See generally, e.g., GIANFRANCO POGGI, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN STATE: A
SOCIOLOGICAL INTRODUCrON (1978); SMrm, supra note 7, at 130-34; CHARLES TILLY, COERCION,
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theories about the relationship between modernization and the emergence of
states typically share the core claim that the forging of a common culture, mani-
fested especially (though not necessarily) in a national language, was crucial to
the long-term success of state-making processes.
Ernest Gellner, for example, attributes the development of national iden-
tity above all to the imperatives of industrialization. For Gellner, industrial so-
ciety required social organization on the political scale of the state and a literate
and linguistically unified culture within the state. An essential attribute of in-
dustrial society is that a government's legitimacy depends above all on eco-
nomic growth. That, in turn, requires a capacity for innovation-in particular,
for ready reallocation of labor. This level of labor mobility can be assured,
Geliner argues, only if there is a common medium for communication-one that
is shared across the breadth of the political community (the state). Education in
a common language is essential to this aim. To the extent that a common lan-
guage is a core attribute of common culture, state-making-a modem concomi-
tant of the industrial age-engenders some measure of common culture. The
important point is that in Gellner's view, nations are products of state-making. 9
"It is not the case," Gellner concludes, "that nationalism imposes homogeneity;
it is rather that a homogeneity imposed by objective, inescapable imperative
eventually appears on the surface in the form of nationalism. '0
Immanuel Wallerstein similarly emphasizes economic factors in his ac-
count of state- and nation-making. With others, he argues that the rise in the
late fifteenth century of core states that controlled major economic exchanges
within their territories and with others fostered an unprecedented level of eco-
nomic integration within states, a process that continued over ensuing centuries.
In time, state-regulated capitalism accelerated interstate rivalries while height-
ening interdependence among diverse regions within states.4
Still others have emphasized the role of conflict between states in foster-
ing national consciousness and in stimulating the development of professional
militaries that depend upon the expertise of modem bureaucratic states.42 Mi-
chael Mann, for example, has argued that from the thirteenth century onward
warfare increasingly favored the type of specialized, complex, and integrated
command structures that only centralized territorial states could produce and
sustain.43
Many influential accounts emphasize the central importance of the birth of
administrative vernaculars, a concomitant of the rise of the bureaucratic state
from the late fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries, in forging a national identity
among disparate peoples.' 4 For Benedict Anderson the combined impact of
CAPrrAL ANm EUROPEAN STATES, A.D. 990-1990 (1990); 1 IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE MODERN
WORLD-SYSrEm (1974); 2 id. (1980); 3 id. (1989); Michael Mann, The Autonomous Power of the State:
Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results, 25 EutR. J. Soc. 185 (1984); Tily, supra note 37.
39. This analysis is elaborated in chapter five of GELLNER, supra note 8, at 53-62.
40. Id. at 39 (citation omitted).
41. See 1 WALLERsTE, supra note 38.
42. See SMrrH, supra note 7, at 132.
43. See Mann, supra note 38, at 208.
44. See, e.g., SMrrH, supra note 7, at 133. Although many writers agree on the importance of a
common language to state-building, there is a range of views on the nature of the causal relationship. For
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print technology and capitalism, which enabled print media to be reproduced
and disseminated on a massive scale, was critical to the construction of national
consciousness.45 By creating "unified fields of exchange and communication,"
46
the new print languages of the administrative state enabled citizens to imagine
and identify with other readers-fellow citizens-and thereby constitute a politi-
cal community in a society as vast as the modem state.47
But if national identity was more a result than an engine of state-making
in Western Europe before the nineteenth century, it would be wrong to con-
clude that cultural homogeneity was irrelevant to the success of nascent states in
this period. States' capacity to create a community of political allegiance was
crucial to their success as states, and their ability to generate a common culture
played a central part in this endeavor.4" And so, by the late eighteenth century,
states undertook proactive efforts to foster a "committed and politically con-
scious citizenry" through a "standardized and patriotic culture."'"
It was during this period that nationalism "as we understand it"5" today
emerged as a political idea-or, more accurately, as a series of political move-
ments in a number of European countries and in the Americas. In revolutionary
France and in the United States nationalism worked a radical transformation in
prevailing conceptions of sovereignty. The French revolutionaries seized state
sovereignty from the monarchy and delivered it to "the people." In the litera-
ture of the time, the nation "was the body of citizens whose collective sover-
eignty constituted them a state which was their political expression. For, what-
ever else a nation was, the element of citizenship and mass participation or
choice was never absent from it."
51
The nationalism of revolutionary France accepted the state form that it
had inherited from the absolute monarchs, but replaced the organizing principle
of governance within the state. 2 Yet the democratic principle of national self-
Alfred Cobban, "the development of political unity naturally stimulated the growth of a common language
and culture, and the assimilation of alien cultural elements." COBBAN, supra note 34, at 27.
45. See ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 37.
46. Id. at 44.
47. In Anderson's words: "These fellow-readers, to whom [individuals] were connected through
print, formed, in their secular, particular, visible invisibility, the embryo of the nationally imagined
community." Id. Anderson also reminds us of the historical arbitrariness of the boundaries of modem
states: "The potential stretch of these communities was inherently limited, and, at the same time, bore none
but the most fortuitous relationship to existing political boundaries (which were, on the whole, the
highwater marks of dynastic expansionisms)." Id. at 46.
48. See MORTON A. KAPLAN & NICHOLAS DEB. KA7ENBACH, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 34 (1961) ("The growth of solidary sentiments of loyalty toward the nation gave
the nation-state a strength and coherence that other forms of political organization lacked."); SMIrrl, supra
note 7, at 136. Still, one should not overdraw the degree of cultural homogeneity actually achieved in such
early Western European states as England, France, and Spain. Each of these has significant ethnic
minorities, yet each is considered a nation-state by virtue of a core national group whose "cultural-political
domination ... has been so great that it has largely dictated the forms and content of the social institutions
and political life of the whole population within the borders of the territorial state." Id. at 139.
49. SMrrH, supra note 7, at 133-34.
50. KOHN, supra note 14, at 3.
51. HOBSBAWm, supra note 8, at 18-19.
52. Hans Kohn argued that this form of nationalism was "unthinkable before the emergence of
the modern state," which the French nationalists accepted while changing "by animating it with a new
feeling of life and with a new religious fervor." KoHN, supra note 14, at 4.
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determination that emerged in the Age of Revolution meant not only that the
nation could choose its government within an established state, but also that it
could choose the state to which it would belong. Cobban writes:
The revolutionary theory that a people had the right to form its own constitution and choose
its own government for itself easily passed into the claim that it had a right to decide
whether to attach itself to one state or another, or constitute an independent state by itself.
The effect of revolutionary ideology was to transfer the initiative in state-making from the
government to the people.53
Importantly, then, although the democratic ideals of the French Revolution
were not yet recognized as principles of international law, they were seen as
having profound implications for peoples' right to determine the boundaries of
their political communities.
The latter half of the eighteenth century also saw the emergence of a pre-
dominantly cultural nationalism in European political thought, which found
fuller expression in the nineteenth-century theories of Italy's Giuseppe Mazzini
and the German writers Johann Gottfried von Herder and Johann Gottlieb
Fichte.' Where French, American, and British nationalism was essentially po-
litical, the nationalism that took shape in Germany and Italy had a more cultural
orientation, celebrating the Volksgeist as manifested particularly in literature
and folklore. 5
While the two manifestations of nationalism emerged as parallel develop-
ments,56 they became entwined (but nonetheless also continued to develop as
distinct strands of political thought).57 New theories of national self-
determination held that each cultural nation had the right to constitute an inde-
pendent state.58 For liberal nationalists, this view incorporated both the political
principles of Enlightenment philosophy and the celebration of national culture
of the Romantic movement. 59 Their vision was altruistic; they believed that a
world of nation-states would secure both personal freedom within sovereign
states and peace and prosperity internationally.'o
53. COBBAN, supra note 34, at 41. As noted below, in the early period of the Revolution,
France indeed respected this principle by conducting plebiscites before annexing territories. See infra text
accompanying note 131.
54. See KOHN, supra note 14, at 14; Mommsen, supra note 28, at 211.
55. See KOHN, supra note 14, at 4.
56. See COBNAI, supra note 34, at 34.
57. On the different faces of nineteenth-century nationalism, see ALTER, supra note 14, at 16-
65; CARLTON J.H. HAYES, THE HISToRICAL EVOLUTION OF MODERN NATIONALSM (1931); HANS KOHN,
THE AGE OF NATIONALISM 12-28 (1962); and Mommsen, supra note 28, at 210-22.
58. See CoBBAN, supra note 34, at 39. As Cobban notes, culturally united states had existed for
some centuries before the French Revolution. But where the nation-state had previously been a historical
fact, it now became a theory. See id. at 35. But see Mommsen, supra note 28, at 210 ("Long before the
French Revolution the idea was born that at least ideally state and nation ought to be identical with one
another.").
59. See HAYES, supra note 57, at 160.
60. Despite variations among liberal internationalists,
they all assumed that each nationality should be a political unit under an independent
constitutional government which would put an end to despotism, aristocracy, and
ecclesiastical influence, and assure to every citizen the broadest practicable exercise of
personal liberty, political, economic, religious, and educational. They all assumed,
moreover, that each liberal national state in serving its true interests and those of its own
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With these developments in political thought, national identity became an
engine as well as a product of state-making. Where nation-states "had formerly
been built up, in the course of centuries, from above, by the influence of gov-
ernment[,] henceforth they were to be made much more rapidly from below by
the will of the people." 6 The "principle of nationality" proved a potent political
force, inspiring revolts against the Napoleonic and Habsburg empires and
changing the map of Europe from 1830 to 1878. Its notable achievements in-
cluded the unification of Germany in 1871 and of Italy in 1870; elsewhere, its
effects were disintegrative, as in the division of Austria-Hungary into the Dual
Monarchy following the Compromise of 1867 and the gradual dismemberment
of the Ottoman Empire.62
Where Western Europe tended to follow the state-to-nation trajectory de-
scribed above, genealogical myths of descent loomed more prominently in na-
tional movements in Central and Eastern Europe. 63 In some cases, notably that
of German nationalism, elements of both ethnic and territorial models of the
nation combined in a potent alchemy.'
Throughout this period, various strands of nationalist thought managed to
reconcile their core principles with the colonial expansionism of the time. Early
on, nationalists justified colonial expansions as a means of revitalizing national
culture, infusing it with new impetus while extending its benefits to non-
European peoples.6 As the liberal, emancipatory element of nationalism associ-
ated with the early nineteenth century gradually yielded to more chauvinistic
strands of nationalism, 66 the 1880s saw an unprecedented fusion of nationalism
and imperialism.67 In the age of high imperialism (roughly 1880 to 191868), it
became commonplace for Europeans to believe that no nation-state could afford
to be without a colonial empire if it were to compete successfully in global
power politics.
69
2. The Global Spread of States and Nationalism
If nations and nationalism were products of discrete historical phenomena
originating in Western Europe, once created they became "'modular,' capable
of being transplanted ... to a great variety of social terrains, to merge and be
merged with a correspondingly wide variety of political and ideological con-
citizens would be serving the true interests of humanity at large and that "true interests"
could best be served by national policies of free-trade, anti-militarism, anti-imperialism, and
international cooperation and peace.
Id. at 159.
61. COBBAN, supra note 34, at 41.
62. See HOBSBAWM, supra note 8, at 23, 42-43.
63. See KOHN, supra note 14, ch. 7; SMrrH, supra note 7, at 136-38, 140-44.
64. See SMITH, supra note 7, at 141.
65. See Mommsen, supra note 28, at 218-19. Some eighteenth-century liberal nationalists, such
as Jeremy Bentham, saw colonial rule as antithetical to the basic principles of the nationalism they
espoused. See HAYEs, supra note 57, at 129-30.
66. See Mommsen, supra note 28, at 215.
67. See id. at 217.
68. See id. at 212.
69. See id. at 217-18.
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stellations." 70 Much the same could be said of Western-style states, which be-
came the model that other polities, including the Chinese and Mughal Empires,
had to emulate if they hoped to survive and retain their territories.7 '
Both the success and the early appearance of Western nation-states made
them a natural model for other regions. Colonial expansions had the ironic ef-
fect of universalizing the model-ironic, of course, because colonialism itself
placed subjugated peoples under a political arrangement that could not readily
be reconciled with the paradigm of civic nations comprising citizens of an inde-
pendent territorial state. But as colonial powers withdrew, their former subjects
were left, it seemed, with no choice but to organize themselves as territorial
states72-and in many cases with the daunting prospect of forging nations.
The postcolonial experience of African states in particular is often cited as
empirical support for the ideal of nation-states. In this view, the enduring
weakness of some African states is due in large measure to the arbitrariness of
the postcolonial states' borders. In the standard account, many of these states
are beset by "tribalism" because their borders were superimposed by colonial
powers without regard for tribal communities, implicitly if not explicitly the
natural unit of political solidarity in traditional Africa.73 And so, in this view,
when colonial powers withdrew, they left in their wake unnatural units com-
prising disparate tribes brought together in doomed statehood by the fortuitous
circumstances of colonial advances.74
And yet Western European nation-states were also products of historical
processes, including brutal conquests, that welded disparate peoples into civic
nations.75 There is, however, a crucial difference: Postcolonial African states
had to accomplish the same result-the forging of national identity-in a re-
70. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 4.
71. See SMITH, supra note 7, at 132.
72. See BAsiLDAVIDSON, THE BLACKMAN'S BURDEN: AFRICA AND THE CURSE OF THE NATION-
STATE 172 (1992) (criticizing British government for its "remarkable complacency in shepherding the
British colonies ... into an accumulation of newly invented and entirely separate nation-states" rather than
allowing them to establish pan-African federal arrangement favored by many African nationalists in mid-
twentieth century); cf. HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY ANm SELF-DETERMrNATioN: THE
ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICITNG RIGHTS 25 (1990) (noting view that nation-state is one of Europe's
most enduring legacies to Asia, Africa, and rest of world).
73. See, e.g., Rupert Emerson, Nation-Building in Africa, in NATnON-BUILDING 95 (Karl W.
Deutsch & William Foltz eds., 1963); see also Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6, 50-53
(Feb. 3) (separate opinion of Judge Ajibola) (attributing recurring upheavals in Africa to its arbitrary
partition in 1885).
74. See MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 160 (6th ed.
1987) ("Colonial boundaries, particularly in Africa, are often unnatural, disregarding tribal divisions and
cutting through areas which form a natural economic unit .... ."); Howard W. French, A Century Later,
Letting Africans Drmv Their Own Map, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1997, § 4, at 5 (observing that it is article
of faith among African intellectuals that Europe's partition of Africa is at root of much of continent's
instability). Compare these views to those of Bill Berkeley, who, while noting that Uganda's borders
exemplified "colonial mapmaking at its most arbitrary," nonetheless disputes the view that "Africa's many
tribes are inevitably prone to conflict and bloodshed" and notes that "most, even among Uganda's forty-
odd tribes, live side by side in relative harmony." Bill Berkeley, An African Success Story?, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Sept. 1994, at 22, 24.
75. See supra text accompanying note 34; cf WI.LAM PFAFF, THE WRATH OF NATIONS:
CIVILIZATION AND THE FURIES OF NATIONALISM 19 (1993) ("The original nations were created by dynastic
hazard, and had no unitary ethnic base.").
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markably short time. Where the French and English nations had emerged
across centuries, the rapid collapse of colonialism spawned new countries,
many of whose citizens shared scant history as solidary nations, virtually over-
night. 6 Thus, the debility of some African states may have less to do with their
ethnic diversity than with the comparative weakness of their civic culture and
their dearth of nation-building experience. 7
In many contemporary accounts of nationalism, it is asserted that, to en-
dure as effective states, postcolonial societies must find shortcuts to the histori-
cal processes that enabled citizens of such multiethnic states as Switzerland to
forge a solidary national identity. Writing of recently decolonized states, An-
thony D. Smith puts the case starkly:
If the nation is to become a 'political community' on the Western territorial and civic
model, it must, paradoxically, seek to create those myths of descent, those historical memo-
ries and that common culture which form the missing elements of their ethnic make-up,
along with a mutual solidarity. It must differentiate itself from its closest neighbours, distin-
guish its culture from theirs, and emphasize the historic kinship of its constituent ethnie and
their common ties of ideological affinity. This is done by creating or elaborating an 'ideo-
logical' myth of origins and descent.7"
Whether or not such myths are necessary to foster loyalty to the state, it is
surely true that nascent states will remain weak if their citizens do not develop a
sentimental loyalty to the state-a civic religion.79 Ethnic diversity within a
young state may have some bearing on the success of this process. Without a
common language, both literally and figuratively, it may be difficult for dispa-
rate peoples to imagine themselves as a national community. 0 Too great a di-
76. In contrast to the experience of some African countries, many Latin American countries
seemed to adapt well to the borders established by virtue of their colonial heritage. Benedict Anderson
notes that "[tihe original shaping of the American administrative units was to some extent arbitrary and
fortuitous, marking the spatial limits of particular military conquests." ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 52.
Nonetheless, over time these units acquired "a firmer reality under the influence of geographic, political
and economic factors." Id. For example, Madrid divided these administrative units into separate economic
zones. Further, in the pre-industrial age communications and travel between these units was immeasurably
difficult, reinforcing each unit's self-contained nature. See id. at 52-53.
77. Rupert Emerson makes the latter point succinctly: "The prime condition for the building of
nations is that they have an opportunity to age in the wood, and it is precisely this which the African
peoples have been denied." Emerson, supra note 73, at 104. Equally important, African peoples had had
little opportunity to develop the habits of a self-governing political community before they attained
independence. In this respect the experience of postcolonial Africa bore some resemblance to that of
countries that emerged from the gradual dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, whose transition to
statehood was more troubled than that of the older states of Western Europe. Writing of East Central
Europe, Wolfgang Mommsen could just as easily have been describing postcolonial Africa: "Here existed
little of a political tradition on which the new national movements could build; moreover, there existed a
great diversity of ethnic, cultural and economic conditions." Mommsen, supra note 28, at 214.
78. SMrrH, supra note 7, at 146. Citing the case of Nigeria, Smith asserts: "Quite simply,
Nigeria will have to invent ethnic ties and sentiments, perhaps by rewriting ethnic histories and conflating
ethnic cultures, if the state is to form a nation out of itself." Id.
79. On the function of nationalism in developing a political community committed to the modern
state, see Kupchan, supra note 14, at 2-4.
80. This poses an acute dilemma for many postcolonial countries, whose only "national"
language is that of their former colonial masters. During the decolonization period some African
nationalists argued that the use of colonial languages hampered the development of an African national
identity, but in seeking to replace the colonial language with an indigenous official language, leaders of
multilingual countries like Nigeria faced the "thorny issue of which local dialect one chooses." Kenneth
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vergence between sentimental loyalty to one's ethnic community and civic loy-
alty to the state may be conducive to ethnic conflict.
Still, it is not plain that a high level of ethnic diversity within a state is in
itself problematic-a widely held assumption among writers on nationalism,
evident in both academic publications8 and the popular media.82 While such di-
versity obviously presents conditions in which interethnic conflict may de-
velop,83 it is scarcely inevitable that such conflict will erupt, as the essential sta-
bility of scores of multiethnic states attests. Instead, intergroup conflict in post-
colonial Africa, as in other multiethnic countries beset by conflict, is usually
proximately caused by the actions of political leaders who have deliberately
fostered and exacerbated intergroup tensions.'
Indeed, to the extent that blame for "tribalism" in Africa can be laid at the
doorstep of former colonial powers, their fault may have less to do with their
legacy of "artificial borders" that cage into shared citizenship inherently unsuit-
able compatriots than with patterns of colonial administration that heightened
Africans' awareness of their ethnic identity and fostered interethnic rivalry.85
Similarly, postcolonial ethnic conflicts in Africa, as elsewhere, can often be
better explained as a product of elite manipulation than as the inevitable boiling
over of long-simmering "ancient hatreds." In short, the ethnic conflict associ-
ated with many African countries owes more to the general weakness of those
Noble, Nigerian's Plan: Adopt the (250) Mother Tongues, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1991, at A4 (quoting
Dwayne Woods).
81. See, e.g., SMrrH, supra note 7, at 147. More generally, to the extent that Gellner,
Anderson, and others ascribe to common language a central role in the construction of national identity,
they of course presume that some degree of cultural homogeneity is generally essential to the consolidation
of modem states.
82. See, e.g., Henry Kissinger, Toward a Moment of Truth in Bosnia, WASH. POST, June 11,
1995, at C7 (implying that, in recognizing state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, U.S. policy was misguided in
part because Bosnia's multiethnic composition was antithetical to successful statehood and deprived it of
key attribute of "historical European nation states").
83. C. Michael E. Brown, Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflict, in ETHNIc CoNFLicT
AND INTERNATIONAL SEcuRrTY 6 (Michael E. Brown ed., 1993) ("The first and most obvious systemic
prerequisite for ethnic conflict is that two or more ethnic groups must reside in close proximity.").
84. For discussion of examples in various African countries, see Bill Berkeley, Rwanda: Those
Who Started the Slaughter, WASH. POT, Apr. 18, 1995, at A17; Bill Berkeley, Sounds of Violence, NEuW
REPuBLic, Aug. 22-29, 1994, at 18; Bill Berkeley, The Warlords of Natal, ATLANTIC MoNTHLY, Mar.
1994, at 85; Howard W. French, Mobutu, Zaire's 'Guide,' Leads Nation into Chas, N.Y. TImEs, June
10, 1995, at Al; Kenneth B. Noble, Democracy Brings Turmoil in Congo, N.Y. TuMEs, Jan. 31, 1994, at
A3; and Jane Perlez, Ethnic Violence Is Shaking Kenya, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1992, at As. Although the
media often attribute ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia to "ancient hatreds" or "old enmities,"
implying that the explosion of ethnic violence was all but inevitable, see, e.g., Roger Cohen, Five Years
Later: Eastern Europe, Post-Communism-A Special Report; Ethnic and Religious Conflicts Now Threaten
Europe's Stability, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1994, § 1, at 6, in fact political manipulation played a central
part in instigating national conflict there. See TOM GJELTEN, SARAJEVO DAILY: A CITY AND ITS
NEwSPAPER UNDER SIEGE 41, 53-68, 77-78, 132-34 (1995) (describing calculated efforts by political
leaders to foment Serb nationalism in former Yugoslavia); Stephen Kinzer, News Media in Belgrade Mute
Their Nationalism, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1995, at A5 (noting that in early 1990s, Serbian press, serving
political goals of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, "played a crucial role in whipping up nationalist
fervor and hatred of non-Serbs").
85. See DONALD L. HOROwITZ, ETHNIc GROuPS IN CONFLIcT 147-67 (1985); Alex de Waal,
The Genocidal State: Hutu Extremism and the Origins of the "Final Solution" in Rwanda, TIMES LITERARY
SUPPLEMENT (London), July 1, 1994, at 3.
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states' institutional structures and civic culture-doubtless a legacy of colonial-
ism-than to the states' multiethnicity.
3. Diversity and Democracy
A related and important factor contributing to ethnic conflict in postcolo-
nial African and other states has to do with the political context in which they
gained independence. The world in which decolonization took place was one in
which popular sovereignty had long been established as a legitimating principle
of government. 86 While multiparty democracy has come slowly to many Afri-
can states, most emerged from colonialism with some form of popular enfran-
chisement. Faced with the challenge of marshalling public support to consoli-
date fragile new governments, postcolonial leaders in ethnically diverse coun-
tries have had powerful incentives to play the ethnic card-a perennially potent
resource for political mobilization.'
In this respect, nation-building in the postcolonial world was disadvan-
taged vis-A-vis older Western states:
A crucial difference between the nation-building of Western Europe and that of Africa and
much of Asia was that the processes in Europe occurred well before the rise of popular de-
mands for democratic rights: Nations already existed as relatively cohesive citizenries. In
postcolonial Asia and Africa, on the other hand, nation-building was the first task on the
agenda of newly independent colonies, which were suddenly endowed with the full panoply
of democratic institutions. . . . [Diemocratization and nation-building were to prove anti-
thetical in circumstances of ethnic diversity. 88
Ironically, then, the combined impact of two developments-the flowering of
popular sovereignty and the emancipation of colonial territories-often proved
to be a toxic brew.
86. Cf. Henry J. Steiner, Political Participation as a Human Right, 1 HARV. HUM. RTS. Y.B.
77, 97 (1988) ("All regimes, including over time the most repressive, permit or encourage or even require
some institutionalized modes of political participation.").
87. African leaders have at times justified single-party government on the ground that multiparty
democracy would prove divisive in multiethnic countries with weak democratic traditions. See, e.g.,
Donatella Lorch, Rebels Without a Cause Terrorize Uganda's Poor, N.Y. TwS, June 21, 1995, at A3
(noting that President Yoweri Museveni has resisted international pressure to promote multiparty
democracy, claiming that this would aggravate tribal divisions). Although these claims have often been
regarded as a pretext for consolidating personal rule, there is respectable support for the view that at least
some exercises in multiparty democracy can aggravate intergroup tensions in these situations since
politicians might be tempted to play the proverbial ethnic card for short-term political gain. Cf. Donald L.
Horowitz, Making Moderation Pay: The Comparative Politics of Ethnic Conflict Management, in
CoNFLIcr AND PEACEMAKING IN MuLTmIETmNc SoCMiES 451, 456-71 (Joseph V. Montville ed., 1991)
(arguing that multiparty system in Sri Lanka developed in way that tended to encourage appeals to ethnic
sentiment); Berkeley, supra note 74, at 24, 28 (quoting view of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni that
multiparty democracy is dangerous in Africa, where political parties reflect ethnic divisions, and noting
that most political leaders who support "multipartyism" in Uganda are "bent on reclaiming power by
aggravating ethnic divisions"); Kenneth B. Noble, Democracy Brings Turmoil in Congo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
31, 1994, at A3 (quoting view of government official that democratic elections in Congo "unleashed a
Pandora's box of tribal hatreds that may take generations to heal").
88. David Welsh, Domestic Politics and Ethnic Conflict, in ETHNIc CONFLICT AND
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 43, 44 (Michael E. Brown ed., 1993); cf. HOSAWM, supra note 8, at 43
(noting that political systems of Western nation-states in latter half of nineteenth century "still benefited
from the absence of electoral democracy").
1998] International Responses to Ethno-Separatist Claims
The resurgence of ethno-national assertion in Central and Eastern Europe
following the collapse of communism presents a more contemporary analogue.
As democracy overwhelmed communism in the Balkans and the Soviet Union,
some political elites-notably Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia, Franjo Tudjman in
Croatia, and Vladimir Zhirinovsky in Russia-found national appeals to be a
powerful springboard for political ascendance. The ideological vacuum created
by communism's rapid collapse provided the political space in which ethnic
mobilization could inflate to dangerous proportions. 89
Yet it would be a mistake to conclude that democracy and ethnic diversity
are fundamentally antithetical; distinguished theorists believe, on the contrary,
that ethnic diversity provides the essential matrix for enlightened self-
government.' ° More to the point, the prolonged absence of liberal democratic
institutions in colonial territories, as in Soviet-bloc countries, may have been a
crucial factor in the eventual explosion of ethnic violence in postcolonial Africa
and post-Soviet Eastern Europe. Bill Berkeley, an astute chronicler of ethnic
conflict in Africa, notes that Uganda's recent history of conflict is due less to its
ethnic divisions-the country comprises some forty ethnic groups-than to the
country's "feeble institutions of law and civil society, which left the country es-
pecially vulnerable to the idiosyncratic personalities of its leaders.""' Others
have observed that the introduction of democracy in divided societies that lack a
tradition of constitutional liberalism tends to correlate with a surge in ethnic
conflict.' What is dangerous, then, is not the dawning of democracy in itself,
but its rapid onset in a racially diverse polity lacking a tradition of constitutional
liberalism. The very fragility of political institutions and civic culture makes re-
sort to ethno-politics more likely-and more perilous.'
89. See Charles A. Kupchan, Conclusion to NATIONAIASM AND NATIONALITIES IN THE NEW
EUROPE, supra note 14, at 180.
90. See infra text accompanying notes 306-308, 318-326 (summarizing claims to effect that
configuration of states along ethno-national lines subverts justifying aims of democratic government); cf.
Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of illiberal Democracy, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 22, 33 ("India's
semi-liberal democracy has survived because of, not despite, its strong regions and varied languages,
cultures, and even castes."). But see infra text accompanying notes 295-319 (summarizing arguments to
effect that too much diversity might be antithetical to democratic government).
91. Berkeley, supra note 74, at 25-26. Tom Gjelten similarly attributes the explosion of ethnic
violence in the former Yugoslavia in part to the suppression of the civic culture of democracy during the
35-year rule of Marshal Tito: "[B]y blocking the free work of democratic institutions, Tito inhibited the
growth of the civic culture Yugoslavia needed if its people were to begin thinking of themselves as citizens
and not as members of rival national groups." GiELTEN, supra note 84, at 40; see also MICHAEL
IGNATIEE1, BLOOD AND BELONGING: JOURNEYS INTO THE NEW NATIONALISM 24-25 (1993) (asserting that
by failing to allow plural political culture to mature, Tito ensured collapse of state structure following his
death; ethnic differences erupted in nationalist hatred when political elites in post-Tito 1980s manipulated
nationalist emotions); Aleksa Djilas, Fear Thy Neighbor: The Breakup of Yugoslavia, in NATIONALISM AND
NATIONALrrIEs IN THE NEW EUROPE, supra note 14, at 85, 85 (stating that communist regime established
in Yugoslavia in 1945 "faled to erect the political institutions and to nurture the civic culture needed to
overcome historic tensions" and its collapse therefore led to revival of nationalist rivalries); Kupchan,
supra note 14, at 11-12 (offering explanations for propensity of nondemocratic states to produce aggressive
strains of nationalism).
92. See, e.g., Zakaria, supra note 90, at 35, 37. Constitutional liberalism refers to the tradition
that emphasizes protection of individual autonomy and dignity against coercion, relying above all on the
rule of law. See id. at 26.
93. There is, finally, an irony in postcolonial Africa's experience, which highlights the
distinction between an objective and subjective principle of self-determination. Implicit in some critiques of
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4. Nation-States as a Historical Phenomenon: Preliminary Conclusions
These points go some way toward answering the first question posed at
the outset of this Section: Does the history of state-making support the claim
that nations are a natural-perhaps the ideal-unit for successful states? The
first point to be made here is that the historical experiences of state-making
range across a broad canvas, making any generalizations problematic. Still,
some modest conclusions are possible. First, some measure of national iden-
tity-typically centered around the culture of a dominant group-helps assure
the success of states, and historically the most stable states have been ones in
which the predominant model of national identity is civic rather than ethnic. 4
Perhaps ironically, the most enduring civic nations emerged from an early his-
tory in which disparate peoples were welded together, often through brute
force, by medieval overlords. Despite this seemingly inauspicious genesis, the
older civic nations of Western Europe benefited from a protracted period of na-
tion-building. When, eventually, their states became democratic, these nations
had- developed felicitous conditions for successful self-government-a strong
civic identity and stable institutional life together.
The absence of both a long tradition of shared statehood-surely condu-
cive if not indispensable to civic nationalism-and of liberal democratic institu-
tions has, in contrast, predisposed many postcolonial countries to ethnic ten-
sion. Here, the principal reason for these countries' comparative instability is
not ethnic diversity per se, but the relative debility of government institutions
and civic culture. But these conditions need not doom a new state. While politi-
cal leaders are more likely to resort to ethnic mobilization in these circum-
stances, enlightened government policies can avert ethnic conflict. 5
Still, there may be times when ethnic divisions have so rent a state polity
that separation may be inevitable, or at any rate may present the best alternative
to a conflictive arrangement. Even in situations that fall short of unremitting
hostility, some separatist claims can be honored without risking untoward re-
Africa's boundaries is the claim that they configure states that are patently inconsistent with an "objective"
principle of self-determination, pursuant to which political frontiers should be drawn along national lines.
But it was African political leaders who elected to maintain the colonial administrative boundaries as the
international frontiers of newly independent states, just as Latin American countries had done in their
earlier wave of decolonization. See infra text accompanying note 231. In this respect, the configuration of
many postcolonial African states results from an exercise of "subjective" self-determination.
94. See Kupchan, supra note 14, at 4-5.
95. Donald Horowitz has demonstrated the significance of institutional arrangements in either
aggravating or averting ethnic conflict by comparing political institutions and levels of conflict in two
multiethnic countries, Sri Lanka and Malaysia. Although at the time each achieved independence Malaysia
seemed more likely than Sri Lanka to be destined for ethnic conflict, the opposite has proven true.
Horowitz attributes the two countries' disparate experiences in large part to Malaysia's enlightened political
arrangements, which created incentives for ethnic accommodation, and to Sri Lankan political
arrangements that heightened appeals to ethnic outbidding. See Horowitz, supra note 87, at 660-71, 683-
84; see also Arend Lijphart, The Power-Sharing Approach, in CoNIcr AND PEAcemAN IN
MULTmTHcIc SocImrms, supra note 87, at 491, 494-508 (advocating power-sharing approach as means of
accommodating ethnic groups within state and averting partition or secession); David Wippman, Practical
and Legal Constraints on Internal Power Sharing, in ETHNIC IDENTrrY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (David
Wippman ed., forthcoming 1998) (manuscript at 211, on file with the Yale Journal of International Law)
(arguing that ethnic power-sharing arrangements can ease ethnic tension).
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sults. Throughout history states have been reconfigured periodically, often
when national assertion becomes, proverbially, an irresistible force, as hap-
pened in the waning period of the First World War.96 Even in the turbulent Bal-
kans, Slovenia's separation from the former Yugoslavia has produced a stable
and economically viable state.' But if such divisions are at times unproblem-
atic, nothing in the history of state-making suggests that a nation-to-state tra-
jectory has been or should become the norm.98
Returning to the second question posed in this Section, to what extent
have self-determination-based claims of national groups been validated? Setting
aside for now the interwar period, which is examined in Part I, the important
point that emerges from the foregoing account is that during periods when the
ideal of popular sovereignty became a force in political life, that principle was
widely seen to have profound implications for the demarcation of state frontiers
and not simply for the organization of political life within a state. This insight,
as I will elaborate in Part IV, has significant implications for contemporary
separatist claims. For today, international law has stamped its imprimatur on
the democratic ideals that inspired the Age of Revolution.
I. THE NATION-STATE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
While nationalism had a profound influence in political discourse and on
the cartography of Europe during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
its principles registered only at the margins of international legal doctrine until
the interwar period. More particularly, issues of national identity remained
largely-though not wholly-irrelevant to determinations of statehood under
international law until 1919, when the "principle of national self-determination"
became the touchstone for peacemakers at Versailles.
Pursuant to that principle, the boundaries of new and reconfigured states
in Central and Eastern Europe would, to the extent possible, be drawn along
national lines, and in that respect the predominantly ethnic strand of nineteenth-
century nationalism seemed finally to have triumphed in the peace of Versailles.
Further, to the extent that this application of an "objective" principle of self-
determination necessarily relies upon groups' subjective identification of them-
selves as nations, the vindication of national claims entailed an element of
"subjective" self-determination as well. Finally, by resolving that the fate of
some territories would be determined by plebiscite, the Versailles peacemakers
96. Robert Dahl reminds us that "Europe consists of people who have been constituted by
divisions and separations," ROBERT A. DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION? 47 (rev. ed. 1990), and these
divisions have produced states that are generally regarded as models of stability. The Scandinavian
countries are a case in point. Sweden was once part of Denmark; Norway part of Sweden; and Finland part
of Sweden and then Russia. In Asia, the mutually consensual separation of Singapore from Malaysia stands
as another example of successful division.
97. See Cait Murphy, A Pocket of Peace in the Stormy Balkans, WASH. POST, June 25, 1995, at
El.
98. The interwar period may provide a limited exception to the observation that the nation-to-
state trajectory has not played a normative role in state-making. See infra text accompanying notes 164-
170.
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explicitly affirmed the strand of self-determination that emphasized popular
sovereignty.
But if statesmen were willing to apply the principle of self-determination
to the territories they configured at Versailles, states were not yet prepared to
recognize self-determination as a legal right. That would have to wait until after
the next world war. And when international law finally recognized a right of
self-determination, that same law drained the concept of the rich meaning it had
borne at Versailles. With its elevation to the status of legal entitlement, self-
determination acquired a new and inherently finite meaning: Colonial territories
had a right to independence.
Yet however limited their reach, these applications of the principle of self-
determination illuminated its complexity and potentially transformative power.
In particular, the interwar experience highlighted the inextricable and complex
relationship between national identity and the exercise of popular sovereignty.
A. The (Virtual) Irrelevance of Nations in International Law Before 1919
Although in some respects prefigured by earlier developments, the princi-
ple of national self-determination applied at Versailles represented a radical de-
parture in international law. Before 1919, if international law enforced any con-
ception of self-determination, it meant one thing: Established states had a right
to be left alone by other states.' This principle was the very linchpin of inter-
national law from its inception, and it could not have been otherwise. For that
law arose, with the advent of sovereign states, as a means of regulating rela-
tions among them. States-self-regarding sovereign entities-were scarcely
likely to establish a regulatory system that would compromise their own inde-
pendence."°°
Patterns of political behavior that prevailed in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries further buttressed international law's insistence on states' right
to independence. The balance of power system that structured international re-
lations in that period required flexibility of alignment among states. In a world
where relationships among states were essentially competitive and pragmatic,
states needed to be able to shift readily from one alliance to another when this
seemed likely to enhance their security."'1 In this setting, one state's control of
another would impair the flexibility of alignment that undergirded the security
of all states.lO"
99. See RuTH DONNER, THE REGULATION OF NATONA'TY IN NTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (2d ed.
1994).
100. In a similar vein, Kaplan and Katzenbach have written:
The state was the exclusive actor or subject of international law simply because there could
not be any enforceable law norms save those enforced by states within their own territory or
forcibly imposed upon one state by others acting alone or in conjunction. This was so pri-
marily because national governments claimed a monopoly of law enforcement institutions
within their territories and were prepared to resist forcibly any institutional arrangement that
weakened that authority.
KAPLAN & KATZENBACH, supra note 48, at 88.
101. See id.at 32.
102. See id. at 36.
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It was during this period that the statist orientation of international law
reached its zenith. A "fortress-like conception of state sovereignty"'t0 formed
the basic pillar of international law. This conception of sovereignty was above
all concerned with established states' right to determine their destiny within
their territorial borders unimpeded by other states. This noninterference para-
digm of sovereignty served to prevent international law from concerning itself
with individuals' right to shape their government within an existing state; °4
much less did it support any people's right to secede from an established state.
Accordingly, while international law assured the independence of states-itself
a key dimension of self-determination-that right vested only after states al-
ready had achieved independence. 5
Far from legitimizing national aspirations to statehood, international law
refused even to address such claims until they had succeeded. In contrast to the
relatively elaborate rules regulating transfer of territorial sovereignty between
established states, when it came to changes in territory occasioned by the emer-
gence of a new state, international law was essentially indifferent to the mode
by which sovereignty was established."°
While this dichotomy may seem anomalous, it can readily be explained in
terms of the statist orientation of eighteenth-nineteenth-century international
law. International law's extensive regulation of transfers of territorial sover-
eignty served to protect established states' interests, and in that respect was
fully consistent with the prevailing fortress-like conception of state sovereignty.
That same conception of sovereignty also meant that international law would
allow governments virtually unfettered sway over matters of governance within
their territory. These included questions relating to secession, a process deemed
103. Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L
L. 539, 545 (1992).
104. This approach was exemplified in publicists' approach to questions of recognition. Writing
in 1758, for example, Vattel advocated a de facto control test. See 4 EMER DE VATrEL, THE LAw OF
NATIONS ch. V, § 68 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., Legal Classics Library 1993) (1758).
105. While postwar law recognizing a right to self-determination, which I address in Section
IL.E, infra, has established an important exception, it is still the general rule that entities are entitled to
statehood by virtue of acquiring its attributes. The prevailing view in contemporary international law is that
statehood is a function of objective conditions, and established states must treat an entity that possesses
these qualities as a state regardless of whether they formally recognize it as such. See RESTATEMENT OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 202(1) (1987). In the words of the Restatement, "a
state is an entity that has a defined territory and permanent population, under the control of its own
government, and that engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such
entities." Id. § 201. The Restatement follows the widely accepted definition set forth in the Montevideo
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. I, 49 Stat. 3097, 3100, 165 L.N.T.S.
19,25.
106. This approach remained characteristic of international law well into the twentieth century.
See R.Y. JENNINGS, Tm ACQUISrION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (1963). The common
assertion that international law generally has fbled to regulate transfers of territory occasioned by the
emergence of a new state is in some respects misleading. As Akehurst points out, international rules
governing territorial sovereignty derived from Roman law produce a "distorted view of modem
international law" because they "presupposeo] that transfers of territory take place between already existing
states," whereas today the "most frequent form of transfer of territory has occurred when a colony has
become independent; since territory is an essential ingredient of statehood, the birth of the state and the
transfer of territory are inseparable-a state is its territory." AKEHURST, supra note 74, at 143-44.
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a domestic matter beyond the province of international regulation." 7 Once a
separatist movement succeeded in achieving effective independence, the inter-
national community would recognize the established facts of statehood, but
would not intercede earlier to help secure them.
Was, then, prevailing doctrine impervious to the broader temper of nine-
teenth-century nationalism? Not entirely. In some respects, European national-
ism in fact may have intensified the statist orientation of international doctrine.
Gregory Fox writes:
States in the nineteenth century, caught increasingly in the throes of aggressive nationalism,
saw their domestic political institutions as essential components of a unique national culture.
In order to protect these institutions from external pressures, the dominant states of Europe
shaped an international law that carved out an exclusive sphere of domestic jurisdiction. "0
In this respect, then, the statist version of self-determination-the right of es-
tablished states to be left alone by other states-reinforced and gave legal ex-
pression to nineteenth-century ethno-nationalism.
But in other more consequential respects, international law seemed tone-
deaf to the nationalism that swept nineteenth-century Europe, notwithstanding
challenges to the statist vision of international law presented by advocates of
liberal nationalism." Nowhere was the contrast between ethno-nationalism and
international legal doctrine more starkly evident than in the 1815 settlement of
the Napoleonic Wars. However offended nationalist sensibilities may have been
by the Congress of Vienna, the Allied powers were unencumbered by any in-
ternational legal principle when they redrew European borders in disregard of
nationality (by, for example, distributing German-speaking territories among
numerous kings). Beyond this, nations simply had no juridical existence in in-
ternational law. As one nineteenth-century writer concluded, "Without a State,
no nation. " 011
Yet in larger perspective, evolving conceptions of the relationship be-
tween states and citizens during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries worked
subterranean transformations in international legal doctrine, prefiguring Ver-
sailles's endorsement of national self-determination. To understand that proc-
ess, it is necessary to examine how, over the centuries, international law has
regulated changes in territorial sovereignty.
B. The Private Property Model of State Sovereignty
The prototype for political organization during the medieval period, when
the foundations for both modem states and international law began to take
shape, had a lasting impact on the rules governing the establishment of territo-
rial sovereignty. Feudal law, the public law of the time, assimilated sovereignty
107. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 132 (4th ed. 1990);
JENNINGS, supra note 106, at 8-9.
108. Fox, supra note 103, at 545.
109. See Berman, supra note 5, at 1800-01 (asserting that interwar writers viewed nineteenth
century as source not only of statist positivism, but also of rival vision of liberal nationalism).
110. Id. at 1801 n.35 (quoting Johann C. Bluntschli).
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to a form of title to property held by the ruling king."' Territory, the crucible
of sovereignty, was something that a sovereign could transfer or acquire,"'
much as private property owners transferred parcels of land among themselves.
Derived from Roman law, principles of international law governing terri-
torial sovereignty embodied medieval, feudal notions that "confound[ed] in a
common haze the right of the lord to rule in his manor and the right of our sov-
ereign lord the king to rule in his kingdom.""' The trend toward absolutism in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries reinforced the private property approach
to territorial sovereignty; treaties ceding territory in that period resembled in-
struments effecting the sale of land between private owners." 4 Along with the
territory went its inhabitants, whose citizenship was transferred much as though
it were an appurtenance to bartered land." 5
The power of monarchs to transfer a population with the territory they in-
habited was of course utterly inimical to both subjective and objective dimen-
sions of self-determination. As to the former, it meant that the affected popula-
tion could acquire a new sovereign without its consent; 116 as to the latter, the
national identity of the transferred population was simply irrelevant to the de-
termination of its political allegiance and the configuration of the state to which
it belonged. Although eighteenth- and nineteenth-century developments abraded
somewhat the private ownership model of sovereignty, the basic paradigm en-
dured. 17
Throughout the centuries there were, however, alternative visions of the
relationship between sovereignty and territory, and these had some impact on
state practice while also laying the groundwork for later developments in inter-
national legal doctrine. As early as the thirteenth century, the power of kings to
alienate sovereignty, including territory, was limited by what came to be seen
as a "principle of state" in fourteenth-century France and England." 8 The prin-
111. See BROWNLiE, supra note 107, at 128; JENNINGs, supra note 106, at 3.
112. Cf. AKEHunSr, supra note 74, at 143 ("[T]he right of a state to transfer its territory to an-
other state... is often regarded as the acid test of sovereignty over territory .. ").
113. 1 JOHN WESrtAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PEACE 86-87 (1904), quoted in JENNINGS, supra
note 106, at 3; see also HENRY SUMNER MAINE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (Richard M. Pious ed., Dabor
Social Science Publications, 1978) (1888) (noting that sixteenth-seventeenth-century jurists derived their
view of sovereignty from Roman law and regarded "the civilised world as a space of soil divided between
a number of Roman proprietors").
114. See BROWNNLIE, supra note 107, at 131; see also AKEHuRsr, supra note 74, at 143 (noting
that sixteenth-seventeenth-century theories of absolute monarchy regarded state's territory as "private es-
tate" of prince).
115. Although not compelled by international law, the basic rule was that inhabitants of the trans-
ferred territory automatically lost their prior citizenship and became citizens of the acquiring state. See
Berman, supra note 5, at 1829; Diane F. Orentlicher, Citizenship and National Identity, in ETHNIC
IDENTITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 95 (manuscript at 296, 313-14, on file with the Yale
Journal of International Law).
116. Cf. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 427-28 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1967) (1690) (writing that governments are dissolved when sovereign delivers "the People into
the subjection of a Foreign Power" because this necessarily entails change of legislature, and therefore viti-
ates very purpose for which people enter into society-to govern themselves by their own laws).
117. Notably, contemporary writers on international law still use the terms "territorial sover-
eignty" and "title" interchangeably. See, e.g., BROWNUE, supra note 107, at 132.
118. See Theodor Meron, The Authority to Make Treaties in the Late Middle Ages, 89 AM. J.
INT'LL. 1, 3 (1995).
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ciple of inalienability of sovereignty meant that kings and princes could not
transfer public territory without some form of community assent, typically ob-
tained through a representative institution like the assemblies of Estates in
France or the Parliament in England." 9
Limitations on monarchs' power to cede territory without the consent of
the local population also had influential proponents in sixteenth- and seven-
teenth-century publicists. Gentili believed that princes' power to alienate prop-
erty was inherently limited by natural law. A ruler exercised power "not for
purposes of tyranny, but of administration. And one who has free administra-
tive power does not have the right to transfer it to others." 20 For Gentili, the
point was clear: People conferred sovereignty and power on princes "in order
that they might be governed like men, not sold like cattle..'' Grotius and Pu-
fendorf similarly believed that kings should transfer a territory only with the
consent of its inhabitants."
In practice, however, kings frequently alienated territories throughout the
sixteenth-eighteenth centuries" without any meaningful concession to these
publicists' views other than granting a right of option: Some treaties of ces-
sion 24 contained clauses providing that inhabitants of ceded territory could
choose between the two allegiances within a specified time."t If, however, they
chose to remain subjects of their former sovereign, they had to move out of the
ceded territory and into the remaining territory of the ceding state.'26 Even this
limited right was viewed as an exception to the general rule of automatic dena-
tionalization 27 and in any event could be exercised only on an individual, and
not a collective, basis.
This limited qualification aside, the basic rule in international law re-
mained what it had long been: Kings could extend their sovereignty over all in-
habitants of conquered or ceded territory without regard to the people's prefer-
ences. " Eighteenth-century sensibilities might have been offended by Genoa's
sale of Corsica to the French, but this had scant impact on prevailing legal doc-
trine. Edmund Burke protested, "Thus, was a nation disposed of without its
119. Seeid. at2-6.
120. 3 At..aiuwco Grfnu, DE IURE] BEi Lmm TRns 372 (John C. Rolfe trans., Clarendon Press
1933) (1598).
121. Id. at 371.
122. See 2 HUGo GROTiuS, THm LAW OF WAR AND PEACE ch. 6, §§ IV, VII (Francis W. Kelsey
et al. eds. & tram., Bobbs-Merrill 1925) (1625); 8 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JuRE NATuRAE Er GEntMA
ch. 5, § 9 (C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans., Clarendon Press 1934) (1672).
123. The American historian Carlton Hayes wrote of this period: "European peoples were bar-
tered from one reigning family to another like so many cattle, sometimes as a marriage dowry, sometimes
as the booty of conquest." HAYES, supra note 57, at 8.
124. Cession is the voluntary, intentional transfer of territorial sovereignty by one state to another
and is typically accomplished through treaty. See Cession of Territory (Reparation Comm'n v, German
Gov't, 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 199 (Sept. 3), reprinted in ANNuAL DIGEsr OF INTERNA GNAL LAW
CAsEs, 1923-24, at 344 (John Fischer Williams & H. Lauterpacht eds., 1933); JENNiNGS, supra note 106,
at 16.
125. See SARAH WAMBAUGH, A MONOGRAPH ON PLEBISCrrES 4 (1920).
126. See id. An option clause appeared in a treaty of cession as early as 1697. See id. at 4 n.4.
127. See Berman, supra note 5, at 1829.
128. See WAMBAUGH, supra note 125, at 4.
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consent, like the trees on an estate."129 Rousseau sounded the same theme: "It is
making fools of people," he wrote, "to tell them seriously that one can at one's
pleasure transfer peoples from master to master, like herds of cattle, without
consulting their interests or their wishes. "130 However offensive, such transfers
were not prohibited by international law.
Still, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw significant intimations of
Versailles's effort to accommodate national aspirations. In the first years of the
revolution France committed itself to ascertaining the popular will of local in-
habitants before annexing their territory. The classic rules of international law
that enabled monarchs to transfer territory without regard to popular sentiment
were thought incompatible with revolutionary conceptions of popular sover-
eignty. Plebiscites preceded the annexation of half a dozen regions between
1791 and 1798.' The fairness of these plebiscites became increasingly doubt-
ful, however, and the Napoleonic era saw the abandonment of France's formal
commitment to the principle of self-determination.
Though the violent turn of the French Revolution left Europe leery of the
principles of self-determination initially espoused by the revolutionaries, plebi-
scites enjoyed a resurgence in popularity in the mid-nineteenth century. In 1848
plebiscites played a central role in effecting the eventual union of Italy and in
resolving the status of Schleswig-Holstein. From 1855 to 1866, popular con-
sultation frequently figured in the settlement of territorial disputes in Europe.
Notably, an international congress, meeting in Paris in 1856 to negotiate a
treaty ending the Crimean War, decided that plebiscites overseen by the great
powers would determine the fate of the principalities of Moldavia and Walla-
chia, resulting in their union with Romania in 1859.132 This marked the first
time that great powers resolved the fate of small, weak states based on the will
of the affected peoples as expressed through an internationally supervised
vote. 133
Furiter, a number of national revolts in the nineteenth century received
the support of major powers. When, for example, Belgium declared its inde-
pendence from Holland, major states jointly recognized Belgium's independ-
ence in 1832 despite Holland's continuing claim to the territory.1 34 Similarly,
Western powers supported the Greek revolt against the Ottoman Empire and
recognized Greece in 1827. Half a century later, the Congress of Berlin estab-
lished the independence of Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro from Ottoman
rule.
135
But in supporting these national movements, the major powers did not be-
lieve they were validating a general principle that nationality carries a presump-
129. THE ANNUAL REGISTER FOR THE YEAR 1768, The History of Europe, ch. I, at 2 (1768).
130. 1 JEAN JACQUES RoussEAu, THE POLmCAL WRITNGS 340-41 (C.E. Vaughan ed., John
Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1962) (n.d.) (trans. by author).
131. See WAMBAUGH, supra note 125, at 33-57.
132. SeeMi. at 11-12.
133. See id. at 101. The earliest known instance of a vote being taken to ascertain the will of the
people prior to annexation occurred in the sixteenth century. See id. at 3.
134. See KAPLAN& KATZENBACH, supra note 48, at 116.
135. See id. at 117.
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tive entitlement to statehood. Instead, each of these settlements was seen as
serving the interests of the great powers in the prevailing balance of power
system. 136 This was, in essence, great power power-brokering, not the flower-
ing of self-determination as a principle. Still, nationality was not irrelevant to
great power calculations. The above-noted arrangements followed national lines
to the extent that this was thought to assure increased order and resistance to
outside interference. 137 In this respect the impact of nationality on the interna-
tional community's acceptance of new states was incidental but important; at
least in some instances, great powers reckoned that recognition of new nation-
states would enhance international order. Yet national liberation was a byprod-
uct of war, not the result of international efforts to apply an accepted princi-
ple-much less an established right-of national self-determination. 3 '
C. Dependent Territories
A full-blown principle of national self-determination would in fact have
been anathema to the major European powers, which retained extensive colo-
nial holdings well into the twentieth century. And so they reconciled their in-
sistence on the principle of noninterference by one state in the affairs of another
with their colonial incursions in Africa, Asia, and Latin America by contriving
into international law such categories as "dependent" territories. 39
Although classical international law had not discriminated on grounds of
race or continent, 40 nineteenth-century positivism introduced a distinction be-
tween "civilized nations"-principally the same European powers that created
and shaped international law-and others. Importantly, international law bound
and protected only the former. 4' This doctrinal move conveniently advanced
Europe's acquisition of sovereignty over African territory.
While European states acquired sovereignty over some colonial territories
through occupation of what was characterized as terra nullius"' and over other
areas through conquest, 4 ' in most cases transfers of sovereignty from African
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See COBBAN, supra note 34, at 49.
139. See KAPLAN & KATZENBACH, supra note 48, at 37. For a general discussion of dependent
states, see JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 186-208 (1979).
140. See CHARLES HENRY ALEXANDROWICZ, THE EUROPEAN-AFRICAN CONFRONTATION: A
STUDY IN TREATY MAKING 23, 27, 117 (1973).
141. See CRAWFORD, supra note 139, at 13-14.
142. Terra nullius refers to territory that was unoccupied and had not been acquired by another
state. A state could establish sovereignty over terra nullius merely by effectively occupying it, See western
Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 39 (Jan. 1); CRAWFORD, supra note 139, at 173-74. Ian Brownlie writes that this
doctrine was at times invoked with respect to territory that was inhabited by organized communities. See
BROWNLIE, supra note 107, at 128. Still, the characterization of territory as terra nullius was often success-
fully challenged. See, e.g., Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 39-40 (finding that "at the time of colonization
[by Spain] Western Sahara was inhabited by peoples which, if nomadic, were socially and politically o r-
ganized in tribes and under chiefs competent to represent them," and concluding that Western Sahara ther e-
fore was not then terra nullus). Crawford notes that only Australia and the South Island of New Zealand
were found to meet the strict requirements of terra nullius. See CRAWFORD, supra note 139, at 180.
143. Later known as "subjugation," see JENNMIGS, supra note 106, at 7, this mode of acquisition
is no longer valid. See BROWNLIE, supra note 107, at 128.
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to European governments were formally effected by bilateral treaties, 44 in-
cluding treaties of cession14 and treaties establishing protectorates. Such treaties
implicitly recognized that the African rulers who signed them possessed the at-
tributes of sovereignty being transferred, while the treaty form implied a legal
equality between the two signatories. 46 In practice, however, during the nine-
teenth century African rulers often executed these treaties under considerable
duress. 47 Further, the treaties were legally relevant less as a mode of transfer-
ring rights between the two parties than as a means "by which European pow-
ers could demonstrate as against each other their occupation of a particular ter-
ritory.'
148
The law of the time also served to convert protectorates established over
African territories into "instruments of absorption." 149 Traditionally, a protec-
torate vested certain rights of external sovereignty in the protector, which
shielded the protected entity from the hazards of interstate rivalries while leav-
ing the protected entity's right of internal sovereignty intact. o Numerous bilat-
eral treaties between African and European states established such divided sov-
ereignty,' but in practice the internal sovereignty of African protectorates was
flagrantly transgressed. During the 1884-85 Berlin Conference, the European
colonial powers privately agreed that each would be free to breach the internal
sovereignty of "protected" African entities.5
Finally, international law's insistence on independence as a precondition
of statehood served to perpetuate the exclusion of Europe's colonies from the
community of states that are full subjects of international law. In effect, subor-
dination of colonial territories by European powers became its own justifica-
tion. Lacking independence, a colonial territory failed one of the basic tests of
statehood t53-and thus was not able to assert the right of states to noninterfer-
ence by other states."M The logic was ingenious and self-serving: Fashioned by
European powers, international law accommodated their colonial ambitions.
Recognition of the principle of self-determination at the Versailles peace con-
ference did little to change this. '55
144. See ALEXANDROWICZ, supra note 140, at 46.
145. See id. at 58.
146. See id. at 27, 30.
147. See id. at 38 (describing circumstances surrounding establishment of French protectorate
over Tunisia through bilateral treaty imposed by force in 1881); see also id. at 80 (noting that treaties es-
tablishing protectorates often were concluded at initiation of African rulers "who needed protection within
the turbulent conditions of the scramble for titles").
148. Malcolm Shaw, The Western Sahara Case, 49 BRIrr. Y.B. INT'LL. 119, 133 (1979).
149. ALEXANDROWICZ, supra note 140, at 80.
150. Seeid. at62.
151. See id. at 68.
152. See id. at 80, 124.
153. See CRAWFORD, supra note 139, at 48 ("Independence is the central criterion of state-
hood.").
154. See id. at 49 (noting that independence is a right of states); cf. Austro-German Customs
Union Case (Aus.-Germ.), 1931 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 41, at 57-58 (Sept. 5) (separate opinion of Judge
Anzilotti) (suggesting that independence of states under international law connotes that they are not subject
to authority of other states).
155. See infra Subsection Il.D.4.
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D. The Treaty of Versailles: Enthroning the Principle of National Self-
Determination... ?
The importance that the principle of national self-determination assumed
in the peace settlement of the First World War would have been difficult to
imagine even a few years earlier. To most observers, nationalism seemed ir-
revocably on the decline. 156 Going into the war, the Allies affirmed the rights of
small countries, but the principle at stake was the independence of established
states (however small), and not the right of national groups to form their own
states.1"1 Unofficially and early on, there was some sentiment within Allied
countries, such as the United Kingdom, to broaden their aims to address "na-
tional aspirations."' But as long as these countries were allied to Tsarist Rus-
sia, they were in no position officially to endorse a right of national self-
determination. 159
The fall of Tsarist Russia in 1917 decisively altered the Allies' calcula-
tions, freeing them to embrace self-determination as a key peace aim."6 The
Russian provisional government was quick to proclaim its goal of establishing
peace on the basis of "the right of the nations to decide their own destinies.,1
6
1
With this declaration, in Alfred Cobban's words, "the ice broke, and the
dammed-up waters of nationality began a wild rush which was to sweep onward
until the end of the year and beyond, in an increasingly powerful and ultimately
uncontrollable torrent." 62 As the war progressed to its close, "wherever there
was... a subject nationality, national armies were gathering and national gov-
ernments being set up. For the stronger and better organised of the subject na-
tionalities, self-determination ... was afait accompli in Europe long before the
Allied statesmen sat down to discuss the new order at Versailles."
But if the Versailles conference did more in the way of ratifying estab-
lished facts than fashioning states out of whole cloth, the Western powers
nonetheless came to the peace table officially committed to the principle of na-
tional self-determination. Outlining the Allies' war aims in his Fourteen Points
address, President Woodrow Wilson declared that the "evident principle... of
justice to all peoples and nationalities" ran through the "whole programme."164
Soon after, he proclaimed national self-determination to be "an imperative prin-
156. See COBBAN, supra note 34, at 48.
157. See id. at 49-50; Michla Pomerance, The United States and Self-Determination: Perspectives
on the Wilsonian Conception, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 20-21 (1976).
158. COBBAN, supra note 34, at 52 (citing views circulating within British Foreign Office in
1916).
159. See id. at 50.
160. See Woodrow Wilson, War Aims of Germany and Austria (Feb. 11, 1918), in 3 THE
PUBLIC PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON: WAR AND PEACE 177, 182-83 (Ray Stannard Baker & William E.
Dodd eds., 1927).
161. COBBAN, supra note 34, at 50.
162. Id. at 50-51.
163. Id. at 55.
164. Woodrow Wilson, An Address to a Joint Session of Congress (Fourteen Points Address)
(1918), in 45 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 534, 539 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1984).
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ciple of action,"65 and indeed that principle became the capstone of the peace
settlement. Notably, President Wilson assembled a group of historians, eth-
nologists, and geographers to provide expert guidance in his efforts to secure
state borders that coincided with national identity at the Paris peace confer-
ence. 16
At Versailles, as at past peace conferences, power politics and strategic
considerations played a significant role in determining whether and to what ex-
tent nations would come away with their own states. 67 But this time there was a
crucial difference: However much the goal of national self-determination might
have been compromised in the face of competing considerations68 (or, in some
cases, by virtue of U.S. diplomats' poor grasp of history and demography' 69),
the peacemakers at Versailles officially adopted the principle as their North Star
when they set out to remap postwar Europe.
Against centuries of international law's denial of juridical status to na-
tional groups, this was a pathbreaking moment, a tectonic shift of legal para-
digms. But how to characterize the precedent established or initiated by the
Treaty of Versailles170 and related treaties is by no means a straightforward
task. Did the peace of Versailles establish a universal "right" of national self-
determination? And, whatever its legal status, what was the substantive mean-
ing of the principle of "national self-determination" applied by the peacemak-
ers? What role, finally, would international law and institutions play in imple-
menting the assurances to national groups set forth in the peace treaties?
1. Legal Status of the Principle of National Self-Determination
In the narrow doctrinal terms in which lawyers commonly assess prece-
dent, the answer to the first question is a straightforward "no." As Wilson
readily conceded, there was no attempt to universalize the principle of self-
determination to apply, for example, to the Allies' dependent territories. This,
Wilson explained, would have to wait for another day:
165. ROBERT LANSING, SELF-DETERMINATION 5 (1921) (quoting address by Woodrow Wilson
before both Houses of Congress on February 11, 1918).
166. Franck, supra note 4, at 53.
167. See MICHLA POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE 5 (1982). Some
critics of Wilson's performance at Versailles charge that his own unequal sympathies for various
nationalities determined the extent to which he pressed their respective causes. See Pomerance, supra note
157, at 6.
168. In addition to ethnographic factors, expert commissions at Versailles took into account
strategic, economic, and historical considerations in proposing the boundaries of postwar states. See
Pomerance, supra note 157, at 8; see also WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT VERSAILLES 460 (Edward Mandell
House & Charles Seymour eds., 1921); cf. 3 RAY STANNARD BAKER, WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD
SmLEMENT 35, 37-38 (1922) (discussing report prepared for President Wilson in January 1918 on "War
Aims and Peace Terms" that espoused balance of factors, including national homogeneity, economic
viability and defensive considerations, that should govern postwar determination of territorial boundaries of
Italy and Poland respectively).
169. See Pomerance, supra note 157, at 5.
170. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, June 28, 1919, 2
Bevans 43, 225 Consol. T.S. 188 [hereinafter Treaty of Versailles].
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We were sitting there with the pieces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in our hands ....
We were sitting there with various dispersed assets of the German Empire in our hands...
but we did not have our own dispersed assets in our hands... and therefore we had often,
with whatever regret, to turn away from questions that ought some day to be discussed and
settled and upon which the opinion of the world ought to be brought to bear. "',
Further, even at Versailles "self-determination" was taken as a guiding princi-
ple, and not a binding mandate. Where it ran up against overriding considera-
tions, it gave way. 172
Yet the principle of national self-determination had entered the lexicon of
international diplomacy and indeed had been invoked to guide one of the most
consequential matters on which international society passes judgment: the es-
tablishment of new states. Because international law allows state practice to
play a key role in creating law, the peace settlement could become a corner-
stone in the construction of new norms. President Wilson, the chief architect of
the principle of self-determination embodied in the peace settlement, conceived
the precedent as the capstone of the global order inaugurated at Versailles.
Wilson hoped to universalize the principle applied in the postwar settle-
ments by incorporating it into the Covenant of the League of Nations, an inte-
gral part of the Treaty of Versailles. He proposed a draft provision of article III
of the Covenant that would commit the Contracting Powers to effect "such ter-
ritorial readjustments, if any, as may in the future become necessary by reason
of changes in present racial conditions and aspirations or present social and po-
litical relationships, pursuant to the principle of self-determination .... "173 But
the proposal encountered powerful opposition, not least among some of Wil-
son's own advisors, and was defeated. 74
But if this outcome denied Wilson's principle the immediate force of
positive law, it would be a mistake to dismiss the framework established at
Versailles as merely a case-specific disposition of territorial issues that left no
imprint on international legal doctrine. To reduce discussion of the peace set-
tlement's precedential import to such a narrow compass obscures both the doc-
trinal richness of the postwar settlements and the paradigms of international in-
stitutional competence that they generated-paradigms that continue to influence
international responses to nationalism.175
2. The Principle of Self-Determination: What Did It Mean?
While the principle of self-determination had several distinct renderings in
the Treaty of Versailles, it meant above all that the new borders of Europe
171. Woodrow Wilson, Address at Indianapolis (September 4, 1919), in 1 RAY STANNARD
BAKER & WIL.IM E. DODD, WAR AND PEACE 616-17 (1923).
172. See supra notes 167-168 and accompanying text.
173. Woodrow Wilson, Covenant (Wilson's First Draft) in 2 DAVID HUNTER MILER, TIlE
DRAFrING OF THE COVENANT 12 (1928).
174. See BucmErr, supra note 35, at 64-66.
175. For development of these themes, see Nathaniel Berman, Between "Alliance" and "Local-
ization": Nationalism and the New Oscillationism, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 449 (1994); and Ber-
man, supra note 5.
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would, to the extent possible, be drawn along national lines. 76 Thus the "ob-
jective" principle of self-determination that had been such a robust force in
nineteenth-century Europe became, in the early twentieth century, a principle
for state-making, at least in the context of a peace settlement. In this respect the
Paris peace conference inverted the state-to-nation progression that had been
characteristic of the formation of Western European nation-states. 77
But if the objective "principle of nationalities" loomed large in the peace
settlement, it was not the only version of self-determination invoked by the
peacemakers nor was it perfectly realized to the extent it was applied. For one
thing, the Treaty of Versailles included several provisions that would, with
some exceptions, automatically denationalize German nationals who resided in
territories that were transferred from Germany to another state.17 The principle
that citizenship should correspond to nationality was, of course, compromised
with respect to these Germans.
More consequentially, in several important respects the Treaty of Ver-
sailles gave explicit effect to the "subjective" principle of self-determination. In
some disputed regions, such as Upper Silesia 7 9 and Schleswig, ts° the fate of a
territory and its population would be determined by an internationally super-
vised plebiscite. Still, the plebiscite principle played only a supporting role in
the peace settlement; despite the importance President Wilson had attached ear-
lier to the subjective principle of self-determination, the peace treaties provided
for plebiscites only to resolve the fate of several disputed border regions.
18 '
The element of consent to sovereignty that found expression in collective
terms in the plebiscite principle found expression on an individual basis in van-
176. This had been foreshadowed in President Wilson's Fourteen Points speech, in which he
called for, inter alia, "[a] readjustment of the frontiers of Italy . . . along clearly recognizable lines of
nationality"; "the relations of the several Balkan states to one another [to be] determined . . . along
historically established lines of allegiance and nationality"; and the establishment of "[a]n independent
Polish state... which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations." Wilson,
supra note 164, at 537-38.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 30-47. To the extent that congruence between nationality
and state territory could not be fully achieved, national groups that consequently would form a minority in
a new or reconfigured state received special protections through minority rights undertakings, whose
implementation would be supervised by various organs of the League of Nations. Provisions protecting
minority rights were included in the peace treaties of some countries, including Austria, Hungary,
Bulgaria, and Turkey. Several other countries, including Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Greece, and
Yugoslavia, concluded minority rights treaties with the Allied and associated powers. Still other countries,
including Albania, Iraq, and the Baltic states, were required to make minority rights declarations as a
condition to membership in the League of Nations. These declarations set forth protections similar to those
found in the minority rights treaties. See ImNs L. CLAUDE, JR., NATIONALMiNoRrriEs 16 (1955).
178. See, e.g., Treaty of Versailles, supra note 170, art. 36 (providing that once transfer of
sovereignty over certain territories from Germany to Belgium had been completed, "German nationals
habitually resident in the territories will definitively acquire Belgian nationality ipso facto, and will lose
their German nationality"); id. art. 91 (similar provision with respect to German nationals in Poland). As
noted below, a right of option granted adult German nationals habitually resident in those territories sought
to mitigate the effect of those provisions.
179. See id. arts. 88-90.
180. See id. arts. 109-14.
181. See Woodrow Wilson, The Four Principles (Feb. 11, 1920), in Extracts from President Wil-
son's Speeches in 1918, 1 A HISTORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE OF PARIs 435, 437-39 (H.W.V. Tern-
perley ed., 1969); see also Berman, supra note 5, at 1859-60 (noting that, despite Wilson's emphasis on
consent of population, postwar treaties provided for plebiscites in only few disputed regions).
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ous provisions of the peace settlement assuring certain persons a right of option.
For example, adult German nationals who habitually resided in certain territo-
ries transferred from Germany to other states could opt for German nationality
within two years following the transfer of sovereignty."' Still, the basic rule of
automatic denationalization followed the traditional rule that citizenship fol-
lowed territory, and to that extent seemed to flout both the subjective and ob-
jective principles of self-determination."n
While the juxtaposition of subjective and objective dimensions of self-
determination in the peace settlement may appear to signify inconstancy, the
principle of nationalities has little meaning apart from the collective will of na-
tional groups. Throughout the peace conference the Allied powers consulted
representatives of various national groups to ascertain their wishes, and were
guided by their responses in their attempts to apply the principle of self-
determination.'" At a deeper level, of course, the subjective will of a group is
itself constitutive of national identityl-a point that was scarcely lost on inter-
war legal theorists.
186
The very complexity of the peace conference's conception of self-
determination induced palpable anxiety among some participants and commen-
tators, and surely amplified the concerns of those already chary of any version
of the principle. Robert Lansing, who served as President Wilson's Secretary of
State until asked to resign in 1920, privately recorded his own misgivings dur-
ing the peace negotiations: "When the President talks of 'self-determination'
what unit has he in mind? Does he mean a race, a territorial area or a commu-
nity?" 87 Indeed, as so often has been noted, the question is even more complex
than Lansing suggested.1 88 Who are the members of the "race" or "commu-
nity," and how is membership determined? How does one establish the rela-
tionship between a group and territory when there have been significant trans-
fers of population? In these situations, how does one establish the appropriate
182. See, e.g., Treaty of Versailles, supra note 170, arts. 37, 91.
183. The conceptions of national identity and self-determination reflected in the peace settlement
were considerably more complex and innovative than suggested by the examples noted in the text. The
Treaty of Versailles established several novel juridical regimes and, in some instances, the foundation for
League efforts virtually to construct a new national identity. For example, Germany's sovereignty over the
Saar region was placed in abeyance for a 15-year period, during which the region would be governed
under the trusteeship of a League of Nations commission. See id. art. 49; id. annex § 16, at 218. The
League commission created a novel status for inhabitants of the Saar, determining that "the status of
'inhabitant of the Saar' constitutes a new kind of legal subject" and entrusting inhabitants' diplomatic
protection abroad to France. See Berman, supra note 5, at 1882 (quoting HENRI CouRsimI, LE STATUT
INTERNATIONAL DU TERRITOIRE DE LA SAARE 99 (1925)). Contemporaneous commentators noted that the
Saar territory was totally a creature of international law, with "no roots in the past." MICHAEL T.
FLoRINsKY, THE SAAR STRuGGLE 11 (1934). For a fascinating analysis of these highly experimental
regimes, see Berman, supra note 5, at 1874-98.
184. See COBBAN, supra note 34, at 67.
185. See supra text accompanying note 10.
186. For a discussion of the views of one leading theorist, Robert Redslob, regarding the complex
interplay between subjective and objective factors in the construction of national identity, see Berman,
supra note 5, at 1812-16.
187. LANSING, supra note 165, at 9. Other advisors had similar misgivings. See 2 MILLER, supra
note 173, at 72 (1928) (criticizing proposed article III in Wilson's second draft of League Covenant and
urging that language regarding self-determination be omitted).
188. See, e.g., POMERANCE, supra note 167, at 2-4.
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baseline date for distinguishing between inhabitants entitled to participate in an
exercise of self-determination and those deemed "settlers" who are to be ex-
cluded? How, in any case, should a population's wishes be ascertained? Should
there be plebiscites in every case? Who may vote-just those who might secede,
or also other inhabitants of a territory from which the former might secede?
Where plebiscites are held, should their results have lasting effect, or should the
relevant population be allowed to change its mind in light of changes in its
identity and desires over time? Each of these daunting questions presented
themselves for resolution at the Paris peace conference.
Several participants and observers voiced more fundamental concerns.
Even if narrowly defined to sidestep some of these conundrums, a principle of
self-determination could prove endlessly destabilizing if validated by interna-
tional law. Recalling the national movements that preceded the peace confer-
ence, Edward Mandell House, United States Commissioner Plenipotentiary at
the conference, evoked a specter that continues to influence international re-
sponses to separatist claims: "No tribal entity was too small to have ambitions
for self-determination."' 9
As Nathaniel Berman's scholarship has elucidated, the interwar period
was one of extraordinary experimentalism in international institutional and legal
responses to these and other dilemmas presented by nationalist claims."9 Legal
disputes arising in that period generated a rich jurisprudence, which reflected
both the ambitious reach and doctrinal complexity of the interwar regime.
The League's resolution of one dispute in particular-a conflict over the
status of the Aaland Islands-has special pertinence to the issues addressed in
this Article. Declining to recognize a general right of self-determination, two
League of Nations bodies involved in this dispute nonetheless foreshadowed
important doctrinal developments, which have renewed relevance today. Nota-
bly, both bodies intimated that minorities might enjoy an exceptional, last resort
right of territorial exit as a remedy to intractable repression. Further, one of the
League bodies suggested that international actors may enjoy a heightened com-
petence to address separatist claims during periods of political-juridical trans-
formation 91-during circumstances, for example, such as those attending the
dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.
3. Aaland Islands Dispute
Many aspects of the interwar regime have a Rorschach-like quality, pro-
viding material for radically different interpretations depending on the perspec-
tive of the analyst. This is notably true of the disposition by two League bodies
of the Aaland Islands dispute. In conventional doctrinal terms, their reports are
often cited as dispelling any thought that international law recognized a general
189. Edward M. House, The Versailles Peace in Retrospect, in WHAT REALLY HAPPENED AT
PARTS 425, 431 (Edward Mandell House & Charles Seymour eds., 1921).
190. For discussion of three innovative legal regimes created by the Versailles peace settlement,
see Berman, supra note 5, at 1874-98.
191. See infra text accompanying notes 198-200.
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right of national self-determination." 9 While this interpretation is well-founded,
it obscures the more subtle and potentially far-reaching implications of the re-
ports.
The League appointed a Commission of Jurists to determine the League's
competence to examine an unresolved dispute relating to the Aaland Islands.
Representatives of the islands, which were under the jurisdiction of Finland,
had sought annexation to Sweden at the Paris peace conference, invoking the
"right of peoples to self-determination as enunciated by President Wilson. " ")
While Sweden proposed that the islanders be allowed to determine their status
through a plebiscite, Finland insisted that this would constitute interference in a
matter that, under international law, was solely within its domestic jurisdic-
tion. " If Finland was right, the League would, under its Covenant, have no ju-
risdiction to entertain the petition submitted by Sweden.19 While the narrow is-
sue presented to the Commission was one of League competence, its analysis
led it to pronounce on the substantive question of whether international law rec-
ognized a general right of national self-determination.
In a widely cited portion of its report, the Commission asserted that, al-
though the principle of self-determination of peoples played "an important part
in modem political thought" and had been recognized in some international
treaties, the latter "cannot be considered as sufficient to put it upon the same
footing as a positive rule of the Law of Nations."' 96 The Commission contin-
ued:
On the contrary, in the absence of express provisions in international treaties, the right of
disposing of national territory is essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every State.
Positive International Law does not recognise the right of national groups, as such, to sepa-
rate themselves from the State of which they form part by the simple expression of a wish,
any more than it recognises the right of other States to claim such a separation. 11
192. See, e.g., Franck, supra note 4, at 54; Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Degrees of Self-
Determination in the United Nations Era, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 304, 304 (1994).
193. 4 PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: THE PARS PEACE
CONFERENCE 1919, at 172 (1943). The Aaland Islands had belonged to Sweden until 1809, when they
were surrendered to Russia as a result of conquest. Finland, too, was incorporated into Russia in 1809, and
the Aaland Islands were, in the words of a League of Nations Commission of Jurists, "undoubtedly part of
Finland during the period of Russian rule." Report of the International Committee of Jurists Entrusted by
the Council of the League of Nations with the Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects
of the Aaland Islands Question, LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. 3, at 9 (1920) [hereinafter Jurists'
Report]. With the outbreak of the Russian revolution, Finland declared its independence from Russia, and
the population of the Aaland Islands expressed their desire to be separated from Russia and reattached to
Sweden. See id. at 7, 10. Finland took the position that the Aaland Islands had been incorporated into the
state of Finland, which attained independence in 1918. See id. at 10.
194. See Jurists'Report, supra note 193, at 5, 11.
195. Article 15, paragraph 8 of the Covenant denied the League Council competence to make
recommendations regarding the settlement of a dispute if that dispute "is claimed by one of [the parties],
and is found by the Council, to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the dome s-
tic jurisdiction of that party .... " LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENAw art. 15, para. 8.
196. Jurists'Report, supra note 193, at 5.
197. Id. Whether a portion of an established state's territory could determine its fate by plebiscite
was, the Commission reasoned, entirely left to the sovereign discretion of the state concerned. "Any other
solution," it reasoned, "would amount to an infringement of sovereign rights of a State and would involve
the risk of creating ... a lack of stability which would not only be contrary to the very idea embodied in
the term 'State,' but would also endanger the interests of the international community." Id.
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A report by a League of Nations Commission of Rapporteurs, which had been
appointed to assess the merits of Sweden's petition, agreed with the Jurists'
conclusion that the principle of free determination "is not, properly speaking a
rule of international law."198
It is difficult to imagine a more unequivocal denial of a general right of
national self-determination or a more ringing affirmation of the right of states to
dispose of their territory without external interference. Yet other portions of the
Commissions' reports suggest a more innovative and far-reaching approach to
national separatist claims.
After proclaiming the "sovereign rights of a State" not to be threatened by
secession, the Commission of Jurists went on to reason that "all that has been
said concerning the attributes of the sovereignty of a State" generally applies
only to a fully and unambiguously established state, and then only "so long as it
continues to possess these characteristics."" 9 But in periods of fundamental
transformation and transition when a territory's status is unclear, international
society enjoys a heightened competence to address the issues presented by that
transition, which "cannot be considered as [a situation] confined entirely within
the domestic jurisdiction of a State." 200 Because such transitions tend to lead to
changes in territorial status, they "interesti] the community of States very
deeply both from political and legal standpoints."" 1
At one level, the Jurists seemed to be using a semantic sleight-of-hand to
establish League competence: If the League Council addressed a situation aris-
ing in territory that was not yet or no longer an established state, the Council
could scarcely be faulted for breaching a sovereign state's protected sphere of
exclusive jurisdiction. At a deeper level, the Commission was making more
radical claims. First, not only would the international community have a
broader warrant to address questions of territorial sovereignty during periods of
uncertain status, but it would have a profound interest in doing so. The import
198. The Aaland Islands Question: Report Submitted to the Council of the League of Nations by
the Commission of Rapporteurs, League of Nations Doc. B7.21/68/106, at 27 (1921) [hereinafter
Rapporteurs'Report]. In this Commission's view, international society could not long survive a rule of free
determination:
To concede to minorities, either of language or religion, or to any fractions of a population
the right of withdrawing from the community to which they belong, because it is their wish
or their good pleasure, would be to destroy order and stability within States and to
inaugurate anarchy in international life; it would be to uphold a theory incompatible with
the very idea of the State as a territorial and political unity.
Id. at28.
199. Jurists'Report, supra note 193, at 5-6.
200. Id. The Commission reasoned:
From the point of view of both domestic and international law, the formation,
transformation and dismemberment of States as a result of revolutions and wars create
situations of fact which, to a large extent, cannot be met by the application of the normal
rules of positive law. This amounts to a statement that if the essential basis of these rules,
that is to say, territorial sovereignty, is lacking, either because the State is not yet fully
formed or because it is undergoing transformation or dissolution, the situation is obscure
and uncertain from a legal point of view, and will not become clear until the period of
development is completed and a definite new situation, which is normal in respect to
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of this viewpoint can be appreciated when one recalls the traditional approach
of international law to issues bearing on the establishment of new states (in es-
sence, outside actors and international law itself have nothing to say about this
process until it has been completed'2). Further, the Jurists reasoned, circum-
stances of fundamental transformation may enable international society to in-
voke and apply the principle of national self-determination-the very principle
to which the Jurists had seemed emphatically to deny international legal ef-
fect.
2c
Beyond the suggestion that periods of transition establish a juridical
space-however transient-within which international society might give effect
to the principle of national self-determination, the Commission of Jurists also
implied that the wall of sovereign prerogative enjoyed by established states
might be breached when those states abuse minority rights. The Jurists' report
left open the possibility that "a manifest and continued abuse of sovereign
power, to the detriment of a section of the population of a State, would, if such
circumstances arose," bring an international dispute arising from the situation
within the competence of the League, presumably because it would implicate
international legal principles.2t 4
While the Commission of Rapporteurs reached a conclusion different
from that of the Jurists with respect to Finland's sovereignty over the Aaland
Islands, it too hinted at the possibility that it would support a claim of secession
under narrow circumstances. Prefiguring a concept that would resurface over
subsequent decades, the Commission's report suggested that secession might be
available as a "last resort when the State lacks either the will or the power to
enact and apply just and effective guarantees" of minority rights.2"5
In sum, then, conventional interpretations of the Aaland Islands case cor-
rectly characterize the two Commissions' reports as affirming that international
law does not recognize a general right of national self-determination. 26 But the
report of the Commission of Jurists also intimated that a different approach is
justified in circumstances of profound transition, which bring into play a para-
digm of heightened international engagement and competence. Further, in the
view of both Commissions, even within normal juridical time established states'
rights in respect of territorial sovereignty may be forfeited, at least in part, by
virtue of their failure to assure basic rights of national groups in their territory.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 105-106.
203. Under circumstances of transformation, the Jurists reasoned,
the principle of self-determination of peoples may be called into play. New aspirations of
certain sections of a nation, which are sometimes based on old traditions or on a common
language and civilisation, may come to the surface and produce effects which must be taken
into account in the interests of the internal and external peace of nations.
Jurists' Report, supra note 193, at 6.
204. Id. at 5.
205. Rapporteurs' Report, supra note 198, at 28. Astonishingly, the Commission further sug-
gested that it "should not have hesitated to consider" the solution of allowing the Aaland Islands to separate
from Finland and become part of Sweden if this were "the only means of preserving its Swedish language
for Aaland." Id. at 29.
206. See supra text accompanying note 192.
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4. Mandates
If the Versailles peace settlement introduced an unprecedented measure of
international support for national self-determination, it also demarcated the
outer limits of Western states' commitment to that principle. Notably, the
Treaty of Versailles perpetuated the long-standing dichotomy in international
law between "advanced" states and those that had not yet achieved full sover-
eign status.2"7 While the peace settlement embodied the high-water mark of in-
ternational support for the principle of national self-determination, the principal
beneficiaries were European nations. In contrast, the peoples who inhabited
colonial territories of the defeated powers-and who, in the words of the
League Covenant, were "not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenu-
ous conditions of the modem world" 2"'-were placed under a system of Man-
dates. The "tutelage" of these peoples would be "entrusted to advanced na-
tions," acting as Mandatories on behalf of the League.2"9
The League Covenant envisioned eventual independence for "[c]ertain
communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire" which, after a period
of tutelage by a Mandatory power, would be "able to stand alone.'210 But for
"[o]ther peoples, especially those of Central Africa,"2. indefinite rule by the
Mandatory was envisaged. Whatever national self-determination meant at Ver-
sailles, then, it was clear that it did not mean to undo Europe's subjugation of
colonial peoples. Instead, competence for administering colonial territories
would be transferred from the defeated powers to the League of Nations.
E. Self-Determination: Decolonization
Remarkably, after the Second World War the principle of self-determination became the
most dynamic concept in international relations.
2 12
One might have imagined that, with the disastrous failure of the interwar
system, the principle of self-determination would have vanished from interna-
tional legal doctrine with the collapse of its institutional manifestation, the
League of Nations. In many respects, international law experienced a funda-
mental disruption with the onset of World War II, and the principle of self-
determination might have seemed a leading candidate for entombment as a
manifest failure of the interwar system. Yet it was impossible to contain the
concept's mobilizing power in the ensuing years and decades. The principle
(later "right") reappeared across decades in a raft of international instruments,
the legitimacy of its inclusion no longer subject to serious challenge-but its
meaning periodically subject to renewed contention.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 140-141.
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The Charter of the United Nations gave a prominent place to the "princi-
ple of self-determination," yet the sponsoring countries could not agree on the
meaning of this conveniently ambiguous phrase. The U.N. Charter enshrines
the principle in its first article: "The Purposes of the United Nations are...
[t]o develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. ... ",23 Different views about
the meaning of this provision emerged when it was first proposed by the Soviet
Union at the San Francisco Conference,"' and states approved the language
without resolving their differences. The technical committee that recommended
including this provision in the Charter described its meaning in an impenetrable
verbal fog:
mhe principle of equal rights of peoples and that of self-determination are two comple-
mentary parts of one standard of conduct; that the respect of that principle is a basis for the
development of friendly relations and is one of the measures to strengthen universal peace;
that an essential element of the principle in question is a free and genuine expression of the
will of the people .... 25
Other Charter provisions addressed the administration of dependent territories
in terms that supported progress toward self-government but did not, on their
face, establish an absolute right to independence.2 6
How the principle of self-determination became a right and acquired a
distinctive meaning in the postwar period has been well chronicled2t 7 and can be
briefly summarized here. The "principle of self-determination of peoples" was
a natural banner for the decolonization movement that swept the globe in the
early decades of the United Nations's life, 2' and it took little time for this prin-
ciple, previously associated with the right of subject nationalities to form their
213. U.N. CHARTER art. 1(2).
214. On the one hand, "it was strongly emphasized... that this principle corresponded closely to
the will and desires of peoples everywhere and should be clearly enunciated." But on the other hand, "it
was stated that the principle conformed to the purposes of the Charter only in so far as it implied the right
of self-government of peoples and not the right of secession." Doe. 343, 1/1/16, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Does. 296
(1945).
215. Doc. 944, 1/1/34, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Does. 455 (1945).
216. Article 73, the key provision dealing with "non-self-governing territories" administered by
U.N. member states, enunciates the principle that the administering states should "develop self-
government.... take due account of the political aspirations of the [non-self-governing] peoples, and...
assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular
circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement." U.N. CHARTER
art. 73(b). Chapters XII and XIII establish a system for the administration by a U.N. body of, inter alia,
former colonies of the Axis powers and territories placed under mandate by the League of Nations. See id.
arts. 75-91. Like non-self-governing territories administered by member states, trust territories were not
given an absolute right to independence. Instead, the trusteeship system aimed to promote the "progressive
development" of inhabitants of the trust territories "towards self-government or independence as may be
appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes
of the peoples concerned .... ." Id. art. 76(b).
217. See, e.g., HANNUM, supra note 72, at 33-49; Franck, supra note 4, at 54-60.
218. The anticolonialism movement had already gathered momentum in the interwar period, and
during the Second World War the U.S. government's planning for a postwar international organization fo-
cused considerable attention on supervision of dependent peoples. See LELAND M. GOODRICH ET AL.,
CHARTER OFTHE UNITED NATiONS 29-30 (3d ed. 1969).
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own state, to metamorphose into a right of colonial territories to break free of
the metropolitan state.
In 1950, the General Assembly adopted the first of what would be many
resolutions recognizing "the right of peoples and nations to self-determination"
as fundamental.219 Among later resolutions reaffirming that right, two stand out
for their normative importance. The first, the 1960 Declaration on the Granting
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples ("Declaration on Colonial
Countries"),' linked the right unambiguously to a decolonization context,
equating self-determination to freedom from "alien subjugation"" and requir-
ing that "[i]mmediate steps" be taken to secure the independence of "Trust and
Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet at-
tained independence."' In 1970, the General Assembly adopted the Declara-
tion on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Na-
tions,' which reaffirmed that the "right of self-determination of peoples" was
to be understood as a right to decolonization. Again, the "people" entitled to
self-determination was "the people of the [territory of a] colony or non-self-
governing territory .. . ." States, in turn, had a duty to assist the United Na-
tions in "bring[ing] about a speedy end to colonialism, having due regard to the
freely expressed will of the peoples concerned. "'
By seizing the mantle of self-determination, the anticolonial movement
renewed the principle's vitality and brought international law into harmony with
the political temper of the time. And if colonial powers were not uniformly
sanguine about the United Nations's efforts to wrest colonial territories from
their control, 6 many nonetheless were relieved to see the "principle of self-
determination" redefined to respond to contemporary demands while containing
expectations within tolerable limits.' 2
While supporting colonial territories' right to free themselves from metro-
politan rule, U.N. instruments affirming "peoples' right to self-determination"
simultaneously affirmed states' right to territorial integrity.228 A resolution
219. G.A. Res. 421, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 42, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
Other key instruments establishing self-determination as a right include the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, both of
which were adopted by the United Nations in 1966. The first article of both conventions proclaims that
"[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determination." The International Court of Justice recognized self-
determination as a right in its advisory opinion in Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 36 (Jan. 1).
220. G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, 67, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1960) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 1514]
221. Id. para. 1.
222. Id. para. 5.
223. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8018 (1970)
[hereinafter G.A. Res. 2625].
224. Id. at 340.
225. Id.
226. See Franck, supra note 4, at 55 (noting that "Imperial powers complained about the General
Assembly's use of Charter article 73(c) to monitor political developments in their colonies").
227. See Bucm-Err, supra note 35, at 7.
228. The 1960 Declaration, for example, proclaimed that "[a]ny attempt aimed at the partial or
total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the pur-
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adopted by the General Assembly the day after it adopted the 1960 Declaration
on Colonial Countries left little doubt that the solidifying "right of self-
determination" was limited to a colonial context. Establishing the so-called
"salt-water" test, the resolution implied that the "peoples" entitled to independ-
ence were limited to inhabitants of discontiguous territories governed by Euro-
pean states. 9 The "peoples" entitled to self-determination were defined as the
inhabitants of a colony but not as ethnically distinct groups within those territo-
ries or established statesY °
It was not just established states that were eager narrowly to define the
right of self-determination as a right to end colonial status. The newly inde-
pendent states of Africa were keen to erect a breakwater against the spread of
secessionist proclivities to subgroups in their territories. And so, with the
dawning of decolonization in its continent, the Organization of African Unity
adhered to the principle of uti possidetis, developed a century earlier when
Latin American states acquired independence from Spain."3 That principle
"upgraded former administrative delimitations, established during the colonial
period, to international frontiers," 2 thereby assuring their sanctity as state bor-
ders. 3 It also provided a bright line test for assessing claims to self-
determination-one that could be rationalized more readily in terms of interna-
tional stability concerns than of political philosophy.'
The postwar interpretation of self-determination recognized one possible
exception to uti possidetis, which provided the principal conceptual link be-
tween the interwar and postwar renderings of the principle. Like the two
League of Nations commissions that reported on the Aaland Islands dispute, the
Declaration on Friendly Relations hinted at the possibility that established states
might forfeit their right to territorial integrity if they abused the rights of mi-
norities:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any
action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or po-
litical unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus
poses and principles of the Charter of the United Nations," G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 220, para. 6, and
the 1970 Declaration contained similar language, see G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 223, Annex, at 122.
229.. The resolution, which sets forth principles relevant to non-self-governing territories gov-
erned by Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter, asserts that a territory is presumed to be non-self-governing if it
is geographically separate and ethnically or culturally distinct. See G.A. Res. 1541, U.N. GAOR, 15th
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 29, U.N. Doc. A/4651 (1960).
230. A review of 30 secessionist movements since the United Nations's founding revealed that the
Organization did not formally support any of those movements and actively intervened to prevent the se-
cession of Katanga from the Congo. See Gregory H. Fox, Self-Determination in the Post-Cold War Era: A
New Internal Focus?, 16 MicH. J. ITr'LL. 733, 740 (1995).
231. See Resolution on the Intangibility of Frontiers, Organization of African Unity, AGH/Res.
16(1) (1964), reprinted in DocuMENrs OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNrrY 49 (Gino J. Naldi ed.,
1992) (noting adoption by African heads of state at first summit following creation of OAU).
232. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 566, para. 23 (Dec. 22).
233. See id. paras. 23-24.
234. A chamber of the International Court of Justice conceded as much when it applied uti pos-
sidetis to resolve a border dispute between Burkina Faso and Mali, recognizing the principle as a general
rule of international law. See id. paras. 23-24, 26.
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possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without
distinction as to race, creed or colour.?5
In the postwar era, then, international law finally elevated self-determination to
the status it had been denied by the League of Nations-a rule of international
law. 6 Further, by applying the principle to colonial territories, international
law at last shed its centuries-long indulgence of colonizing states.
But if these aspects of postwar law seemed to augment both the status and
compass of the principle of self-determination, its coupling with the principle of
uti possidetis severely contracted its reach. If anything, uti possidetis reinforced
the ultrastatist view of nineteenth-century law, which regarded the state as a
virtually impenetrable fortress. More fundamentally, by defining the "self' en-
titled to exercise the right in strictly territorial terms, the postwar rendering of
self-determination drained the principle of its rich interwar meaning. Self-
determination thus was transformed from a principle for state-making into a
corrective to the historical injustice of alien subjugation. Through this legal al-
chemy, international law could claim to preserve a principle that had acquired a
potent symbolic power while simultaneously depriving that principle of its
power to threaten established states' territorial boundaries.
Yet even the postwar rendering of self-determination is more complex
doctrinally than is suggested in its common characterization as a right of "ex-
ternal" self-determination-that is, a right of territorially defined peoples to
emancipation from imperial rule. As elaborated by the United Nations, peoples
entitled to self-determination could not only cast off their metropolitan over-
lords but also determine their political status through the exercise of collective
will. General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV) notes that available options in
this regard include independent statehood, free association with an independent
state, and integration with an independent state3 7 In terms evocative of the Age
of Revolution, the resolution makes clear that the free choice of peoples, mani-
fested through democratic processes, was the pivot on which exercise of the
postwar right of self-determination would turn. 8 In an important opinion on
the postwar law of decolonization, the International Court of Justice defined the
principle of self-determination as "the need to pay regard to the freely ex-
235. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 223, at 340 (emphasis added). Ironically, this clause has been
read narrowly to apply "only [to] Pariah states like South Africa, which oppresses its majority on racial
grounds." Patrick Thornberry, Seif-Determination, Minorities, Human Rights: A Review of International
Instrwments, 38 INT'L& CoMp. L.Q. 867, 877 (1989). Yet the United Nations's goal with respect to South
Africa-finally realized in 1994-was a transition to nonracial democracy and not secession of the coun-
try's long-oppressed majority black population.
236. Indeed, some publicists regard the norm as peremptory. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note
107, at 513.
237. See G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, Annex, princ. VI, at
29, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
238. See, e.g., id. princ. VII(a) ("Free association should be the result of a free and voluntary
choice by the peoples of the territory concerned expressed through informed and democratic processes.");
id. princ. IX(b) (stating that integration with independent state "should be the result of the freely expressed
wishes of the territory's peoples acting with 'full knowledge of the change in their status, their wishes hay-
big been expressed through informed and democratic processes").
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pressed will of peoples" 9 after first making clear that the right was, in es-
sence, a right of decolonization.
In its postwar incarnation, the principle of self-determination has now
largely accomplished its assigned task.240 Yet an array of scholars and advocates
are reluctant to retire the right and have earnestly sought to find it new work. A
significant measure of scholarly support has begun to coalesce around the view
that self-determination should once again be invested with new meaning, this
time emphasizing its internal dimension-democratic governance.24
This view derives persuasive power from recent developments affirming a
democratic entitlement. But as I argue in Part IV, the implications of interna-
tional law's recent validation of democratic rights cannot readily be confined to
those relating to internal self-determination. For the right to choose one's gov-
ernment inevitably raises the question, may people choose-or reject-the state
in which they will exercise the right to govern themselves?
IV. NATIONALISM AND THE DEMOCRATIC ENTITLEMENT
[It is not] conceptually or strategically helpful... to treat the democratic entitlement as i n-
extricably linked to the claim of minorities to secession. 
2 2
The doctrine of national self-determination is based on and inseparable from that of popular
sovereignty.73
Although the idea of popular sovereignty transformed the political land-
scape of eighteenth-century Europe and the United States, it would take more
than another century and a half for international legal doctrine to support the
principle outside the limited context of the Paris peace conference. And while
international human rights instruments have assured a right to political partici-
pation since 1948,2' that right was virtually ignored for decades while other
239. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12,25 (Jan. 1).
240. See William Branigin, Independence for Palau Ends U.S. Sovereignty over Pacific Islands,
WASH. PosT, Oct. 2, 1994, at A30 (observing that independence of Palau ended islands' status as last
U.N. trust territory); Christopher S. Wren, Committee from the Past Lingers in the Present, N.Y. TMEs,
Aug. 1, 1995, at A4 (noting that U.N. Committee on Decolonization "has little left to do these days").
241. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 103; Franck, supra note 4; Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-
Determination, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 57-63 (1993) (advocating reinterpretation of right of self-
determination to subsume human rights norms, including, in particular, rights to participate in political life
of one's country and to protect one's identity).
242. Franck, supra note 4, at 52.
243. WAMBAUGH, supra note 125, at 2.
244. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 21(1), G.A. Res. 217 (1) A, U.N. Doc.
A/810, at 75 (1948) ("Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country directly or
through freely chosen representatives."); id. art. 21(3) ("The will of the people shall be the basis of the
authority of Government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures."); see
also African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 26, 1981, art. 13(1), O.A.U. Doc.
CABILEG/67/3/Rev. 5, 9 I.L.M. 58, 61 ("Every citizen shall have the right to freely participate in the
government of his country, either directly or through freely chosen representatives in accordance with the
provisions of the law."); American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969,
art. 23, 36 OAS T.S. 1, OEA/ser.KIXVJ/1.1, doc. 65, rev. 1 Corr.2, 9 I.L.M. 673, 682 (1970)
(promulgating provisions similar to article 25 of ICCPR); International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, art. 25, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 179 [hereinafter ICCPR] ("Every citizen shall
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guarantees, notably assurances of physical integrity and personal autonomy,
were the focus of concerted enforcement efforts. 245 But in recent years, the right
to political participation has moved into the forefront of international advocacy
concerns. In 1992, Thomas Franck noted an historic trend: "Democracy... is
on the way to becoming a global entitlement, one that increasingly will be pro-
moted and protected by collective international processes."246 The emerging
law, Franck argued, "requires democracy to validate governance ... .247
Both formal and practical support for democratic governance have figured
prominently in U.N. activities in recent years,24 and also have loomed large in
the agendas of such regional organizations as the Organization of American
States249 and the Organization for (formerly "Conference on") Security and Co-
operation in Europe.5 0 Notably, in 1994 the U.N. Security Council authorized
military intervention in Haiti for the express purpose of restoring "the legiti-
mately elected President," who had been deposed in a coup'-a measure that
would have been unthinkable until recently.
I will not elaborate on these developments, which have been well chroni-
cled by others." Instead, building upon their work, I consider the implications
of a democratic entitlement for ethno-separatist claims. In this inquiry, I address
two distinct, though overlapping, sets of arguments. First, I examine the claim
that the right of popular sovereignty imports the right not only to make political
choices within established units-here, I focus on states-but also to choose the
political unit within which one exercises popular sovereignty. This type of ar-
gument emphasizes the subjective dimension of self-determination and supports
have the right. . . (a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen
representatives; (b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and
equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the
electors."); Protocol (No. 1) to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, opened for signature Mar. 20, 1952, art. 3, Europ. T.S. No. 9, 213 U.N.T.S. 262, 264
(requiring parties "to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which
will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature").
245. Until recently, the right to political participation scarcely figured in the agendas of human
rights advocates, international organizations, and governments. During the early years of the human rights
movement, advocates focused on a core set of rights around which it was possible to forge consensus in a
divided world. With the Cold War in full sway, the right to democratic government was on no one's short
list of uncontrovertible rights. It took President Ronald Reagan to place the right to political participation
on the public agenda. See Diane F. Orentlicher, The Power of an Idea: The Impact of United States Human
Rights Policy, 1 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43, 44-54 (1991).
246. Franck, supra note 4, at 46. This trend is also chronicled and analyzed in Fox, supra note
103; and Thomas M. Franck, The Democratic Entitlement, 29 RIcH. L. REv. 1 (1994).
247. Franck, supra note 4, at 47.
248. See Fox, supra note 103, at 579-87; Franck, supra note 4, at 64-65.
249. On September 25, 1997, for example, the Organization of American States amended its
charter to provide for suspension from the organization of a member country "whose democratically
constituted government has been overthrown by force." Thomas W. Lippman, OAS Amends Charter to
Shun Coup-Based Governments, WASH. PosT, Sept. 26, 1997, at A21. On OAS support for democracy in
the Americas, see generally Stephen J. Schnably, The Santiago Commitment as a Call to Democracy in the
United States: Evaluating the OAS Role in Haiti, Peru, and Guatemala, 25 U. MIAMI ITER-AM. L. REV.
393 (1994).
250. See Franck, supra note 4, at 66-69.
251. S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/Res/940 (1994).
252. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 103; Franck, supra note 4; Schnably, supra note 249.
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ethno-separatist groups that regard themselves to be an appropriate unit of self-
government.
I next consider arguments hypothesizing that, if successful, ethno-
separatist claims would produce political units in which democratic values are
more likely to be realized than under the previous argument. This set of claims
is concerned with factors that may be instrumental to democratic governance
rather than intrinsic to the basic democratic proposition-that a people should
govern itself-and tends to give greater emphasis to the objective dimension of
self-determination.
I challenge the widely held view that theories of democratic government
have no bearing on questions of political unit. Although democratic theory does
not compel a uniform response to contested separatist claims, neither is it ir-
relevant to their resolution.
Beyond its theoretical implications, a democratic entitlement has consider-
able practical implications for ethno-separatist claims. Just as the idea of popu-
lar sovereignty inspired national revolts in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, so the tide of democratic transition that has swept the globe in recent
years has stoked the aspirations of ethno-national movements3 As previously
noted, the introduction of democracy in formerly authoritarian countries makes
appeals to ethnic politics far more tempting-and more perilous.'
A. The Problem of Unit in Democratic Theory
Democracy has, of course, no natural units. 25
With some exceptions, political theorists generally have failed to consider
the implications of democratic theories for the unit within which self-
government should be exercised. 6 Among those who have addressed the issue,
some assert that the question of unit stands outside democratic theory.57
Whether the issue is how to identify nations that are entitled to their own state
or local populations entitled to home rule, "there is no theory for determining
253. A notable case in point is the former Czechoslovakia. Three years after the "velvet revolu-
tion" swept aside that country's communist government, political leaders of the two constituent republics
concluded a "velvet divorce." See Stephen Engelberg, Czechoslovakia Breaks in nvo, to Wide Regret,
N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 1, 1993, at Al.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 86-93; see also Walzer, The New Tribalism, supra note
2, at 164-65 ("Multinationalism... is a function of predemocratic or antidemocratic politics. But bring
the 'people' into political life and they will arrive, marching in tribal ranks and orders, carrying with them
their own languages, historic memories, customs, beliefs, and commitments.").
255. Walzer, The New Tribalism, supra note 2, at 165.
256. See DAHL, supra note 2, at 193 (1989) (noting that democratic theorists generally have "ei-
ther ignored these puzzling and difficult questions or provided facile answers").
257. See Whelan, supra note 2, at 16 ("Boundaries comprise a problem . . . that is insoluble
within the framework of democratic theory.. . ."); see also C. Edwin Baker, Republican Liberalism: Lib-
eral Rights and Republican Politics, 41 FLA. L. REV. 491, 497 (1989) (noting that "rights-centered liber-
alism has no abstract or prepolitical grounds to determine who should be included within its political
units"); Richard Briffault, Voting Rights, Home Rule, and Metropolitan Governance: The Secession of
Staten Island as a Case Study in the Dilemmas of Local Self-Determination, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 775, 800
(1992) (observing that "the concept of self-government says nothing about who is the 'self' that does the
governing").
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when one. . . polity ought to end and another begin."158 Consistent with this
view, while heralding an emerging right to democratic governance, Professor
Franck eschews the inference that this entitlement includes a right to choose the
territorial boundaries within which self-government should be exercised or the
fellow citizens with whom one will practice self-government 59
The suggestion that democratic principles have no bearing on claims of
national self-determination would surely ring false to eighteenth-century nation-
alists, for whom nationalism and popular sovereignty were inseparable. 21 As
noted in Subsection II.B.1, eighteenth-century conceptions of popular sover-
eignty-above all, the idea that a people had a right to choose its own govern-
ment-naturally led to the claim that "the people" had the "right to decide
whether to attach itself to one state or another, or constitute an independent
state by itself. 261
Although, as I will argue shortly, theories of democratic government also
support countervailing arguments, this claim cannot be readily dismissed. On
the contrary, to the extent that international law validates a democratic entitle-
ment it inevitably, if inadvertently, presents new justifications for at least some
forms of ethno-separatist claims.
B. Intrinsic Arguments
1. Arguments Derived from the Principle of Consent
Here lies the very heart of the democratic idea: that governmental legitimacy depends upon
the affirmative consent of those who are governedZm
For some eighteenth-century nationalists-the intellectual progenitors of
Franck's democratic entitlement-it seemed axiomatic that the right to self-
government implies the right to choose one's fellow citizens. The point seemed
equally plain to John Stuart Mill:
258. Briffault, supra note 257, at 801.
259. Asserting that it is neither "conceptually [nor] strategically helpful . . . to treat the
democratic entitlement as inextricably linked to the claim of minorities to secession," Professor Franck has
opposed the view that international law supports secessionist claims. Franck, supra note 4, at 52; see also
Thomas M. Franck, Fairness to "Peoples" and Their Right to Self-Determination, in FAlRNEss IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTiruTIONS 140 (1995); Thomas M. Franck, Postmodern Tribalism and the
Right to Secession, in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES iNINTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (C. Brolmann et al. eds., 1993).
Citing the principle of self-determination as "the historic root from which the democratic entitlement
grew," Franck characterizes the principle in terms that assume the boundaries of an established political
unit: "Self-determination postulates the tight of a people organized in an established territory to determine
its collective political destiny in a democratic fashion and is therefore at the core of the democratic
entitlement." Franck, supra note 4, at 52.
260. Liah Greenfeld reminds us that "[d]emocracy was born with the sense of nationality. The
two are inherently linked, and neither can be fully understood apart from this connection. Nationalism was
the form in which democracy appeared in the world, contained in the idea of the nation as a butterfly in a
cocoon." LLAH GREENFELD, NATiONAuSM: FIVE ROADs TO MODERNrrY 10 (1992).
261. COBBAN, supra note 34, at 41.
262. Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and Theoreti-
cal Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1391, 1444 (1993).
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Where the sentiment of nationality exists in any force, there is a prima fade case for uniting
all the members of the nationality under the same government, and a government to them-
selves apart. This is merely saying that the question of government ought to be decided by
the governed. One hardly knows what any division of the human race should be free to do,
if not to determine with which of the various collective bodies of human beings they choose
to associate themselves.'
The argument is elegant in its simplicity: Since democracy is, by defmi-
tion, government with the consent of the governed,2 ' the boundaries of political
commitment should be determined in accordance with the principle of con-
sent.2 65 The claim has special force when distinct populations within a state ex-
plicitly agree upon conditions necessary to their continued union-or sufficient
to trigger their divorce-but is relevant wherever the principle of popular
sovereignty is held to be the basis of governmental legitimacy.
This argument need not imply that the boundaries of states are perennially
up for popular reconsideration; continuing consent of established states' citizens
generally can be presumed,2" and indeed this assumption is essential to the on-
going viability of democratic processes-and of states. Historically, the experi-
ence of Western European states examined in Part II justifies this assumption.268
Where such consent is manifestly withdrawn by a significant portion of a state's
citizens, however, the legitimacy of that state's sovereignty over the rebel
population faces a profound challenge-particularly if one agrees with Professor
Franck that international law now "requires democracy to validate govern-
ance .... "269 But while this argument has intuitive appeal, it immediately runs
up against the problem of determining whose consent should be decisive when
groups stake conflicting claims to the same territory, a problem to which I re-
turn in Subsection IV.B.5.
2. Secession as a Remedy for Oppressed and Permanent Minorities
Additional arguments turn on particular justifications for democratic gov-
ernment and support secession in limited circumstances. In particular, varia-
tions on liberal democratic theory may support secession as a last resort remedy
for permanently oppressed or outvoted minority groups.
263. JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1861), in
UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 187, 392 (Every-
man's ed. 1993) (emphasis added).
264. C. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("Mo secure these rights,
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.").
265. See Whelan, supra note 2, at 15.
266. See BUCHANAN, supra note 2, at 35-36. An example of such a country is Ethiopia, whose
constitution establishes a right of secession for each of its ethnically based regions. See Stephen Buckley,
Ethiopia Takes New Ethnic Tack: Deliberately Divisive, WASH. POST, June 18, 1995, at A21.
267. C. Whelan, supra note 2, at 27 (pointing out that although consent when given is ground of
legitimate government, historically consent "grows within states founded by other means (usually force), as
a consequence of good government").
268. See supra text accompanying notes 76-77, 94 (suggesting that protracted history of shared
citizenship engenders solidary commitment to civic nation).
269. Franck, supra note 4, at 47. See Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Terri-
toialInterpretation, 16 YALE J. INr'LL. 177, 184 (1991), for the contrary view that, "[d]espite the rheto-
ric of liberal democracy, actual consent is not necessary to political legitimacy."
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For John Locke, the principle of consent of the governed followed from
the intrinsic worth and equality of all people; if every person had inherent equal
worth, none should be "subjected to the Political Power of another, without his
own Consent."'27 The inherent worth of people also defined the aim of govern-
ment; governments, in Locke's view, are formed to safeguard the natural rights
of citizens, which are prior to the state."
If, with Locke, one believes that the justifying aim of governments is to
protect citizens' natural rights and that citizens therefore have a right to rebel
against tyrannical regimes,' a government would lose its legitimacy vis-A-vis a
distinct segment of its citizens if it systematically failed to protect that group's
fundamental rights. This argument would justify secession at least as a last re-
sort remedy when efforts to secure minorities' fundamental rights within the
existing state prove futile. 73
Framed here in terms of political theory, this position resonates with the
suggestion of the two League of Nations commissions that examined the Aaland
Islands dispute274 and with the U.N. General Assembly Declaration on Friendly
Relations. 5 It has, moreover, received a small measure of contemporary sup-
port through the U.N.-sanctioned establishment of an autonomous zone for
Kurds in Iraq, established to protect Kurds against further repression at the
hands of the Iraqi govenmment.
7 6
More generally, a last resort remedial right of secession provides one an-
swer to the dilemma for democratic theory presented by the permanent minor-
ity. A right to political participation manifestly entails a people's right to choose
its government and accordingly implies that members of the polity must enter-
tain at least the theoretical possibility that their choices will prevail. 7 If, how-
ever, the choices of a minority ethnic group are systematically outvoted, its
members are effectively denied the opportunity to exercise meaningful self-
government.8 (This observation of course assumes what should be an uncon-
270. LocKE, supra note 116, at 348.
271. See id. at 368-69.
272. See id. at 430-32.
273. See Hannum, supra note 241, at 44-46. Even Abraham Lincoln seemed to acknowledge that
the southern states might be justified in seceding if their fundamental rights had been violated. Arguing
against secession, he conceded: "If, by the mere force of numbers, a majority should deprive a minority of
any clearly written constitutional right, it might, in a moral point of view, justify revolution--certainly
would, if such right were a vital one." Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), re-
prited in 6 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 5 (James
D. Richardson ed., n.p., United States Congress 1898).
274. See supra text accompanying notes 204-205.
275. See supra text accompanying note 235.
276. See Jane E. Stromseth, Iraq's Repression of Its Civilian Population: Collective Responses
and Continuing Challenges, in ENFORCING REmTAINT: COLLECrIE I VENTION IN INTERNAL
CONFuCTs 77 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1993).
277. See ROBERTA. DAHL, POLYARCHY 114-21 (1971).
278. Again, these issues were addressed in response to the Confederate states' attempt to secede.
Opposing their effort on the ground that it would amount to minority rule, Abraham Lincoln assumed that
the legitimacy of majority rule turns on the factual circumstance of ever-changing majorities: "A majority,
held in restraint by constitutional checks and limitations, and always changing easily with deliberate
changes of popular opinions and sentiments, is the only true sovereign of a free people." Lincoln, supra
note 273, at 8.
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troversial point-that political choices in a democratic society are sometimes
exercised along group lines.279) This type of exclusion can, of course, be reme-
died through measures short of secession, such as adopting a system of propor-
tional representation or regional autonomy. If, however, the majority govern-
ment is persistently unwilling to accommodate the political aspirations of a sig-
nificant minority, that group arguably can exercise self-government only by se-
ceding. 
0
3. Arguments Derived from the Value of Moral Autonomy
This same conclusion can be supported by liberal democratic theories that
justify self-government in terms of the ultimate value of individual moral auton-
omy. Robert Dahl defines a morally autonomous person as "one who decides
on his moral principles, and the decisions that significantly depend on them,
following a process of reflection, deliberation, scrutiny, and consideration."281
For Dahl, then, moral autonomy is a form of self-governance. Democratic gov-
ernment furthers the value of moral autonomy by maximizing "the feasible
scope of self-determination for those who are subject to collective decisions."282
Since political self-determination must be exercised collectively, this ar-
gument becomes problematic if a democratic society includes a permanent mi-
nority-one whose moral choices consistently are overridden by the majority.
The problem becomes acute if the minority's choices on matters of direct and
particular concern to its members are routinely outvoted.23 Again, the most ap-
propriate remedy may be to devolve certain matters for self-government to par-
ticular groups, and indeed international instruments and organizations have en-
dorsed this approach.' Still, the political aspirations of some groups may so
279. Cf. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 944 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (pointing out that
ethnicity is a significant force in political life"); Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Po-
litical Equality, 77 VA. L. REv. 1413, 1415 (1991) (arguing that strategies of second-generation voting
rights litigants have been based on premise that black voters have distinctive interests, which are more
likely to be addressed by representatives elected from majority-black districts than by those elected from
majority-white districts).
280. Cf. Kirgis, supra note 192, at 306 (suggesting that since 1970, there has been ill-defined
right of peoples to secede from state "that does not have a fully representative form of government, or at
least to secede from a state whose government excludes people of any race, creed or color from political
representation when those people are the ones asserting the right and they have a claim to a defined
territory").
281. DAHL, supra note 2, at 91. Dahl asserts that "the reasons for respecting moral autonomy sift
down to one's belief that it is a quality without which human beings cease to be fully human and in the
total absence of which they would not be human at all." Id.
282. Id.
283. Cf Margalit & Raz, supra note 2, at 440 ("If self-government is valuable then it is valuable
that whatever is a proper matter for political decision should be subject to the political decision of the group
in all matters concerning the group and its members.").
284. See, e.g., Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples, Report of the Working Group on
Indigenous Populations on Its Tenth Session, U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., Agenda Item 15, operative para.
27, U.N. Doe. E/CN.41Sub.2/1992/33 (1992) ("Indigenous peoples have the right to autonomy in matters
relating to their own internal and local affairs. .. ."); Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe:
Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities, 30 I.L.M. 1692 (1991) (noting positive
results that some states have achieved by, inter alia, "local and autonomous administration, as well as
autonomy on a territorial basis" and "self-administration by a national minority of aspects concerning its
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fundamentally and inalterably diverge from those of other citizens that the for-
mer can be adequately realized only through political divorce.
4. Implications for Territorial Sovereignty of a Democratic Entitlement
It remains to be noted that, whatever theory supports an emerging demo-
cratic entitlement, such a right should, in light of established doctrines govern-
ing transfer of territory, have profound implications for a population's right to
determine the status of the territory in which it habitually resides. As noted in
Section IlI.B, much of international law governing acquisition of territorial sov-
ereignty derives from principles of Roman law that analogize territorial sover-
eignty to private property ownership. 5 In this paradigm, a monarch historically
was able to alienate territory along with its inhabitants without seeking their
consent, much as a private property holder could barter territory along with the
cattle that graze on it. In the Age of Revolution, this was thought utterly incom-
patible with the principle of popular sovereignty, and in the early years of the
French Revolution consent of populations was sought as a prerequisite to an-
nexation.
6
Of course the principle of popular sovereignty that seemed to require
popular consent to changes in territorial status was soon abandoned by the
French revolutionaries and in any event failed to acquire the sanction of inter-
national law until the postwar twentieth century 7 (although it was sporadically
applied by great powers before then288). But with the dawning of a democratic
entitlement, the view that prevailed in the early period of the French Revolution
may have acquired renewed support-this time rooted in emerging principles of
international law.
The argument can be simply stated: As previously noted, a basic attribute
of sovereignty is the power to alienate a portion of a state's territory;289 once
international law established democracy as the only legitimate form of govern-
ment, it ineluctably vested the exercise of state sovereignty in "the people"; if
"the people" wish to break off a portion of the state's territory and form a new
state, they possess the power to do so.2" In short, the implications of Professor
identity in situations where autonomy on a territorial basis does not apply"); Document of the Copenhagen
Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, June 29, 1990, art. 35, reprinted in 11
Hum. RTs. L.J. 232 (1990) (noting efforts to "protect and create conditions for the promoting of the
ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of certain national minorities by establishing, as one of the
possible means to achieve these aims, appropriate local or autonomous administrations corresponding to the
specific historical and territorial circumstances of such minorities").
285. See supra text accompanying notes 111-115.
286. See supra text accompanying note 131.
287. See supra text accompanying notes 217-236.
288. As previously noted, plebiscites were used to resolve the disputed status of several regions
following World War I and were also used periodically before then. See supra text accompanying notes
132-133, 179-180.
289. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
290. Of course, in a representative democracy the elected leaders generally act for "the people,"
and presumably once elected may even dispose of state territory on "the people's" behalf. C. Edwards v.
Carter, 580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (finding President's conveyance of Panama Canal without
congressional approval not unconstitutional). But this does not resolve the dilemma considered here-what
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Franck's democratic entitlement are potentially quite radical indeed. By af-
firming popular sovereignty, this emerging right may undermine international
law's bedrock principle of territorial integrity as a ground for opposing separa-
tist claims.
5. But Which People?
A major problem with this argument is, of course, that it does not identify
which "people" may decide the issue of secession if the whole population of the
state from which secession is sought cannot reach common accord. If, as hap-
pened in the former Czechoslovakia, representatives of each major population
consent to political divorce, the principle of popular sovereignty may not only
be consistent with the breakup of a state into two or more new states, but may
affirmatively support that outcome.29" ' More problematic, however, are situa-
tions like those presented by the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia.
When the former Yugoslav republic of Croatia resolved to secede in June
1991, its Serb minority, which comprised roughly 11.5 percent of Croatia's
population, bitterly opposed the decision. Supported in their opposition by the
government in Serbia, they went to war against the Croatian army. A still more
devastating war raged in the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
("Bosnia") for three and a half years beginning in April 1992, when the Euro-
pean Community and the United States recognized Bosnia as an independent
state. Although sixty-three percent of Bosnia's citizens had voted for independ-
ence in a plebiscite in February-March of 1992, most of the Serbs in Bosnia,
comprising roughly thirty-one percent of the population, opposed secession and
boycotted the poll.21 The nationalist Serb political party in Bosnia had already
held its own plebiscite, and the Serbs polled voted for a "common Yugoslav
State. " " As further elaborated in Part V, the use of plebiscites in this situation
was highly problematic.
happens when a significant and defined portion of a state's citizens unambiguously choose to change the
sovereign status of the territory in which they habitually reside? Cf. David Wippman, Treaty-Based
Intervention: Who Can Say No?, 62 U. Cma. L. REV. 607, 624-29 (1995) (arguing that although
international law usually operates on fiction that government represents state when former acts on
international plane, authority to bind state in authorizing future intervention in its internal affairs should be
divided when, as factual matter, state's political community is divided).
291. The reference to democratically elected representatives is deliberate. The "velvet divorce" of
Czechoslovakia's two constituent republics was initiated by Slovakia's Prime Minister, Vladimir Meciar,
and ultimately accepted by the Czech Prime Minister, Vaclav Klaus. Even after these political leaders
concluded the agreement to separate, public opinion polls showed that a majority of both Czechs and
Slovaks wanted the federation to continue. Further, Slovakia's population of 5.2 million included some
600,000 ethnic Hungarians who feared that separation from the Czech republic would leave them more
vulnerable. See Engelberg, supra note 253, at Al. The separation eventually was approved, after two
failed efforts, by the Czech Parliament. See Division Approved by Czechoslovaks, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 26,
1992, at A5.
292. See infra text accompanying note 392.
293. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, On International Recognition of the
Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina by the European Community and Its Member States, Opinion
No. 4, Jan. 11, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1501, 1503, para. 3(b) [hereinafter Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration
Commission, Opinion No. 4]. In contrast, Slovenia's bid for independence in 1991 was virtually
unopposed. A plebiscite there produced an overwhelming majority in favor of secession. Because minority
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This conundrum may at first blush seem to be amenable to resolution
when the justification for secession turns on denial of a significant minority
group's fundamental rights294 since the population entitled to secede seems
readily defined. Even here, though, secession may be problematic if the op-
pressed minority is territorially dispersed or, though geographically concen-
trated, occupies territory whose inhabitants include people who do not wish to
secede.
These examples make plain the limits of democratic theory in resolving
contested claims to territory. Still, considerations bearing on democratic gov-
ernment may be dispositive of some claims, while democratic theory may have
important implications for other, more complex, situations. Specifically, some
resolutions of contested claims may better promote values relating to demo-
cratic governance than others-a subject that comes into sharper focus as we
turn to instrumental arguments in support of separatist claims.
C. Instrumental Arguments
Ethno-separatist movements might seek legitimacy on the ground that the
values thought to be secured by democratic government are most likely to be
realized when a polity is comparatively homogeneous-or, perhaps more im-
portantly, regards itself as sharing a common commitment to core goals and
values. This type of argument draws particular strength from utilitarian justifi-
cations for self-government and from civic republican visions of democracy.
1. Justifications Drawn from Utilitarian Theories
A commonly asserted justification for democracy is the claim that it is the
form of government most likely to secure the interests of the greatest number of
persons subject to governmental authority.295 For eighteenth-century utilitarians
like Jeremy Bentham and James Mill, democracy was not an end in itself but a
means for maximizing the realization of individuals' interests through aggrega-
tion of private preferences.296 But this justification may begin to fray if a polity
is too diverse, at least if its diversity entails significant differences in political
choices.
When individuals define their political interests in terms of the well-being
of the national group to which they belong, nationalism and utilitarian justifica-
tions for democracy may converge to support national separatist movements.
Some contemporary theories of national self-determination make precisely this
type of argument. Asserting that the well-being of individuals is tied to the wel-
fare of the national group to which they belong and which commands their
paramount loyalty, some advocates of national self-determination argue that na-
groups in Slovenia were not sizable, the results generally were viewed as legitimate. See MISHA GLENNY,
THE FALL OF YUGOSLAvA: THE THRD BALKAN WAR 165 (3d ed. 1996).
294. See supra text accompanying notes 270-280.
295. See DAHL, supra note 2, at 93-95.
296. See DAVID HELD, POL1TICALTHEoRY AND THE MODERN STATE 25 (1989).
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tion-states may offer the best assurance of securing the well-being of nations
and their members. 2"
If this argument seems radical, its basic assumptions have routinely in-
formed decisions regarding representation of minority groups within established
democratic states. In the United States, decades of experimentation under the
Voting Rights Act have seen various efforts to redraw voting districts to assure
racial equality in the exercise of the franchise. One such approach, largely dis-
credited by recent Supreme Court decisions,298 has been to create "majority-
minority" districts whose demographic makeup virtually assures that the mi-
nority group comprising a majority in the district will be able to determine the
outcome of an election. This approach recognized that political votes have, at
times, correlated significantly with racial demography. 2" Similarly, propor-
tional representation schemes utilized in many countries, including several
Western European democracies,3"° implicitly endorse the view that ethnicity can
be an appropriate basis for determining the territorial boundaries of a franchise
within an established state.
2. Arguments Derived from the Republican Tradition
Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities.
Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different lan-
guages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of representative govern-
ment, cannot exist.30
Although the republican tradition offers a significantly different vision of
democracy than utilitarianism, the former, like the latter, may provide support
for at least some separatist claims. Specifically, republicanism seemingly would
be furthered by the success of separatist claims if the result were two or more
states whose citizens were better able than the citizens of the previous unified
state to consider the common good in their democratic deliberations. 3"
The core principles of contemporary versions of republicanism include a
commitment to citizen participation in the deliberative process,3"3 made possible
by civic virtue; equality of political actors; and affirmation of the notion of a
297. See, e.g., TAMm, supra note 8; Margalit & Raz, supra note 2.
298. The most important of these is Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), in which the Supreme
Court held that majority-minority districts in North Carolina gave rise to an equal protection claim.
299. See Guinier, supra note 279, at 1415. While critiquing this approach, Guinier offers an al-
ternative that assumes that there are "politically cohesive minority interests"-i.e., political interests that
correlate with racial identity, however fluid the correlation. Id. at 1462.
300. See DAHL, supra note 2, at 159.
301. MILL, supra note 263, at 392.
302. The discussion that follows draws upon contemporary liberal revisions of republicanism,
whose more traditional versions often have been highly exclusionary.
303. In this respect republicanism fails within a broader set of justifications for democratic gov-
ernment-participation theories. In contrast to utilitarianism's concern with democracy's instrumental value
in securing individuals' rights and interests, participation theories emphasize the intrinsic value of political
participation. See Steiner, supra note 86, at 100, 102. The values associated with greater citizen participa-
tion in public life include in particular greater self-realization: "Through increased participation in the in-
stitutions affecting their lives, [citizens] develop a sense of their worth and significance." Id. at 105.
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common interest or good." 4 In the classical version of republicanism, "political
participants were to subordinate their private interests to the public good
through political participation in an ongoing process of collective self-
determination. "3 05
In principle, liberal renderings of republicanism not only tolerate but as-
sume and even require some measure of diversity within the self-governing
polity, and offer an alternative to utilitarianism that proponents of liberal repub-
licanism believe is better designed to secure the interests of minorities. Republi-
canism rests on "a belief in the possibility of mediating different approaches to
politics, or different conceptions of the public good, through discussion and
dialogue" 06 and sees disagreement as a creative force that promotes political
deliberation.3" Republicanism regards the deliberative process itself as playing
a central part in the constitution of political identity; through the deliberative
process, initial preferences might be modified, and the outcome of that process
ideally will promote a common, rather than majority, good." 8
Yet this process requires not only "a commitment to political empathy,
embodied in a requirement that political actors attempt to assume the position of
those who disagree, " " but also a capacity to empathize with citizens whose
interests may be different from one's own. The fabric of republicanism, like
that of utilitarianism, might be strained by too much diversity within the pol-
ity.
310
It was precisely this consideration that led John Smart Mill to conclude
that "it is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the bounda-
ries of government should coincide in the imain with those of nationalities."'
Indeed, the capacity to empathize was central to Mill's conception of nations:
A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality if they are united among
themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and any others-which
make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be
under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves or a
portion of themselves exclusively
1 2
Like other arguments examined above, the claims of republicanism do not
lead inexorably to a general rule favoring separatist claims. One leading propo-
nent of liberal republicanism, Cass Sunstein, finds in republican principles
themselves the potential for resolving problems posed by diversity through pro-
304. See generally Baker, supra note 257, at 491; Frank I. Michelnan, Conceptions of Democ-
racy in American Constitutional Argument: Voting Rights, 41 FLA. L. REV. 443 (1989); Raskin, supra
note 262, at 1453-54; Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YAIE L.J. 1539 (1988).
305. Sunstein, supra note 304, at 1547-48 (footnote omitted).
306. Id. at 1554 (footnote omitted).
307. See id. at 1562, 1575. Sunstein argues that "[miodem republicanism is thus not grounded in
a belief in homogeneity; on the contrary, heterogeneity is necessary if republican systems are to work." Id.
at 1576.
308. See id. at 1554-56.
309. Id. at 1555 (footnote omitted).
310. C. id. at 1556 (observing that "the republican belief in deliberation about the common good
is most easily sustained when there is homogeneity and agreement about foundations").
311. MILL, supra note 263, at394.
312. Id. at 391.
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portional representation rather than secession."' More generally, institutional
arrangements designed to promote interethnic accommodation can go a long
way toward assuring cooperation in multiethnic societies.314
But if the republican vision of democratic governance does not generally
support separatist movements, neither is it irrelevant to their claims. In specific
cases, as when part of a population declares itself inalterably hostile to the in-
terests of another major group in the same state, republican theories may point
toward political divorce on the ground that separation would produce two states
in which republican democracy can be viable, instead of one in which its pros-
pects are bleak. 5
D. Countervailing Arguments
I have argued that although theories supporting democratic government do
not provide a general rule for determining the ideal boundaries of a political
unit, such theories point to considerations that may be pertinent in resolving
boundary disputes. While the preceding sections demonstrate how democratic
theories might support some separatist claims, other considerations, also de-
rived from justifications for self-government, may point in the opposite direc-
tion.
1. Counter-Majoritarian Veto
From the perspective of separatist groups, a right to secede seems fully
consistent with democratic principles. But from the vantage point of the state
from which secession is sought, the very possibility imperils the democratic
process.
If a secessionist movement opposed by most of a country's citizens pre-
vailed, its success would vitiate the principle of majority rule.3"6 Further, even
the possibility of secession may thwart democratic deliberations, making the
sort of compromise that is the warp and woof of the democratic process unten-
able. When secession is known to be possible, political minorities within a de-
mocracy can distort the outcome of political processes by threatening to secede
if their views do not prevail." 7
313. See Sunstein, supra note 304, at 1588-89.
314. See supra note 95.
315. C. Thomas L. Friedman, Fire, Ready, Aim, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1995, § 4, at 15 (arguing
for partition of Bosnia along national lines); Thomas L. Friedman, It's lime to Separate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
29, 1995, § 4, at 15 (arguing that establishment of separate Palestinian and Jewish states assures best
prospect for peaceful coexistence of Israeli Jews and Palestinians).
316. President Lincoln invoked this argument in opposing the secession of the southern
confederacy. See Lincoln, supra note 273, at 9.
317. See BUCHANAN, supra note 2, at 100; Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58
U. CGn. L. REv. 633, 648-49 (1991). This problem can, however, be mitigated by constitutional
provisions that specify and limit the conditions that can justify secession. Such a delimitation would seek to
minimize the situations in which a minority could invoke the threat of secession as a bargaining chip. See
BUCHANAN, supra note 2, at 100.
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2. Authoritarian Tendencies of Ethno-National States
To the extent that democracy is justified in terms of individuals' intrinsic
and equal worth,318 an objective rendering of the principle of national self-
determination may seem fundamentally antithetical to democratic principles.
Opposing the objective principle of national self-determination in 1862, Lord
Acton argued this point forcefully:
By making the State and the nation commensurate with each other in theory, [the modem
theory of nationality] reduces practically to a subject condition all other nationalities that
may be within the boundary. It cannot admit them to an equality with the ruling nation
which constitutes the State, because the State would then cease to be national, which would
be a contradiction of the principle of its existence. Accordingly, therefore, to the degree of
humanity and civilisation in that dominant body which claims all the rights of the commu-
nity, the inferior races are exterminated, or reduced to servitude, or outlawed, or put in a
condition of dependence.
31 9
A related argument is that to configure states along ethno-national lines is
to establish the conditions for authoritarian social arrangements. Such condi-
tions are antithetical to the exercise of individual autonomy that is central to
many justifications of democratic government, 320 and imperil the natural rights
of individuals-the protection of which, in Locke's view, is the justifying aim
of government.32' This concern reflects "what is seen to be the totalizing ten-
dency of the traditions and cultures that are invoked" in the "nationalist version
of communitarianism." 31 Lord Acton's nineteenth-century warning has re-
newed force today: "In a small and homogeneous population there is hardly
room ... for inner groups of interests that set bounds to sovereign power. " "
For Lord Acton, the multiethnic state "provides against the servility which
flourishes under the shadow of a single authority, by balancing interests, multi-
plying associations... diversity preserves liberty .... 324
Of course these risks can be mitigated by minority rights protections.
Even with such assurances, however, elevating national self-determination to an
organizing principle of states cannot help but impair the inculcation of values
that sustain a democratic culture-above all, respect for all citizens' intrinsic
and equal worth.
Still, it is important to distinguish between a principle of objective self-
determination that would legitimize as a general organizing principle the para-
digm of nation-states, and the resolution of particular secessionist claims in fa-
vor of the separatists. The latter outcome is not per se undemocratic, as Robert
318. See supra text accompanying notes 270-271.
319. ACrON, supra note 30, at 7.
320. See supra text accompanying notes 281-282.
321. See supra text accompanying note 271.
322. Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities, 66
NOTRE DAME L. Rnv. 1219, 1250 (1991).
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Dahl reminds us, recalling that democratic Europe "consists of people who
have been constituted by divisions and separations. "31
E. Authoritative Resolution
While these considerations argue against any general rule or presumption
in favor of ethno-separatist claims, there remains an unavoidable dilemma: The
international community, whether acting as autonomous states through bilateral
recognition policies or collectively through such fora as the United Nations, has
no choice but to respond to such claims when they are asserted. Perhaps the
most acute dilemma arises in situations like those presented in the former
Yugoslavia and in Russia, where significant subunits of a state wish to secede
while the remaining population opposes secession. To the extent that democratic
processes are brought to bear in resolving the contested claims, these situations
raise the difficult question of how to identify the unit(s) that should participate.
The answer to that question will determine the outcome of the democratic
process in the situations described above. Consider, for example, the juridical
status of Northern Ireland and its Catholic minority. Suppose that an authorita-
tive body undertook to resolve this dispute through a plebiscite. If that body
identified Northern Ireland's Catholic minority as the relevant unit entitled to
determine its own status, the voting population would likely choose to unite
with the Republic of Ireland. A plebiscite conducted in the whole island of Ire-
land-that is, both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland-might produce
the same outcome. If, instead, the population of Northern Ireland were to re-
solve this issue, the majority would likely opt to remain in the United Kingdom
and to keep Northern Ireland's Catholic minority in that union. Similarly, if
pollsters consulted the entire population of the United Kingdom, the majority of
voters would probably choose the status quo.326 Each approach purports to re-
solve the dispute through democratic processes, yet alternative approaches may
produce opposite results. Does democratic theory offer any guidance on which
of these options is preferable?
From the point of view of Northern Ireland's Catholic minority, it might
seem patently undemocratic to be forced to remain in a state to which it does
not consent to belong. This view can be countered in terms of democratic the-
ory if it can be demonstrated that the rest of Northern Ireland's or the United
Kingdom's population has an interest in keeping Northern Ireland's Catholic
minority within the United Kingdom. If such interests are established, the larger
population would have a claim to participate in a plebiscite to resolve the dis-
pute under a variation of the "all-affected" standard. As framed by Robert
Dahl, that standard posits that "[e]veryone who is affected by the decisions of a
government should have the right to participate in that government."327
It takes little reflection to recognize that the entire population of a state
might be profoundly affected by the secession of a constituent part of that state.
325. DAHL, supra note 96, at 47.
326. This example is drawn from Whelan, supra note 2, at 23-24.
327. DAHL., supra note 96, at 49.
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Secession could leave the remaining state altered in several important respects:
A vital portion of the state's economic base may be lost,3" the demographic
profile of the country might be altered in a way that changes the outcome of
statewide polls, and so forth. Further, the possibility of fragmentation in itself
threatens the cohesion of a state polity and its capacity to find common ground
in matters of public policy.329 And as recent developments in the former Soviet
Union and former Yugoslavia remind us, when one or more parts of a federal
state assert independence, they may make inevitable the dissolution of the entire
state, effectively forcing independence on republics that would have preferred
the status quo. 330 Accordingly, the all-affected principle would seem to dictate
that the state's entire population should vote on the secession of a constituent
part.
One problem with using the all-affected principle to resolve the unit di-
lemma, however, is that it does not provide a means of weighting competing
interests. Instead, it gives every voter who has an interest in the outcome of a
plebiscite an equally weighted vote, even though the outcome will affect some
citizens far more profoundly than others.
This type of dilemma is not inherently insoluble, but its resolution re-
quires an entity that can authoritatively resolve the conflicting claims. Analo-
gous dilemmas have, in fact, been resolved within states by vesting such
authority in a particular government entity. In the United States, for example,
the Supreme Court has recognized that federal states generally have the power
to determine the boundaries within which questions of reorganization, such as
whether a local governing unit will merge with another, will be decided by
popular vote.331' But these situations are fundamentally different from the situa-
tion addressed in this Article: In theory, at least, a federal state government can
consider the welfare of all of its citizens in deciding the territorial boundaries of
the vote on a proposed political reorganization that does not entail secession
from the state.
For example, the State of New York could be expected to take account of
the relative interests of all of its citizens in deciding how to structure a vote on
Staten Island's bid to secede from the City of New York.332 The state govern-
328. Cf. Czechs and Slovaks Divide Up Assets on Brink of Separation, N.Y. TeMS, Dec. 11,
1992, at A8 (describing negotiations over division of assets of former Czechoslovakia on eve of its division
into two separate states).
329. See supra text accompanying note 316.
330. See GLENNY, supra note 293, at 143-44 (recounting how secession of Slovenia and Croatia
from former Yugoslavia induced Bosnian secession, though Bosnia would not have seceded from intact
Yugoslavia); Margaret Shapiro, Identity Crisis Pulls Many in Belarus Toward Russia, WASH. POST, July
2, 1995, at A23 (describing general regret among citizens of Belarus that breakup of Soviet Union led to
their country's separation from Russia and noting, inter alia, severe economic consequences for Belarus).
331. See, e.g., Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action at the Local Level, Inc., 430
U.S. 259 (1977) (rejecting challenge to New York's procedure for reorganizing counties). There are,
however, exceptions to states' power in this area. For example, the Fifteenth Amendment forbids a state
from depriving citizens of the right to vote because of their race, and this provision has been applied to
invalidate some states' discriminatory districting schemes. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339
(1960); cf. Guinier, supra note 279, at 1433 (criticizing districting model of enforcing Voting Rights Act
because it "ignores the role of prejudice at the legislative level").
332. That bid has been analyzed in Briffault, supra note 257.
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ment would not be an interested party in the outcome of that vote in the way
that it would be if Staten Island sought to secede from the State of New York
itself. And as the government of all of the citizens significantly affected by
Staten Island's quest to secede-that is, both residents of Staten Island and resi-
dents of the greater metropolitan area-the state government could be expected
to weigh all affected citizens' interests in an essentially impartial fashion.33 In
short, the New York state government theoretically possessed both the requisite
interest in the welfare of all of the affected groups and the necessary impartial-
ity as between them to be entrusted with the decision about the territorial
boundaries of the franchise. In cases where these assumptions may be
doubted-as, for example, where a state historically has pursued racially dis-
criminatory districting plans-the federal government can step in to provide the
requisite oversight."
In contrast, there is no authoritative entity that stands in the position of the
State of New York vis-A-vis the Staten Island secession bid in situations where a
group seeks to secede from a country, as when Chechnya sought independence
from Russia. Moscow, which opposed the Chechen rebels with brutal force,
3"5
was hardly disinterested in the outcome of Chechnya's bid."
In addressing preliminary issues raised by the plebiscite principle-in par-
ticular, who will be entitled to vote and what consequences will follow in the
event of an electoral split-authoritative determinations would, of course, have
to be guided in part by considerations that stand outside democratic theory, such
as the historical relationship of claimants to particular territory.337
In sum, I have argued against the claim that democratic theories have no
bearing on questions of boundary. Considerations relating to democratic gov-
ernance may well be pertinent to the resolution of conflicting claims to sover-
eignty, even if democratic theory provides no general rules that produce a pre-
dictable outcome in all such disputes. In particular, various justifications for
democratic government may provide support for separatist claims of minorities
that are systematically and irremediably denied fundamental rights within a
state. But these considerations can only be brought to bear in a patently legiti-
mate fashion if there is an authoritative and disinterested entity capable of doing
so-a subject I explore further in Part V.
333. While this assumption may be necessary, it doubtless is somewhat naive. Since a state
government is largely the sum of its constituencies, its resolution of intrastate boundary disputes is likely to
be the product above all of the most effective lobbying by affected interest groups.
334. See supra notes 298-299 and accompanying text.
335. See HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RussIA: WAR IN CHEClNYA (1995); Lee Hockstader, Russian
Forces Drive on Rebel Chechen Capital, WASH. Posr, Dec. 14, 1994, at Al.
336. A closer analogy to the Staten Island situation would exist if the Soviet Union were still a
country when Chechnya sought to secede from the Republic of Russia; then, the national government could
perform the same function that the State of New York has undertaken in mediating questions of
reorganization within the state.
337. See Brilmayer, supra note 269, at 191-92. Professor Brilmayer places this factor at the
center of her theory of separatist claims.
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F. The Democratic Paradox
If theories of democratic government point to principles that are relevant
in assessing separatist claims, the practice of democracy has profound implica-
tions for ethno-nationalism and, in particular, its relationship to the central con-
cern of international law-maintaining peace and stability. 38 As I have argued
in Part II, intolerant ethno-nationalism is less likely to emerge in a robust
democratic culture.339 In larger perspective, a rich body of empirical evidence
now supports the core claim of Immanuel Kant's theory of democratic peace:
Liberal democratic states rarely go to war against each other. 40 If not a panacea
for the perennial threat of destabilizing force, the global sweep of liberal de-
mocracy nonetheless would seem to be the best inoculation against it.
And yet, another vein of empirical research discloses a correlation be-
tween democratization of autocratic regimes and increased levels of ethnic con-
flict.34 How can this paradox be explained? Anne-Marie Slaughter has ob-
served that scholarship on the "democratic peace" has focused on conflicts be-
tween states, not on the intrastate conflicts characteristic of ethnic strife.342 As
she notes, the systemic factors believed to account for the infrequency of wars
between liberal democracies are absent in countries rent by ethnic divisions.
Theories explaining the phenomenon of the liberal peace assume the operation
of parliamentary control over the decision to go to war and "the deep inculca-
tion of norms of peaceful change and positive-sum bargaining that flow from
long experience of alternating parties in power." 343 Ethnic conflict is compara-
tively likely to emerge in countries where such alternation is rare."
I would like to press the analysis further: Democratic processes are highly
relevant to both the incidence and intensity of ethnic conflict within a political
community, but their implications depend, above all, on their cultural depth and
institutional strength. As Ted Robert Gurr has noted, minorities in advanced in-
dustrial democracies typically face fewer barriers to the exercise of political
power and are more likely to utilize the (democratic) tactic of protest than that
of rebellion to press their claims.345 Advanced industrialized democracies
structurally are more disposed to respond to the nonviolent political demands of
organized constituencies, including those organized principally along ethno-
national lines, and also are more likely than developing democracies to have the
338. For an analysis of conditions in which nationalism increases the risk of war, see Stephen
Van Evera, Hypotheses on Nationalism and the Causes of War, in NATIONAISM AND NATIONAITIES IN
THE NEw EUROPE, supra note 14, at 136.
339. See supra notes 75-88 and accompanying text.
340. See BRUCE RussErr, GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE (1993); Michael W. Doyle, Kant,
Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs (pts. 1 & 2), 12 PHIL. & PUB. Ann. 205, 323 (1983); Anne-Marie
Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 503, 504 (1995).
341. See TED ROBERT GuRR, MINoRrrIEs AT RISK: A GLOBAL VIEW OF ETHNOPOLrTCAL
CONFLiCrs 137-38 (1993).
342. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Pushing the Limits of the Liberal Peace: Ethnic Conflict and the
"Ideal Polity", in ETFMC IDENTITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 95 (manuscript at 143, on file
with the Yale Journal of International Law).
343. Id.
344. See id.
345. See GuRR, supra note 341, at 137-38.
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resources necessary to respond effectively to the demands of groups operating
within a democratic framework. 6 Further, when democracies develop along-
side a tradition of constitutional liberalism, citizens enjoy systemic protections
against abuse of individual and minority rights.'
By contrast, the very process of political liberalization in democratizing
autocracies presents new opportunities for increased ethnic mobilization, and
rapid democratization in autocratic societies often has correlated with height-
ened levels of ethnic conflict.348 The fragility of institutional structures and the
dearth of resources for responding effectively may produce a conflictive, rather
than accommodative, outcome.
349
What, then, is left of the liberal internationalist project? Can international
policy successfully promote the deepening of a liberal democratic culture where
it has not yet taken root while avoiding the minefield of destabilizing transition?
In fact, there is substantial evidence that appropriate institutional arrangements
in multiethnic societies can go a long way toward averting conflict and pro-
moting accommodation in a framework of democratic governance, particularly
if these arrangements are adopted early in a newly independent state's political
life. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to explore such arrangements, a
rich literature on this subject provides cause to believe that wise policy initia-
tives can promote the global sweep of liberal democratic values while mini-
mizing the risks of increased ethnic mobilization.35
By equal measure, poorly conceived efforts to promote democracy can
aggravate tensions in regions where the specter of ethnic conflict looms large.
Nowhere has this been more tragically evident than in the former Yugoslavia,
where a thin democratic culture provided the context in which political leaders
cynically fostered predatory ethno-nationalism, leading to the country's violent
dismemberment. Although well-intentioned, efforts by the European Commu-
nity to craft a democratic resolution only deepened the problem.
V. THE BREAK-Up OF YUGOSLAVIA: A CASE STUDY
However inadequate, international responses to the dissolution of Yugo-
slavia were extensive, presenting the nearest contemporary approximation of an
authoritative resolution of ethno-separatist claims. Notably, a commitment to
principles of democratic government figured prominently in international efforts
to mediate the Yugoslav breakup. But efforts to apply those principles failed to
achieve the liberal and pacifying aims of their proponents. The results instead
demonstrated the potentially disastrous consequences of poorly conceived ef-
forts to promote democratic processes in a context of ethnic conflict.
346. See id. at 137.
347. See supra note 92 and accompanying text; Stephen S. Rosenfeld, Democracy: 7he Down
Side, WAsH. POsT, Dec. 5, 1997, at A27.
348. See Zakaria, supra note 90, at 38 (describing data demonstrating that democratizing states
have gone to war significantly more often than either stable autocracies or liberal democracies in last 200
years).
349. See GURR, supra note 341, at 137-38.
350. See supra note 95.
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The developments that precipitated Yugoslavia's dissolution likewise
highlight the complex, at times perilous, relationship between democracy and
nationalism. Above all, a weak democratic culture in post-Tito Yugoslavia pro-
vided the context in which opportunistic political leaders incited lethal national-
ism. For all of these reasons, the dissolution of Yugoslavia and international re-
sponses to it merit special consideration.
A. International Responses to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia
1. Prelude to War
Legal chronologies of Yugoslavia's dissolution typically begin in the fall
of 1990, when Slovenia took its first formal step toward secession." 1 But events
leading to the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)
were set in play several years earlier. Crucial impetus for the unraveling of
Yugoslavia was provided by a rising star in Serbia's political firmament, Slobo-
dan Milosevic. In the late 1980s, the communist system in Yugoslavia was in a
state of terminal decay, and Milosevic, then head of Serbia's League of Com-
munists, determined that he would need a new base of political support to se-
cure a dominant place in post-communist Yugoslavia.35
This was a classic case of an unscrupulous leader mobilizing ethnic hos-
tilities to advance his political ambitions. Although Milosevic previously had
condemned nationalism in his role as Communist party functionary, he now re-
solved that Serb nationalism would be the base from which he would propel his
career forward. Beginning in the autonomous province of Kosovo, where Serbs
had been defeated in battle by Ottoman Turks six hundred years earlier,
Milosevic began a sustained campaign of nationalist vitriol, deliberately stoking
Serb paranoia-and identifying the Serbs' cardinal enemies as other national
groups in Yugoslavia. 3
Milosevic's program was to refashion Yugoslavia into a Greater Serbia.
"If the other republics would not agree to a new Yugoslavia dominated by the
Serbs," Michael Ignatieff writes, "Milosevic was prepared to incite the Serbian
minorities in Kosovo, Croatia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina to rise up and demand
Serbian protection. These minorities served as Milosevic's Sudeten Germans-
pretext and justification of his expansionary design."3
351. See Marc Weller, The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT'LL. 569, 569 (1992).
352. See GiELTEN, supra note 84, at 52-53.
353. See id. at 53-56. Understanding this background to the Yugoslav conflict is essential to an
evaluation of international responses. Policynakers, including President Clinton, periodically characterized
the conflict as the most recent flareup of "ancient hatreds," a phrase that has become a code word for in-
tractability. In policy terms, this characterization implies that outside actors cannot affect the outcome of
such conflicts. C. Morning Edition (National Public Radio broadcast, July 17, 1995) (quoting, in report by
Tom Gjelten, President Clinton inaccurately stating that Bosnian conflict had roots in eleventh century, and
suggesting that this account was designed to ward off pressure for United States to intervene in Bosnia).
354. IGNATIEFF, supra note 91, at 26.
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Against a history of interethnic violence in Yugoslavia," it was not diffi-
cult to persuade various national groups that they would be vulnerable if left
outside their national republic in a reconfigured Yugoslavia. This was notably
true in Croatia, which, in contrast to relatively homogeneous Slovenia, had a
sizable Serb minority, comprising some 600,000 people.116 The ultranationalist
policies of Croatia's leader, Franjo Tudjman, did nothing to assuage their
anxieties, and indeed serious abuses were being committed against Croatian
Serbs.357
While Milosevic's rhetoric preyed on Croatian Serbs' insecurity, his ex-
pansionist policies reinforced Slovenian and Croatian nationalists' belief that
their future would be precarious if they remained in a Serb-dominated federal
Yugoslavia. The first formal step toward separation came on September 27,
1990, when Slovenia's parliament declared that federal legislation would no
longer have binding force in the republic."5 On December 22, the Croatian
parliament made a similar declaration.359 The following day Slovenian voters
overwhelmingly supported a referendum on independence, as did Croatians in
May 1991260 Initially, the two republics sought greater autonomy within the
SFRY, but Serbia opposed any arrangement that would dilute its power, and
negotiations among the leaders of the various republics during the spring of
1991 failed to bridge these differences. On June 25, 1991, both Slovenia and
Croatia declared their independence.'
The federal Yugoslav army, known by its acronym "JNA," attacked Slo-
venia two days later but withdrew after ten days of fighting. With a negligible
Serb population in Slovenia, the Serb-dominated federal government had com-
paratively little incentive to oppose Slovenia's secession by force of arms."
But Croatian Serbs and the JNA launched and sustained a longer attack against
Croatia.3 63
355. Despite occasional allusions by political leaders and others to the ancient roots of the current
conflict in Bosnia, see supra note 353, the first major explosion of national conflict there occurred during
World War H. See Morning Edition, supra note 353 (quoting John Fine).
356. See IGNATmFF, supra note 91, at 26-27.
357. See GLENNY, supra note 293, at 123.
358. See Weller, supra note 351, at 569.
359. See id.
360. See id. at 569-70.
361. See id. Implementation of these declarations was temporarily suspended under the terms of a
ceasefire agreement negotiated under the auspices of the European Community in Brioni on July 7, 1991.
See id. at 573.
362. See GiELTEN, supra note 84, at 55 (indicating that as early as 1987, Milosevic rejected "the
idea of a federal Yugoslavia and [began] to work toward the goal of a Greater Serbia that would
incorporate Bosnia, parts of Croatia, and all other areas where Serbs lived"); Misha Glenny, Yugoslavia:
The Great Fall, N.Y. REV., Mar. 23, 1995, at 56, 59 (reporting that in March 1991, Serbian President
Slobodan Milosevic abandoned his earlier policy of preserving unified Yugoslavia and instead resolved to
establish Serbian state); Warren Zimmerman, The Last Ambassador, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1995, at
2, 13 (asserting that Milosevic favored allowing Slovenia to secede since this would enable federal army to
"take on a Croatia no longer able to count on Slovenia's support").
363. Hostilities began during the spring of 1991, before Croatia declared its independence. In
January 1992, a ceasefire was negotiated by U.N. special envoy Cyrus Vance and monitored by U.N.
peacekeepers stationed in Croatia. There were, however, periodic breaches, and the Croatian army
launched two major successful operatio1s against rebel Serbs in 1995.
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In contrast to the leadership of Slovenia and Croatia, the government of
Bosnia-Herzegovina desperately hoped to avoid the breakup of Yugoslavia.
When Germany announced its intention to recognize Slovenia and Croatia in
December 1991, Bosnia's President, Alija Izetbegovic, traveled to Bonn to try
to dissuade German leaders from this course, fearing that the secession of
Croatia would leave Bosnia vulnerable to the territorial claims of both Serbia
and Croatia.3'6 Only when it was clear that recognition of Croatia and Slovenia
was inevitable did Izetbegovic decide to seek independence for Bosnia, believ-
ing that his country would fare better as an independent state than as part of a
rump Yugoslavia dominated by Milosevic 65
2. EC Common Recognition Policy
In the early stages of Yugoslavia's dissolution, the European Community
(EC) took the lead in seeking a peaceful resolution of the disputes between
Yugoslavia's constituent republics. On August 27, 1991, the Community de-
cided to convene a peace conference that would attempt to resolve the disputes
over territorial and political status. 36 The European Community established an
Arbitration Commission, chaired by Robert Badinter, President of the French
Conseil Constitutionnel, to resolve discrete issues through the application of le-
gal principles.367 Notably, principles of democratic government played a im-
portant part in the Commission's key rulings.
In its first opinion, issued December 7, 1991, the Commission concluded
that, as a matter of public international law, the SFRY was "in the process of
dissolution."3" A key basis for this conclusion was that the SFRY had been a
"federal-type State" comprising "communities that possess a degree of auton-
omy,"" 9 and, with four of the SFRY's republics having claimed independence,
it could no longer be said that federal authorities "meet the criteria of participa-
tion and representativeness inherent in a federal State."37 With this, the Com-
mission attached a novel juridical consequence to the SFRY's federal struc-
ture37 -ne that emphasized the country's democratic character as a condition
to its continuing existence as a state.
364. See GUENNY, supra note 293, at 163.
365. See id. at 164; see also infra text accompanying notes 382-388.
366. See Introductory Note, Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on
Questions Arising from the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, 31 I.L.M. 1488, 1488 (1992).
367. The Commission was endorsed by the governments of the United States and the Soviet
Union. See id. at 1489.
368. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Committee, Opinion No. 1, 31 I.L.M. 1494, 3, at
1497 (1992) [hereinafter Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Committee, Opinion No. 1]. This finding
placed the territory of the former Yugoslavia in the type of transitional status that, in the view of the
Commission of Jurists that assessed Aaland Islanders' self-determination claims during the interwar period,
justified a heightened international competence to address the territory's juridical status. See supra text
accompanying notes 199-201.
369. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Committee, Opinion No. 1, supra note 368, 31
I.L.M. l(d), at 1495.
370. Id. 2(b), at 1496.
371. Professor Hannum criticizes this view as potentially leading to "immediate recognition of se-
cessionist movements in federal states, while denying such recognition to equally (or more) distinct regions
attempting to secede from a unitary or centralized state." Hurst Hannum, Self-Determination, Yugoslavia
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Having found that the SFRY was in the process of dissolution, it re-
mained for the Badinter Commission to determine what new configuration
would emerge from the wreckage of the former state. Its work centered on as-
certaining whether Yugoslav republics satisfied the criteria for recognition by
EC member states elaborated in two declarations adopted in mid-December
1991. One established a common recognition policy to guide member states'
recognition of new states that might emerge from the breakup of states in East-
ern Europe and the Soviet Union. A commitment to democratic principles fig-
ured centrally in this policy, which affirmed the Community's "readiness to
recognize... those new states which, following the historic changes in the re-
gion, have constituted themselves on a democratic basis, have accepted the ap-
propriate international obligations and have committed themselves in good faith
to a peaceful process and to negotiations."372 Respect for the "rule of law, de-
mocracy and human rights" were among the prerequisites for recognition under
the common position.373
The Declaration on Yugoslavia, adopted on the same day, invited Yugo-
slav republics seeking independence to indicate by December 23, 1991, whether
they wished to be recognized and accepted the commitments set forth in the EC
common recognition policy as well as provisions set forth in a draft convention
prepared by the EC peace conference on Yugoslavia protecting "human rights
and rights of national or ethnic groups. " "
In light of the circumstances surrounding the dissolution of Yugoslavia,
assurances of minority rights protections figured prominently in the EC recog-
nition criteria. Serbian nationalists' opposition to the incorporation of Croatia's
Serb minority in an independent Croatia was central to the dispute between Ser-
bia and Croatia. Later, the involuntary incorporation of Serbs in an independent
Bosnia would become an even more explosive issue. The European Community
addressed this concern by, inter alia, including in its common recognition pol-
and Europe: Old Wine in New Bottles?, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PRoBS. 57, 65 (1993). A later
opinion might have tempered this implication; the Commission found that "the existence of a federal state,
which is made up of a number of separate entities, is seriously compromised when a majority of these ent i-
ties, embracing a greater part of the territory and popukation, constitute themselves as sovereign states
with the result that federal authority may no longer be effectively exercised." Conference for Peace in
Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 8 (July 4, 1992), 31 I.L.M. 1521, 1522 (emphasis
added).
372. Declaration on the "Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in
the Soviet Union", Dec. 16, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 1486-87 (1992) [hereinafter Guidelines on the Recognition of
New States].
373. Id. at 1487.
374. European Community: Declaration on Yugoslavia, Dec. 16, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 1485, 1486
(1992). The EC guidelines on recognition of new states and its further conditions for recognition of states
emerging from the dissolution of Yugoslavia go well beyond the basic criteria for statehood long estab-
lished in international law. See supra notes 372-373. The European Community made clear that its policy
was not an attempt to revise international legal requirements for statehood but instead merely governed the
political act of recognition of new states by EC member states. See Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration
Committee, Opinion No. 10 (July 4, 1992), 31 I.L.M. 1525, 4-5, at 1526; Conference on Yugoslavia
Arbitration Committee, Opinion No. 1, supra note 368, 31 I.L.M. l(a), at 1495. Faced with a situation
in which territorial claims and counterclaims in Yugoslavia had already led to armed conflict, the European
Community sought to utilize its member states' recognition determinations to induce peaceful resolution of
the territorial disputes.
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icy the requirement of "guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups
and minorities ....
Even before this policy was adopted, the EC peace conference put forth as
a basic principle of a proposed settlement the adoption of comprehensive ar-
rangements to protect minority rights, including special status for certain groups
and areas.376 In November 1991, the peace conference presented a draft con-
vention that included a detailed elaboration of minority rights and provided for
autonomous governmental structures in areas where members of a national mi-
nority form a local majority." Yugoslav republics wishing to be recognized as
independent states were required to indicate not only their acceptance of the
general requirements of the EC common recognition policy, but also of the
provisions of this draft convention."'
Yet, although the Badinter Commission expressed reservations about
whether Croatian law adequately provided for autonomy in Serb-dominated ar-
eas as required in the draft convention,379 the presidency of the European Politi-
cal Community declared on January 15, 1992, that the European Community
and its member states had decided to proceed with recognition of Slovenia and
Croatia.Y Three weeks earlier the German government had announced its in-
tention to recognize both Slovenia and Croatia unconditionally on January 15,
1992. Although all but one of the other members of the European Community
and the United States opposed Germany's desire for early recognition, key
European states were unwilling to confront Germany lest this imperil the
Maastricht Agreement of December 1991.38' To maintain a common position on
recognition, the European Community had to recognize Slovenia and Croatia
despite its reservations about whether Croatia met the Community's prerequi-
sites.382
Whether adequate assurances of minority protection could have satisfied
nationalist Serbs and averted the subsequent conflict in Croatia cannot be
known. What is clear is that, by disregarding its own requirements in this re-
spect, the European Community vitiated whatever influence it had in addressing
375. Guidelines on the Recognition of New States, supra note 372, at 1487.
376. The comprehensive peace plan proposed by the EC conference, chaired by Lord Carrington,
set forth elaborate provisions for minority rights protections and political autonomy. See Weller, supra note
351, at 582. When the peace conference became a joint U.N.-EC effort, chaired jointly by Cyrus Vance
and David Owen, the two co-chairmen proposed a comprehensive settlement of the Bosnian conflict that
likewise included elaborate provisions for local autonomy and assurances of minority rights. See Report of
the Secretary General on the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (Nov. 11, 1992), 31
I.L.M. 1549.
377. See Weller, supra note 351, at 583.
378. See Guidelines on the Recognition of New States, supra note 372.
379. See Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, On the Recognition of the Republic
of Croatia by the European Community and Its Member States, Opinion No. 5 (Jan. 11, 1992), 31 I.L.M.
1503, 3, at 1505.
380. See Weller, supra note 351, at 586.
381. See Djilas, supra note 91, at 98. The Maastricht Agreement, which effected greater integra-
tion of EC (now European Union) states, included provisions establishing greater coordination of foreign
policies. Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Feb. 7, 1992, art. J, 1992 O.J. C224/1, 31 I.L.M. 247
(entered into force Nov. 1, 1993).
382. See Djilas, supra note 91, at 163-64.
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Serb concerns about Croatia, and more generally undercut the credibility of its
recognition policy.
313
3. Prologue to Disaster: Bosnia
The tragedy lay in forcing Bosnia to choose an independence in which it could not sur-
vive ."'
EC recognition of Croatia outside a comprehensive resolution of the ter-
ritorial status of the former SFRY had tragic consequences for Bosnia-and this
was foreseeable. When Germany announced its decision to recognize Croatia
and Slovenia unconditionally, the Secretary General of the United Nations,
Javier Perez de Cuellar, implored Germany to reconsider. Its premature recog-
nition, the Secretary General warned, would provoke "the most terrible war" in
Bosnia-Herzegovina." 5
By all accounts, multiethnic Bosnia would be ravaged if Croatia separated
from the former Yugoslavia outside the framework of a comprehensive settle-
ment. As one writer put it, Bosnia cannot "belong to either Croatia or Serbia-
it can act as a bridge between the two but its relationship with both republics
must be equal and agreed on by both sides.'386 With no group forming a major-
ity in Bosnia, its Muslim and, Croat citizens feared for their welfare in a rump
Yugoslavia without Croatia, while many of its Serb citizens opposed Bosnian
independence, wishing instead to remain joined to Serbia.3" Committed to Bos-
nia's multiethnic heritage, its leaders unsuccessfully sought to avert the breakup
of Yugoslavia. Summarizing the Bosnian government's view at the time, Misha
Glenny has written: "The last thing that the [Bosnian] Muslims.. . were de-
manding at the time was independence.'388
But once it became clear that Croatia and Slovenia would become inde-
pendent states, Bosnia was faced with three options: It could remain attached to
383. This effect was compounded by the European Community's failure to accord immediate
recognition to Macedonia upon the Badinter Commission's finding that the republic had satisfied the EC
recognition criteria. The European Community's delay in authorizing member states to recognize
Macedonia was due to Greek objections to the republic's use of the name "Macedonia," which Greece
claimed implied territorial claims against Greek Macedonia. See Raymond Bonner, The Land That Can't
Be Named, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1995, § 4, at 6. When the European Community belatedly declared that
the Yugoslav republic had met its conditions for recognition, it made its finding subject to the new state
being recognized "under a name that can be accepted by all parties concerned." Declaration on the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, EPC Informal Meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs (Guimaraes,
May 1-2, 1992), EPC Press Release 53/92.
384. See Glenny, supra note 362, at 58.
385. GLENNY, supra note 293, at 163.
386. Id. at 144. On October 24, 1991, Bosnia's Assembly adopted a platform on future
arrangements for the Yugoslav Community in which the Republic asserted its willingness to become a
member of a new Yugoslav Community that would include both Serbia and Croatia. See Conference on
Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 4, supra note 293, 31 I.L.M. 2(i), at 1502.
387. See SusAN L. WOoDwARD, BALKAN TRAGEDY: CHAOS AND DIssOLUMTON AFrER THE COLD
WAR 172 (1995). A substantial number of other Serbs in Bosnia remained loyal to the multiethnic Bosnian
government. By one count, in August 1995, 500,000 Serbs remained in rebel Serb-held territory in Bosnia
while 200,000 lived in government-controlled areas. See Charles G. Boyd, America Prolongs the War in
Bosnia, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 9, 1995, at A17.
388. Glenny, supra note 362, at 57.
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a rump Yugoslavia dominated by the ultranationalist Milosevic; it could acqui-
esce in its own division between Serbia and Croatia, as the leaders of those two
republics had proposed between themselves; or it could apply for recognition as
an independent state through the process established by the European Commu-
nity.3" 9 On December 20, 1991, three days before the EC deadline for applying
for recognition, the Bosnian government formally requested EC recognition as
an independent state.
In response, the Badinter Commission noted the opposition of a substan-
tial proportion of Bosnian Serbs, and concluded that "the will of the peoples of
Bosnia-Hercegovina to constitute the [Republic] as a sovereign and independent
State cannot be held to have been fully established."" It suggested, however,
that its assessment "could be reviewed if appropriate guarantees were provided
by the Republic applying for recognition, possibly by means of a referendum of
all the citizens of the [Republic] without distinction, carried out under interna-
tional supervision." 3 ' In this respect, the Commission affirmed a predomi-
nantly subjective model of self-determination-a model that resonates more than
an objective model with the principles underlying international law's emerging
democratic entitlement.
The Commission's suggestion induced the Bosnian government to hold a
plebiscite in late February-early March 1992. The results were predictable and
disastrous. Although almost sixty-three percent of Bosnia's citizens voted for
independence, most of the republic's Serb citizens boycotted the poll.3" Their
leaders previously had announced that they would not accept its results, and
within weeks sporadic battles broke out in several strategically important areas
of Bosnia.3"
However tragic the consequences, Bosnia had satisfied the EC recognition
criteria, and the Community (as well as the United States) recognized Bosnia on
April 7, 1992.394 On April 6, in anticipation of EC recognition, Bosnian Serb
rebels attacked the Holiday Inn of Sarajevo, instigating the war that lasted three
and a half years.395 Backed by Serbia, 396 Bosnian Serbs seized more than sev-
389. See GLENNY, supra note 293, at 143; WOODWARD, supra note 387, at 172; Glenny, supra
note 362, at 57, 61.
390. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 4, supra note 293, at 31
I.L.M. 4, at 1504.
391. Id. Because a referendum was not required by the European Community's common
recognition policy, Marc Weller believes that this aspect of the Commission's opinion can "be understood
as reflecting an additional criterion for recognition of statehood in cases of secession, based on the principle
of self-determination and on considerations of general international law, including human rights law."
Weller, supra note 351, at 593.
392. See Weller, supra note 351, at 593. The government of Bosnia officially promulgated the
results of the referendum on March 6, 1992. The Badinter Commission deemed that to be the effective date
of Bosnia's independence. See International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Documentation on the
Arbitration Commission Under the UN/EC (Geneva) Conference, Opinion No. 11 (July 16, 1992), 32
I.L.M. 6, at 1586.
393. See GLENNY, supra note 293, at 166-67.
394. See James B. Steinberg, International Involvement in the Yugoslavia Conflict, in ENFORCNG
REsTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICrS, supra note 276, at 27, 42.
395. See GIELTEN, supra note 84, at 2. On April 7, 1992, rebel Bosnian Serbs, who had
previously declared themselves to be part of the SFRY, proclaimed independence from Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
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enty percent of Bosnia's territory. Along the way, they committed atrocities so
sweeping and barbarous that the United Nations established the first interna-
tional criminal tribunal since the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals to prosecute
those responsible for crimes, including genocide, committed in the former
Yugoslavia.3 7
4. The Dayton Peace Agreement
The conflict finally came to an end in December 1995 as a result of peace
negotiations brokered by the U.S. government in Dayton, Ohio. Although the
Dayton Peace Agreement398 proximately caused the cessation of hostilities, it
took military action and economic sanctions to bring the warring parties to the
peace table. In particular, the combined effect of air attacks on Serb targets near
Sarajevo by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a rout of Croatian
Serbs by the Croatian army in August 1995,"9 and economic sanctions against
Serbia4° brought Serb leaders to the point where they were willing to negotiate
seriously.
Although a general assessment of the Dayton Agreement is beyond the
scope of this Article, one aspect of the peace plan has special pertinence here.
Pursuant to Annex 3 of the peace accord, the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) was given the mandate to organize elections in
Bosnia."1 The OSCE was to "certify whether elections can be effective under
current social conditions . . . and, if necessary, to provide assistance . . . in
creating these conditions."" Pursuant to this authority, the OSCE held national
elections on September 14, 1996, despite the fact that independent monitors
396. The initial attacks against Bosnian authorities were launched jointly by JNA forces and
irregular Bosnian Serb forces. On May 19, 1992, the JNA publicly divided itself into the Army of the
"Serbian Republic" and the Army of Yugoslavia. The latter became the armed force of Serbia and
Montenegro, while the former remained in Bosnia. When the JNA ostensibly withdrew from Bosnia, it left
its installations and equipment to the rebel Serbs there and encouraged its Serbian soldiers to remain in
Bosnia as soldiers of the army of the "Serb Republic." See generally Prosecutor v. Tadic, I.T.-94-1-T at
37-44, 218-20 (May 7, 1997) (opinion and judgment).
397. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/S27 (1993). The Statute of
the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 establishes its subject
matter jurisdiction over war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. Report of the Secretary-
General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, Annex, arts. 2-5, at 36-38, U.N.
Doc. S/25704 (1993).
398. The peace agreement was initialed in Dayton, Ohio on November 21, 1995, and signed in
Paris on December 14, 1995, when it became effective. The agreement, which consists of a General
Framework Agreement and twelve Annexes, is reproduced at 35 1.L.M. 89 (1996) [hereinafter Dayton
Peace Agreement].
399. See Chris Hedges, Conflict in the Balkans: The Overview; 3 Enemies Agree to Serbian State
as Part ofBosnia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1995, at Al.
400. See Michael Dobbs, Balkan Leaders Approve Bosnian Pact, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 1995, at
Al.
401. Dayton Peace Agreement, supra note 398, Annex 3, art. 1I(1).
402. Id. art. 1(2).
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called for postponement, arguing that conditions were not amenable to a free
and fair election.'
The poll stands as a cautionary tale of how ill-conceived elections can ex-
acerbate divisions in an ethnically riven society like postwar Bosnia. Among
other abuses, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic-by then twice indicted by
the U.N. Tribunal in The Hague-abused the registration process to secure
Serb victories in key areas. For example, humanitarian aid programs adminis-
tered in Serb-held areas of Bosnia by Karadzic's wife were flagrantly manipu-
lated to secure results that would ratify the results of "ethnic cleansing. "4°4 Not
surprisingly, the elections did just that, bringing into office hardline nationalists
who openly oppose interethnic cooperation.4 °5
Conditions prevailing in the lead-up to these elections were so clearly in-
auspicious that the OSCE decided to postpone municipal elections, which ini-
tially had been scheduled to take place along with national elections in Septem-
ber 1996.406 Local elections, held on September 13-14, 1997, after a second
postponement, were marred by serious allegations of fraud and coercion by na-
tionalist political leaders4° and resulted in the election of nationalist politicians
in most municipalities." °8 By virtue of its role in organizing the poll, the inter-
national community legitimized the nationalist leaders whose election was all
but inevitable.
B. Assessing International Responses
Neither the European Community nor any other international actor bears
principal responsibility for the explosive nature of Yugoslavia's breakup; that
belongs to political leaders in the former Yugoslavia who cynically played the
national card to further their political ambitions. 4'n Even so, international actors
403. See William Claiborne, Dole Urges Clinton to Postpone Bosnia Elections as "Sham in the
Making", WASH. Posr, Aug. 30, 1996, at A8; Delay Bosnia's Elections, Editorial, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 29,
1996, at A24; Ian Fisher, West Plans to Correct Bosnia Vote Abuses, N.Y. TIMss, Aug. 24, 1996, at A6;
Anna Husarska, Sarajevo Diarist: Bite the Ballot, NEW REPUBuC, Sept. 9, 1996, at 54; Diane Paul, Edito-
rial, Don't Whitewash Phony Elections, WASH. PosT, Aug. 20, 1996, at A17.
404. See John Pomfret, Karadzic's Party Blocks Serb Refugees' Return Home: Exiles' Votes
Needed to Hold VitalArea, WASH. PosT, July 28, 1996, at A28.
405. See John Pomfret, Nationalist Candidates Lead in Bosnian Vote, WASH. POST, Sept. 17,
1996, at A9; Samantha Power, Pale Imitation, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 14, 1996, at 18.
406. See Chris Hedges, Bosnia Municipal Elections Face New Postponement as Serbs Balk, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 23, 1996, at Al; John Pomfret, U.S. Diplomat Delays Local Voting in Bosnia: Change Puts
Troop Pulloat Date in Doubt, WAsH. PoST, Aug. 28, 1996, at Al.
407. See Anna Husarska, Polling Alone, NEW REPuBuc, Oct. 13, 1997, at 18.
408. See Daily News: Bosnian Local Poll Results Show Emerging Opposition (Radio B92 Open
Serbia (Belgrade) radio broadcast, Oct. 4, 1997), available in
<http:l/b92eng.opennet.orglb92engOSln_970904/txt1004971e.htm> (visited Dec. 10, 1997). Bosnian
Muslims did, however, formally win political control of Srebrenica, a town in eastern Bosnia where per-
haps as many as 7000 Muslims were massacred in July 1995. See David Rohde, Muslims Win Vote in
Town That Serbs 'Cleansed', N.Y. TiEs, Oct. 10, 1997, at A7. These Muslims voted almost entirely by
absentee ballot, and observers believed that enforcing the election result "would be close to impossible,
barring a strong show of force by NATO troops." Id.
409. See Timothy Garton Ash, Eastern Europe's Paradox: Why Some Nations Prosper While
Others Decline, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1997, at C1 ("[Without the] manipulative, post-communist politics,
the ethnic divisions [in several Eastern European countries] would not have turned into open sores or, in
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made crucial blunders in their response to the challenge presented by Yugosla-
via's violent implosion, unwittingly abetting the violent dismemberment of a
state they had pushed toward independence.
1. Utilizing Electoral Processes to Ameliorate Ethnic Divisions
Among these mistakes were several instances of imprudent insistence on
democratic processes during periods of intense ethnic polarization. As noted in
the preceding Section, international actors such as the European Community
and OSCE pressed for elections as a means of resolving such highly charged
disputes as whether Bosnia would remain part of the rump Yugoslavia or seek
independence, and insisted on holding elections when they were more likely to
exacerbate than ameliorate ethnic insecurities.4 t0
This is not to say that the European Community, OSCE, and others were
wrong to promote democratic principles and processes in responding to the
challenge presented by the SFRY's dissolution. Rather, the fault lies in these
actors' ill-conceived insistence on utilizing democratic polls as a principal vehi-
cle for resolving ethnically charged disputes under conditions in which elections
were likely to inflame tensions and legitimize hardline nationalists. it In such
conditions, it may be more constructive to emphasize programs that promote
the flourishing of civil society, the sinews of a vibrant democracy.412
2. Reliable Engagement by the International Community
Deficiencies in the international community's efforts to mediate the con-
flicting claims that led to Yugoslavia's implosion highlight the lack of institu-
tional mechanisms with established and acknowledged authority to resolve such
claims. Over the course of the Yugoslav crisis, principal responsibility for at-
tempting to reach a mediated solution shifted from the European Community to
the case of Yugoslavia, to rivers of blood."); Djilas, supra note 91, at 85 (noting that although roots of
Yugoslav crisis were not invented by nationalist intellectuals or political elites, "the Yugoslav civil war
would not have happened if elites-and especially Serbia's president Slobodan Milosevic and Croatia's
president Franjo Tudjman-had not irresponsibly and deliberately manipulated nationalist sentiments with
their propaganda and policies").
410. By the time these organizations pressed for elections, the risk that polls would heighten eth-
nic polarization should have been evident. National parties captured 80 percent of the vote in Bosnian par-
liamentary elections in November 1990. See GJELTEN, supra note 84, at 65-66. In post-Tito Yugoslavia,
this type of poll may have "merely institutionalized ethnic grudges." Robert Kaplan, Inside the Balkan
Nightmare, WASH. PosT, Mar. 5, 1995, Book World, at X05 (reviewing TOM GiELTEN, SAR.JEVO
DAILY: A CITY AND ITS NEWSPAPER UNDER SIEGE (1995)).
411. One commentator captured the basic flaw in this approach: "The Dayton peace plan is all
about imposing government structures and then legitimizing them through elections. But this simply rein-
forces the power of the nationalist parties and nationalists ... who led Bosnia into war." All Things Con-
sidered: Cvil Society (National Public Radio broadcast, Sept. 12, 1997) (commentary by lain Guest).
412. See id. Effectively promoting civil society may require not only measures of direct support
to independent institutions, but also support for the rule of law; civil society is unlikely to flourish in an
environment where there are inadequate legal assurances of genuine autonomy. C. supra note 92 and ac-
companying text (suggesting that tradition of constitutional liberalism is crucial in averting conflict in mul-
tiethnic democracies).
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a joint U.N.-EC Conference to a five-state Contact Group and finally to the
United States.
413
Among other costs, this ad hoe improvising meant that mediators were
perpetually behind the curve in their efforts to address the Yugoslav crisis. 4 14 If,
as some believed, the breakup of Yugoslavia was likely to be violent,41 efforts
to avert this outcome should have begun before the logic of separation became
inexorable. Yet the European Community did not become seriously engaged
until tensions had escalated to the point of armed conflict. It adopted its com-
mon recognition policy six months after armed conflict had erupted in Slovenia
and seven months after one of the worst massacres in Croatia took place.4"6 If
the European Community hoped to use its recognition policy to advance a
peaceful resolution of the disputes among Yugoslav republics, it waited too
long.
Of course the European Community's failure to intervene earlier is a pol-
icy failure only if timely intervention can affect the outcome of intrastate dis-
putes over territorial status. Is there any support for this proposition? While the
answer must depend on the circumstances of each case, there can be no doubt
that timely intervention can at times make a contribution to the peaceful resolu-
tion of contested separatist claims. For example, the OSCE has played a con-
structive part in mediating disputes between Ukraine and its separatist semiau-
tonomous Crimean peninsula,417 and, despite periodic setbacks in its mediation
efforts, was at times the most constructive outside actor with respect to Russia's
recent confrontation with separatist Chechens.4 8
413. See Paul C. Szasz, The Protection of Human Rights Through the Dayton/Paris Peace
Agreement on Bosnia, 90 AM. J. INT'LL. 301, 301-03 (1996).
414. The chronically belated responses of the international community were doubtless attribut-
able, at least in part, to the low priority of the Yugoslav crisis on the foreign policy agenda of key states.
David Gompert, who worked on Yugoslavia as an official in the Bush Administration, has written that
American interest in the integrity of Yugoslavia per se ended with the collapse of the Soviet
threat to Europe. Indeed, the strategic importance of Yugoslavia was waning at the very
moment the federation was coming unglued. If the end of Tito's communism made
Yugoslavia's breakup certain, the end of the Soviet communism made such a development
seem less threatening to international peace and U.S. vital interests.
David C. Gompert, The United States and Yugoslavia's Wars, in THE WoRLD AND YUGOSLAVIA'S WARS
122, 125 (Richard H. Ullman ed., 1996).
415. A United States National Intelligence Estimate that was leaked in the fall of 1990 predicted
the near-term dissolution of the SFRY. Proponents of this scenario forecast ethnic violence that could lead
to civil war. See David Binder, Evolution in Europe; Yugoslavia Seen Breaking Up Soon, N.Y. TIMS,
Nov. 28, 1990, at A7.
416. See NoEL MALCOLM, BosNIA: A SHORT HISTORY 229-30 (1994) (describing fall of Vuko-
var, Croatia, in May 1991).
417. See Orest Deychakiwsky, OSCE Roundtable Reduces Tension in Crimea, DIGEST (Commis-
sion on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington, D.C.), June 1995, at 1.
418. See, e.g., Lee Hockstader, Russia, Breakaway Chechnya Sign Accord to End Fighting,
WASH. POST, July 31, 1995, at A14; Michael Specter, Chechen Pact with Russia Is Reached, N.Y. TIMES,
July 22, 1995, at 3; Alessandra Stanley, Chechen Voters' Key Concerns: Order and Stability, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 24, 1997, at A3 (noting OSCE's role in organizing and monitoring first elections in Chechnya
following conclusion of peace agreement between Russian and Chechen leaders in August 1996).
Mechanisms designed to respond to nationalist and other conflicts of the CSCE, the precursor to the
OSCE, were just being created when the Yugoslav crisis flared. While the CSCE made some constructive
contributions, it simply was not yet prepared to address a crisis of the magnitude of that presented in
Yugoslavia. See Weller, supra note 351, at 571, 573.
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Knowledgeable observers believe that as late as December 1990 it might
have been possible to devise a new constitutional order that would have ad-
dressed the respective concerns of Slovene, Croat, and Serb nationalists while
avoiding the bloody breakup of Yugoslavia.419 In fact the presidents of the six
constituent republics of the SFRY attempted to do just that during a series of
meetings in the spring and summer of 1991.420 But to meet the enormous chal-
lenges presented at that time, statesmanship and good faith were in order, and
neither Milosevic nor Tudjman was up to the job.42 A credible, impartial me-
diator was needed if negotiations were to forestall Yugoslavia's violent dis-
memberment.
But if earlier engagement by outside mediators might have averted Yugo-
slavia's breakup, the European Community and other critical actors also erred
by insisting on preserving Yugoslav unity long after the inevitability of its
breakup should have been apparent, again minimizing their ability to promote a
peaceful process of territorial change. Some eight months after Slovenia made
its first formal move toward secession, the states whose recognition policies
would matter most to the contesting parties-the United States and EC member
states-were voicing strong support for Yugoslav unity, as was the CSCE.
In April 1991, the European Community asserted its commitment to the
"unity and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia";422 in June, the CSCE adopted a
similar declaration, which U.S. Secretary of State James Baker endorsed during
a visit to Belgrade two days later.4"a The breakup of Yugoslavia, Baker warned,
"could have some very tragic consequences."424 Nor, he added, would the
United States recognize the independence of Slovenia and Croatia "under any
circumstances. ,425
To many observers, the message thus transmitted was that the U.S. gov-
ernment would blame the breakaway republics, not Serbia, if the former per-
sisted in seeking independence and were opposed by force. 426 At a time when
Milosevic was calculating the potential costs of aggressive force, that message
was precisely the wrong one.427 In larger perspective, the position voiced by the
419. See, e.g., Glenny, supra note 362, at 56.
420. See id.
421. C. id. (noting that Milosevic encouraged Croatian Serbs to arm and that Tudjman
disregarded Serb sensitivity).
422. MALCOLM, supra note 416, at 225.
423. See Weller, supra note 351, at 570.
424. The Talk ofthe Town, NEW YORKER, Aug. 12, 1991, at 21 (quoting Baker).
425. Id.
426. See, e.g., MALCOLM, supra note 416, at 225 (suggesting that message from Baker and
European Community emboldened Milosevic to attempt to crush Slovenian and Croatian secessionists with
military force). Warren Zimmerman, the U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia at the time of Baker's visit,
disputes this view, noting that Baker also voiced U.S. opposition to the use of force. Ambassador
Zimmerman concedes, however, that no red light to Milosevic's use of force was interposed by Baker. See
Zimmerman, supra note 362, at 11-12.
427. When Croatia and Slovenia declared independence shortly after Baker's visit, the State De-
partment reaffirmed the position Baker had asserted in Belgrade:
We regret that the Croatian and Slovenian republics made unilateral assertions of
independence from Yugoslavia. These unilateral acts by Croatia and Slovenia will not alter
the way the United States deals with the two republics as constituent parts of Yugoslavia.
As Secretary Baker made clear in Belgrade, we will neither encourage nor reward
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CSCE and Secretary Baker had the effect of disabling the CSCE and the United
States, respectively, from helping to assure a peaceful evolution of the political
status of the territories of the former Yugoslavia. If secession was, in their
view, nonnegotiable, they could hardly play a constructive part in mediating the
contested claims.
Finally, for international institutions to be effective in inducing parties to
territorial disputes to submit to, and accept the results of, third-party mediation
or arbitration procedures, it is incumbent on members of the sponsoring institu-
tion to observe its ground rules. When Germany broke ranks with its EC part-
ners by announcing its unilateral intention to recognize Slovenia and Croatia, it
fairly doomed the EC mediation process to irrelevance.4 '
C. Authoritative Resolution
As noted above, recent initiatives by the OSCE have played a constructive
part in addressing post-Yugoslavia separatist rebellions in Europe, and provide
a paradigm for more effective international engagement in addressing destabi-
lizing assertions of ethno-nationalism. But while the success of various OSCE
mediators429 suggests the potentially constructive contribution of emerging
mechanisms in resolving separatist claims peacefully, the more sobering record
of early mediation efforts in respect of the former Yugoslavia highlights an im-
portant gap in international institutional competence.
In contrast to the period following World War I, no international institu-
tion exists that can authoritatively resolve separatist claims.430 The succession of
ad hoc efforts to mediate the Yugoslav crisis highlights the uncertain compe-
tence of existing institutions-and the uncertainty that any would respond in a
timely and effective fashion. Further, while various international organizations
have arbitration institutions that can impose binding judgments, these mecha-
nisms generally cannot be invoked by non-state entities wishing to resolve a ter-
ritorial claim.431
secession. The United States continues to recognize and support the territorial integrity of
Yugoslavia, including Slovenia and Croatia.
John Fox, The Case of Yugoslavia 12 (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Journal of In-
ternational Law) (quoting statement by State Department spokesperson Margaret Tutwiler detailing content
of private message delivered to Milosevic). "To some observers," a former State Department officer
wrote, "it was as if King Canute, having commanded the tide not to advance, expressed his disapproval
that it had gone ahead and done so." Id.
428. See supra text accompanying notes 380-381.
429. See supra text accompanying notes 417-418. Other examples of effective diplomacy under
CSCEIOSCE auspices include the mediation efforts of the organization's High Commissioner on National
Minorities on behalf of Russian nationals in Latvia and Estonia. See COMMISSION ON SEcuRrrY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATZATION IN EsToNIA 7-9 (1993); COMMISSION
ON SECuRrrY AND COOPERATION N EuROPE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN LATVIA 20-21
(1993); Documents of the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, 4 HELSINIU MoNITOR 43-48
(1993); Orentlicher, supra note 115, at 310-11.
430. See supra notes 192-205 and accompanying text (discussing League of Nations responses to
Aaland Islands dispute).
431. The Human Rights Committee established to monitor States Parties' compliance with the
ICCPR, supra note 244, can receive communications from individuals alleging violations of the Covenant
by a State Party that has ratified an Optional Protocol, but does not have competence to receive
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This gap could be filled by establishing binding arbitration procedures,
attached to both regional organizations and the United Nations, that have
authority to resolve territorial disputes and can be invoked both by states and
non-state entities.432 At the United Nations, an arbitration body with such com-
petence could be established as a subsidiary organ of either the Security Council
or the General Assembly,433 both of which play a role in admitting new mem-
bers to the Organization.4"
While such bodies would fill a major institutional lacuna, they could not
resolve every disputed secessionist claim, at least in the absence of additional
measures aimed at inducing recalcitrant parties to accede to arbitration and ac-
cept the results. As the Yugoslav experience teaches, parties willing to use un-
bridled force to secure territorial aspirations are unlikely to submit to interna-
tional mediation processes unless meaningful sanctions-perhaps even military
force-provide the requisite incentive.435
D. Membership in International Organizations
Apart from institutionalized arbitration procedures of the sort outlined
above, international and regional organizations can more effectively utilize their
existing procedures for admitting new members to promote a peaceful resolu-
tion of conflicting territorial claims. 436 In fact, the European organizations with
communications alleging violation of the Covenant's assurance of the right of self-determination. See
General Comment Adopted by the Hunan Rights Committee Under Article 40, Paragraph 4, of the
International Covenant on Cvil and Political Rights, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 50th Sess., 1314th mtg.,
para. 3.1, U.N. Doc. CCPRICI211Rev.lAdd.5 (1994). For a summary of dispute resolution procedures
developed by the CSCE, see Miriam Sapiro, Dispute Resolution: General Methods and CSCE
Mechanisms, ASIL NEwstLrR (Am. Soc'y Int'l L., Washington, D.C.), Sept.-Oct. 1994, ASIL Insight,
at 1 [hereinafter CSCE Mechanisms].
432. A contemporary example of recourse to arbitration to resolve disputed territorial claims is
the establishment of the Arbitral Tribunal for Dispute Over Inter-Entity Boundary in Brcko Area, which
was established pursuant to the Dayton Peace Agreement to resolve the status of Brcko, a region in Bosnia
whose status was not finally resolved in the Dayton negotiations themselves. See Dayton Peace Agreement,
supra note 398, Annex 2, art. V.
433. The U.N. Charter authorizes both the General Assembly and the Security Council to
establish subsidiary organs. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 7(2), 22, 29.
434. Pursuant to article 4(2) of the U.N. Charter, new members are admitted by a decision of the
General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. When an application is submitted to
the Security Council, its Committee on the Admission of New Members makes a recommendation to the
Council. See Michael P. Scharf, Musical Chalrs: The Dissolution of States and Membership in the United
Nations, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 29, 32 n.16 (1995).
435. The European Community appreciated that its common recognition policy alone did not pro-
vide sufficient incentive for recalcitrant political leaders in the former Yugoslavia to resolve their territorial
disputes peacefully. Early on, it also banned arms exports to Yugoslavia and suspended one billion dollars
in economic aid while continuing to promote peace negotiations. See Weller, supra note 351, at 573.
436. As noted earlier, during the early period of the Yugoslav crisis the European Community
focused on recognition rather than membership as an inducement for peaceful resolution of contested
separatist claims. See supra notes 372-373 and accompanying text. Membership in the Community-now
Union-is highly selective, and new entrants must satisfy both economic and political criteria for
admission. Typically this process takes years, and at the time the Yugoslav crisis began to unfold, other
well-established Western democracies were still in line for admission. Finland, Austria, and Sweden did
not finally join the European Union until January 1995. See Thomas Pedersen, The Common Foreign and
Security Policy and the Challenge of Enlargement, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrrY IN WORLD PoLITcs 32
(Ole Norgaard et al. eds., 1993). In this setting, it would have made little sense for the European
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respect to which membership is most coveted require, as a condition of mem-
bership, a demonstrated commitment to democracy and human rights.437 The
historical record makes clear that these criteria can help advance human rights
within established states, however slow the progress.438 By establishing that a
condition of membership is commitment to pluralism and civic equality, such
institutions can help dispel any hope on the part of political leaders that they
will profit by resorting to national mobilization. At the same time, however, the
tragic implications of the Badinter Commission's suggestion that Bosnia hold a
plebiscite as a precondition to recognition by EC member states underscores the
need for caution in pressing applicants to pursue shortcuts to democracy during
periods of volatile transition.
In the interim period before a state gains entry into such organizations,
economic benefits and forms of association short of full membership439 should,
within principled limits, be used as an inducement toward peaceful resolution of
ethnic conflicts. While some practices may so offend core values that economic
and other sanctions may be warranted-"ethnic cleansing" surely falls in this
category-using human rights criteria as a condition of economic aid may ironi-
cally exacerbate the problems that such conditionality is meant to address. In
particular, withholding financial aid may foster the very conditions of disaffec-
tion in which political elites are most tempted to resort to ethnic mobilization. 440
Community to rely upon its admission process to advance an acceptable resolution of the Yugoslav crisis.
Some regional organizations have, however, sought to use membership-related sanctions to promote human
rights improvements in the territories of the former Yugoslavia. For example the OSCE has suspended
Yugoslavia's participation in the organization's decisionmaing on human rights grounds. See CoMMissioN
ON SECURIY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, THE OSCE AFTER THE LISBON SUMMIT 35 (1997); Miriam
Sapiro, The OSCE: An Essential Component of European Security, ASIL NEwSLETTER (Am. Soc'y Int'l
L., Washington, D.C.), Mar. 1997, ASIL Insight, at 2.
437. Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome provides that "any European State" can apply to become
a member of the European Community. In practice, the Community has used the test of "representative
democracy" to determine membership. See At the European Council in Copenhagen, BULL. EUR.
COMMUNnEs, No. 3, 1978, at 5-6. The Council of Europe is open only to European states that "accept
the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within [their] jurisdiction of human
rights and fundamental freedoms," STATUTE OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, art. 3, and it suspended Greece
when it ceased to be democratic in 1969. See Jenonne Walker, International Mediation of Ethnic Conflicts,
in ETHNIC CONFUCr AND INTERNATIONAL SEcURtY 167, 170 (Michael E. Brown ed., 1993). Recently,
however, the Council has failed to apply its human rights standards vigorously when admitting new mem-
bers, prompting its Deputy Secretary General, Peter Leuprecht, to take early retirement in protest. The
admission of Croatia in 1996 was, in Leuprecht's view, especially inappropriate. See Joel Blocker, The
East: Turmoil Over 'Soft' Standards at Council of Europe, (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty broadcast,
July 2, 1997) available at <http:/lwww.rfer.orgnealfeaturesl1997/07/F.RU.970702152552.htnl> (vis-
ited Dec. 10, 1997).
438. The prospect of membership in the European Community, for example, served as a positive
inducement to political liberalization in Greece, Portugal, and Spain. See Laurence Whitehead, Interna-
tional Aspects of Democratization, in TRANsrroNS FROM AUTHORrrARIAN RULE: COMPARATIVE
PERSPECIvES 3, 22-23 (Guillermo O'Donnell et al. eds., 1986). Further, anecdotal evidence suggests that
some Central and Eastern European states have undertaken human rights reforms to qualify for member-
ship in the Council of Europe. See Walker, supra note 437, at 170.
439. On the various forms of relationship with the European Union short of full membership, see
Pedersen, supra note 436, at 38-41; and Baltic Nations Sign Pacts on Closer 71es to Europe, N.Y. TuMEs,
June 12, 1995, at A12, which describes the conclusion of association pacts between Estonia, Lithuania, and
Latvia and the European Union. On the role of such ties short of membership in advancing democratic
consolidation, see Twenty-Six at Europe's Table, Editorial, WASH. POST, July 5, 1995, at A22.
440. See supra text accompanying note 84; see also Kupchan, supra note 89, at 186.
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To the extent that international organizations may be disposed to judge
qualifications for membership in part by an applicant's demonstrated commit-
ment to democratic principles, they must be prepared to assume the demanding
challenge of applying this criterion responsibly. For while a liberal democratic
culture may be the surest long-term guarantor of interethnic harmony, demo-
cratic processes are all too readily susceptible to ethnic mobilization, with po-
tentially tragic results. The harsh lessons of Yugoslavia admonish us to support
the emerging right to democratic government not only with active engagement,
but also with prudent care.
VI. CONCLUSION
Across the centuries, international law's response to state-seeking nation-
alism has evinced considerable ambivalence, ranging from formal indifference
to guarded approval and, briefly during the interwar period, enthusiastic abet-
ment. Still, the law's otherwise disparate responses to claims of self-
determination since the interwar period share a common regard for the popular
will of people. What has changed in recent years is the unprecedented impor-
tance of popular sovereignty in the normative discourse of law and the political
practice of states.
To all appearances, the democratic entitlement seemed the natural end-
point of international law's broad arc of progress toward cosmopolitan univer-
salism in the twentieth century. While the revival of ethnic particularism has
seemed to belie this trend, democracy has, ironically, helped foster the very
conditions in which lethal nationalism can flourish. For irresponsible politi-
cians, appeals to ethno-nationalism have been all too tempting-and in illiberal
democracies, they have been malignantly infectious.
This democratic paradox presents a singular challenge to global society in
the closing years of the twentieth century. I have argued for robust international
engagement in responding to that challenge. Crucial to my argument is the
premise that ethnic conflicts-including those associated with separatist
claims-are above all the product of deliberate elite manipulation of difference.
While historical grievances often provide a taproot for contemporary assertions
of ethno-nationalism, it is wrong to assume that recent explosive manifestations
are the inevitable boiling over of long-simmering tensions-and therefore are,
in a word, intractable. This explanation too often serves to condone interna-
tional society's acquiescence in the depredations of nationalist movements-and
to justify its self-inflicted helplessness in confronting them.
But if enlightened international policy can play a constructive part in pro-
moting a just and peaceful resolution of disputed separatist claims, it is clear
that timely engagement is essential. The same global commitment to the core
value of human dignity-a commitment that helped bring down the Iron Cur-
tain-must now be renewed to assure that walls of difference do not once again
rise up to divide the community of nations.
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